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This dissertation focuses on the role of non-state actors in international lawmaking and 
institutions.  People increasingly participate in international governance through a range 
of organizations and institutions yet their access remains contested and tentative; often 
described as an accommodation but not a right.  Citizens may be sovereign at home, but 
they lack standing at international law.  I examined multiple cases where participation has 
become part of the machinery of international lawmaking – from regional agreements in 
Europe and the Americas to global accords addressing climate change.  Each case shows 
the assertion of popular will within a governance framework constructed and managed by 
states.  My findings thus reveal a paradigm of state architects and executors that 
accommodates non-state actors as collaborators and animators.  This paradigm challenges 
the idea that state sovereignty is absolute and impervious without rejecting state 
dominion outright.  Within a broader scholarly discourse that often presents a binary 
choice – either states are sovereign (leaving people with no real place in international 
lawmaking) or people are sovereign (leaving the international system assailable for its 
conspicuous democracy deficit) – my findings suggest a hybrid approach that reinforces 
the authority of states while making meaningful space for non-state actors.  International 
governance thus gains some of the value of democratic, participatory models in a way 
that enhances rather than disrupts the existing international legal system. 
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chapter.  Some introductory material laying theoretical foundations in each 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation research has focused on the role of non-state actors in 
international lawmaking and international institutions.
1
  They increasingly 
participate directly in international governance, yet this access remains contested 
and tentative; it is seen as an accommodation but not a right.  Non-state actors 
may be sovereign at home, but they lack standing on the international stage.  This 
raises both theoretical and practical questions.   
As a theoretical matter, the increasing participation of non-state actors 
challenges traditional ideas of state sovereignty in international law which have 
been more concerned with defining territorial authority and ordering horizontal, 
inter-state, relations than responding to the nuances of vertical relationships and 
domestic polities.  Non-state actors present both horizontal and vertical challenges 
to dominant conceptions of relations among sovereign states.  Participatory 
processes align with Locke’s prescription that “all peaceful beginnings of 
government have been laid in the consent of the people,”2 but popular consent has 
little to do with historical ideas of sovereignty in international law.  Some even 
argue that greater participation is anti-democratic because it challenges the 
authority asserted in external relations by state leaders (at least those who are 
                                                 
1
 Throughout my work, I use the term ‘non-state actor’ in its broadest sense to include 
individual actors, organizations, communities, groups, and associations that do not 
directly represent the state, but instead project public views into international discourses.  
A more complete definition is offered in my individual pieces. 
2







  These skeptics contend that states are the only 
meaningful unit for projecting national will and shaping transboundary laws and 
institutions; thus, states should be the exclusive actors in making and 
implementing international law.  My work rejects this contention and advances an 
argument that ideals of popular consent are important in international lawmaking 
and that the participation of non-state actors can advance those ideals.
4
   
As a practical matter, the increasing role of non-state actors challenges 
institutional frameworks that seek to reach consensus, assure legitimacy, and 
promote compliance.  Consensus among states that must exercise their mutual 
will to make new law is a complicated goal made more so with the introduction of 
seemingly limitless, diverse voices of various ambitions, expertise, tactics, and 
influence.  The difficulty of achieving consensus or majoritarian resolution on any 
issue among a global population surpassing six billion individuals would exceed 
the capacity of even the most innovative constitutional framer – so any hope of 
universal suffrage or direct representation would seem utopic.  Yet my research 
suggests that some models of non-state access show promise by increasing the 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 205, 215-218 (2000) (allowing civil society's “intrastate advocates to reargue 
their positions” in international forums “raises profoundly troubling questions of 
democratic theory that its advocates have almost entirely elided.”), Kenneth Anderson & 
David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Sceptical View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 26, 37 
(Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005) (the authors “argue that the ‘democracy deficit’ of the 
international system is buttressed rather than challenged by the global civil society 
movement”). 
4





scope of participation and thus advancing principals of republicanism and 
deliberative democracy.  Some states, and some scholars, question a process that 
engages “outsiders” in the first place on the theory that states are the only 
legitimate transboundary actors.  On this point my work shows that the presence 
of these actors can strengthen legitimacy
5
 through mechanisms that further the 
domestic internalization of international norms.
6
  As for compliance, the 
likelihood that states and their citizens will keep promises and obey international 
rules is promoted where monitoring is expanded and opportunities for redress are 
increased.  Domestic implementation is more likely to be embraced by 
constituencies that help to shape international outcomes and can thus play a more 
direct and enthusiastic role in integrating those outcomes within domestic 
institutions.
7
   
                                                 
5
 See e.g., Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) 
(arguing that nations are more likely to obey laws with a high degree of perceived 
legitimacy, and that legitimacy is reinforced by elements of “determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence, and adherence”) 
6
 See e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-86 (1996) (discussing transnational legal process as 
the “theory and practice of how public and private actors … interact in a variety of public 
and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, 
internalize rules of transnational law”).   
7
 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (advancing a 
“managerial” model of treaty compliance that relies on a continuing dialogue between the 





In the end, the main challenge to the increasing role of non-state actors 
might be the interstate system itself.  A system that emerged from decades of war, 
has been reinforced through more than 350 years of violent conflict and 
compromise, and is projected by a vast institutional framework that seeks to 
assure peace, deliver essential services, fund development, and facilitate dialogue 
on issues of multilateral and global concern is not easily displaced.  Yet I have 
found, as have others, that international institutions are not impermeable. 
My dissertation research has involved the close analysis of emerging 
models of non-state participation in the state-sovereign system.  I studied the 
influence of non-state actors on a European Convention promoting more 
democratic environmental decision-making;
8
 the role of non-state actors in 
shaping agendas and outcomes of head of state / head of government summits;
9
 
and the multiple avenues that non-state actors have found to shape and deploy 
international institutions in response to global climate change.
10
  Each of these 
projects resulted in a publication describing alternative approaches to non-state 
access and analyzing these approaches in light of the literature on public 
participation in international law. 
My findings further the work of scholars, including Philip Alston, Steve 
Charnovitz, Peter Haas, David Hunter, Michele Prieur, and Anne-Marie 
                                                 
8
 See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
9
 See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
10





Slaughter, who have documented and evaluated non-state actor participation in 
multilateral contexts.  Their conclusions, and my own findings, are relatively 
straightforward: non-state actors are actively – and increasingly – shaping 
international legal institutions and outcomes.  But the broader context of this 
phenomenon defies a straightforward conclusion about its impact on international 
law and institutions.  Non-state participation in international lawmaking remains 
contested and non-state actors are only granted standing to participate in limited 
circumstances.  Any claims of a right to participate or forecasts of a shift in 
sovereign authority would be premature. 
I view this phenomenon – an increasingly engaged global polity that has 
no sovereign standing – as a paradox.  The idea of popular sovereignty that 
catalyzed political philosophy and constitutional reform from the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries to the present is essentially absent from (even antithetical 
to) frameworks for international law that emerged from roughly the same era.  
Resistance to public participation by states engaged in international decision-
making seems even more paradoxical in recent decades as democratic models 
have been increasingly projected and embraced by many of the same states.  The 
idea of popular sovereignty as a basis for legitimate authority has become a core 
principle in the discourse on domestic governance while barely penetrating the 
discourse on international governance.  
The origin of this paradox is elusive.  One can speculate that national and 





seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the divergence drew little attention.  
While a constitution could be structured to advance democratic institutions at a 
national level, projecting such institutions across much greater distances, 
geographically and culturally, was far less realistic; perhaps unimaginable.  It is 
also possible that the practical limits of collective violence reinforced the pursuit 
of alternative national and international models.  A modest number of citizens 
could win a capital by storming a bastille, but only more aggregated power could 
project sufficient force to claim and retain sovereignty at great geographic 




Whatever the reasons, two very divergent views of sovereignty – its locus 
and means of expression – emerged as sovereign theories separately informed 
national constitutions and international relations.  But there is reason to believe 
that those models may be converging.  An international polity – something hard to 
imagine even as recently as the United States founding period – began emerging 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to contest the legality of international 
slave trading and to promote new rules for the conduct of war and new norms for 
                                                 
11
 This nomenclature is European, but the principle would seem to apply equally to 





the rights of workers,
12
 and it has since become increasingly active in 
international institutions and international lawmaking. 
My project has been to examine the increasing role of non-state actors in 
what might be characterized as a growing international civil society.  My work is 
situated within the context of the transboundary network arguments and theories 
presented by Anne Marie Slaughter, Margaret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Haas, 
Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, among others.  I believe that I am adding to 
that body of work with detailed case studies (similar to Haas’ work on “epistemic 
communities”13 and building on Slaughter's examples of NGO participation14) 
showing that non-state actors – through networks and inter-state institutions – 
promote rule convergence, strengthen compliance, and facilitate information 
exchange.  I have documented non-state participation that achieves a degree 
(although modest) of positive recognition (which might be a step in the direction 
of the legal personality question, but has meaning beyond that context). 
Where I believe my work challenges, and would thus revise or 
supplement, existing transboundary network theory is in the location of 
sovereignty.  Slaughter starts from the almost universally-accepted premise that 
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183 (1997).  See also infra note 22 and accompanying 
text. 
13
 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 27 (1992). 
14





sovereignty is located in the state and then examines its disaggregation – 
discussing mechanisms and norms to guide power sharing within the existing 
international system.  I argue, in contrast, that sovereignty should initially be 
located in the public rather than the state.  Instead of proceeding to the (not 
illogical) conclusion that this favors a move toward a global parliament
15
 or some 
other transnational government form, I am comfortable working within the 
existing - and evolving - state system.   
I examine and, from a normative perspective, promote democratic changes 
in governance rather than government.  I argue that organic power (sovereignty) 
isn't being “shared” among international institutions (which is, I think, how 
Slaughter sees it) but rather loaned, or placed in “trust,” by the demos.  I realize 
this is a construct rather than pragmatic description, but I think the construct is 
sufficient to achieve my normative goals.  This leads me to some of the same 
conclusions Slaughter reaches regarding mechanisms and norms, but with 
important differences that embrace features we associate more with domestic 
democracies than international institutions.   
My starting point for sovereignty – in the demos, not the state – also has 
potential implications for dealing with non-state actors behaving outside 
responsible polities we associate with civil society.  Could one argue that 
transboundary actors who project violence and reject civil institutions and 
                                                 
15
 See e.g., Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss,” Toward Global Parliament,” FOREIGN 





international political processes have not earned political recognition or legal 
protection from the institutions they reject?
16
  What about state leaders who assert 
territorial sovereignty without engaging and representing the population that 
dwells within that territory?  If sovereignty resides in the people, then what duty 
does the international system owe to states that claim sovereignty apart from their 
people, or states that expressly dictate to their people?   These questions are 
beyond the scope of my work, but they might be seen to emerge as a consequence 
of rethinking the locus of sovereignty in international law. 
Within this broader contest, my work leads me to conclude only that non-
state actors can and should assume a greater oversight role (through mechanisms 
that balance, perhaps even check, state power) along with information-sharing and 
norm-integrating functions (both external and internal to the state).  This is what 
some of the mechanisms I've described are beginning to achieve (albeit crudely 
and preliminarily) and my prescription might be characterized as more of the 
same – but more explicitly embraced within the international system and more 
grounded in the idea of popular sovereignty.  Perhaps popular sovereignty can be 
seen as something of a grundnorm to complement the norms Slaughter offers.  I'll 
have to think about that.  I also want to go back and look at your work on the 
"Liberal Peace and the Challenge of Globalization" where, as I recall, you 
                                                 
16
 Although members and alleged members of these organizations continue to benefit 
from international human rights norms, the organizations themselves would seem to be 





suggested that civil society should have a role in developing norms (if not direct 
governance). 
Origins of Sovereignty 
The origin of the assertion of sovereignty in human relations is lost in 
time, but it is not difficult to imagine.  Numerous species instinctively assert 
territorial authority, enforced by individuals, pairs, family units, packs, herds.  
The human tendency to assert exclusive dominion and control over territory 
likewise appears instinctive – it has been with us for a long time.  At its essence, 
this is sovereignty.  The simple claims “this is mine,” “I was here first,” “stay off 
my land,” or “I am in charge here” amount to assertions of sovereignty. 
The origin of the idea of sovereignty is likewise lost in time.  Scholars 
point to its emergence in the western intellectual tradition through models such as 
the Greek Republic or documents such as the Magna Carta and the Osnabrück and 
Münster treaties, but these are only artifacts that speak to the emergence of the 
idea in a particular place and time.  They offer no clues to the origin or other 
iterations of the idea.  One can imagine that it coincided with competition for 
resources among groups that could not directly or consistently reinforce their 
territorial prerogative with violence.  Asserting dominion over distant or multiple 
landscapes that cannot be monitored to discourage trespass requires the ability to 
project insights about the potential for violence, and not just violence itself.   
The idea of sovereignty is dominion in the abstract.  Enforcement threats 





spiritual sovereignty, for example, was an important subtext to the 1648 treaties 
that heralded the Westphalian Peace and ascendance of civil sovereignty in 
Europe.  Yet even as these instruments left some European princes with greater 
legal control over populations within their territories, the foundation of that 
control was contested.  The Magna Carta had, four hundred years earlier, signaled 
that internal constituencies would challenge the absolute sovereignty of political 
leaders (even those who claimed divine right).  Later political philosophers and 
national founding projects would draw upon this document as well as examples 
from classical Greece and Rome to articulate a broader ideal of “popular 
sovereignty” that expanded the scope of rights and franchise.  This proceeded 
from the idea that populations are the locus of sovereignty and collectively should 
control (or at least consent to) their own governance. 
Yet the idea of sovereignty that emerged from Westphalia to inform 
international law and the idea of sovereignty embedded in the political philosophy 
that informed national founding projects diverged.  Somewhere in the political 
philosophy and diplomatic developments of the period is a distillation of two 
distinct understandings of sovereignty.  They were not, in this historical 
“moment,” necessarily inconsistent, although some present day scholars and 
commentators would have us think so.  They were, however, distinct ideas (one 
localized sovereignty, the other disaggregated it) heading in distinctly different 





Today we see the results of this divergence in the very different claims 
about sovereignty made in liberal democratic states and in international law.  One 
proceeds from the consent of the governed and the other from the will of the state.  
As the governed – through a variety of non-state actors and agents – have 
increasingly asserted themselves in international law the divergence has gained 
new importance.  A desire to understand this phenomenon provided the starting 
point for my JSD dissertation, and my work has been designed to explore its 
relevance as the role of non-state actors in international law has changed over 
time.  
The Expanding Role of Non-state Actors 
The role of non-state actors in shaping and implementing international law 
is expanding on a number of fronts.  They increasingly promote treaties, 
scrutinize international investments, help to shape (and constrain) multilateral 
trade agreements, and monitor human rights compliance.   They are accredited to 
the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, file amicus briefs 
before international tribunals, play active roles as “observers” (many would say 
“lobbyists”) in meetings of states parties to a range of conventions, and even 
make submissions bearing on state enforcement of domestic law under 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
In the Centennial edition of the American Journal of International Law, 
Steve Charnovitz traces the history of non-governmental organization (NGO) 





profound influence on the scope and dictates of international law,” and that their 
influence is growing.
17
  He is not alone in that conclusion.  The phenomenon has 
also been noted by scholars including Philip Alston, José Alvarez, Thomas 
Franck, Diane Orentlicher, Harold Koh, and Dinah Shelton, among many others.  
Professors Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes highlighted the importance of non-
state actors to treaty compliance (a central concern of international law scholars) 
in their 1995 work The New Sovereignty, and mechanisms for engagement have 
only expanded in the intervening decade.
18
   
Legal theory has not kept pace with practice.  While incidents of non-state 
access to mechanisms of international law increasingly abound – and are 
increasingly documented – the underlying rationale for engaging non-state actors 
in international law is still in need of systematic study and clarification.  At a 
2006 speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, for example, 
then-Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, told a plenary session that 
throughout his term he had been seeking to change “the mindset that sees 
international relations as nothing more than relations between the States and the 
United Nations as little more than a trade union for governments.”  To “fulfill its 
vocation and be of use to humanity in the 21st century,” Annan argued, the UN 
                                                 
17
 Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 348 (2006). 
18
 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 





must engage “all the new actors on the international scene.  That includes the 
private sector, but it also includes parliamentarians; voluntary, non-profit 
organizations; philanthropic foundations; the global media; celebrities from the 
worlds of sport and entertainment; and in some cases, labor unions, mayors and 
local administrators.”19  It is interesting to note Annan’s emphasis was on a new 
“mindset” rather than new law.  He pointed to the “utility” of engaging “new 
actors” rather than a legal interest those actors may have in participation.  While 
one would not expect a senior diplomat to abandon the principle of state primacy 
in international relations, his appeal reveals the major premise from which most 
efforts to engage non-state actors proceed; a premise from which it is difficult to 
construct a durable legal framework for participation. 
Emerging practices of engaging non-state actors within the frameworks of 
multilateral agreements and international forums are also often divorced from 
legal principle.  Moves in recent years to open up processes of the UN, World 
Bank, the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), for 
example, seem to be grounded in a moral sense of noblesse oblige rather than 
legal doctrine.  These policy moves are accompanied by instrumental arguments.  
But in an international system rooted in historical constructs of state sovereignty, 
claims for opening international lawmaking and compliance processes are rarely 
                                                 
19
 “Annan calls for ‘new mindset’ at UN involving not just governments but people,” UN 
Newscenter (Jan 6, 2006) available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=17305&Cr=economic&Cr1=forum 





rooted in a principled understanding of the intrinsic status of people in 
international law as the source of sovereignty.  As a consequence, legal theory has 
not offered adequate support for determining the contours of, or justifying limits 
on, non-state participation at the international level and claims of a “right” to 
access remain highly contested. 
Thus at a time when democracy has become both a battle cry and an 
increasingly contested phenomenon in international relations, legal discourse on 
the “democratization” of international law and institutions remains necessarily 
tentative.  In articulating the basis for non-state access to inter-state processes, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the basic principles that underlie 
participatory doctrines in constitutional law (rights of speech, association, 
petition).  This has led to a proliferation of standards and practices that satisfy a 
generalized interest in greater “accountability” or “transparency” (sometimes even 
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 Some argue that even where international processes are beginning to open up, the lack 
of a principled framework leave those processes subject to elite capture – moving more 
toward an international aristocracy than democracy.  Key international institutions such 
as the UN, the World Bank, and the WTO “to date . . . have not articulated a general 
vision of how best to integrate a public role into international institutions.  So in the 
absence of a planned design, attempts to democratize the international system have been 
ad hoc, as citizen organizations and economic elites create their own mechanisms of 
influence.”  Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss,” Toward Global Parliament,” Foreign 





Instrumental arguments for a greater non-state role in international law 
leave proponents of greater participation vulnerable to more principled challenges 
that proceed from nature and identity; challenges that turn on the centrality of 
state sovereignty.  Because international theorists (especially positivists) locate 
sovereignty in the state, the role of non-state actors is made peripheral, and 
mechanisms for engaging those actors are viewed as discretionary.  By starting 
from the point of state sovereignty (the tendency of international law) rather than 
popular sovereignty (the tendency of democratic constitutional theory) access 
mechanisms are seen as accommodations rather than rights.  Where hard lines 
must be drawn, or where disputes arise, non-state actors simply lack the standing 
to assert their own standing. 
This debility has become even more pronounced, and more paradoxical, in 
an international field increasingly dominated by nominal democracies.  Former 
interim US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, illustrated the point by arguing 
that non-state actors are overreaching, “crowding” international meeting halls, 
and “participating as functional equals to nation-states” in a way that is 
“dramatically troubling for democratic theory.”21  Bolton asserted that citizens of 
democracies have their interest in participatory governance satisfied at the 
national level and they shouldn’t have a “second bite at the apple” in international 
                                                 
21
 John Bolton, American Enterprise Institute Conference “Trends in Global Governance: 
Do They Threaten American Sovereignty? Article and Response: Should We Take 





fora.  For Bolton then, and for others who share his perspective, democratic 
practices at the international level are essentially anti-democratic. 
Three Pieces 
To build on the literature concerning the role of non-state actors in 
international lawmaking and international institutions I took a close look at the 
history of non-state access to international law in an as-yet unpublished essay, 
“Chaos and Consent: Non-State Actors in International Governance.”22  That 
history led me to find that “claims for non-state actor participation in the 
mechanisms of international governance are increasingly made – and at times, at 
least, they are meeting with some modest success (defined as access and impact) 
[but] access is still ad hoc, chaotic, and tenuous.” 23   I concluded that 
participation “needs to be better anchored in international law through 
codification, where possible, in the charters of international institutions and the 
texts of international agreements,” and that “access needs to be better 
administered – benignly regulated – to maximize the instrumental benefits that 
can be claimed from access while minimizing the ills that critics seek to 
underline.”24 
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My more recent research has responded to the needs I identified following 
that historical review.  I have examined non-state access in three distinct areas.  
Each of these projects resulted in a published article or chapter, and the three 
pieces are described briefly below. 
A European Commitment to Environmental Citizenship
25
 
This piece examined the European commitment to “promote the 
application of” participatory democratic principles “in international 
environmental decision-making processes and within the framework of 
international organizations in matters relating to the environment.” Article 3.7 of 
the 1998 UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to 
Information, Access to Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (Aarhus Convention) incorporates this commitment as part of a much 
broader regional accord aimed at increased public access to environmental 
matters. While the Aarhus Convention is concerned primarily with participation at 
a domestic level, Article 3.7 makes a unique promise about state behavior in 
international forums (understood broadly to include institutions, bodies, 
secretariats, meetings, and so on).  Its origins suggest a concern with whether 
Europeans can expect their governments to advance the principles of participatory 
democracy on the international stage and also a concern with the kind of 
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“citizenship” that non-state actors might hope to achieve when engaging 
international forums on environmental issues. The piece discusses the 
implications that the Aarhus commitment may have for the normative debate over 
the appropriate role of non-state actors as active constituents in international 
lawmaking and the practical debate over how best to engage non-state actors in 
the work and oversight of international institutions. 
Head of State and Government Summits
26
 
This piece examined non-state access to international summits (meetings 
of heads of state and government) in the context of an ongoing theoretical debate 
regarding the role of citizens in the sovereign machinery of international 
governance.  Lawmaking, though only a ceremonial fraction of summit meetings 
themselves, is advanced by planning and implementing summit commitments; in 
these interstices, non-state actors work to inform outcomes and shape institutional 
agendas.  The piece studies inter-American summits as a case in point, focusing 
on efforts to advance a regional “democracy agenda” through the catalysis of the 
summit process.  Case studies include a U.S. proposal for a regional public 
participation strategy, a Peruvian initiative to discourage and respond to coups, 
and a Canadian measure to increase citizen access to the region’s chief political 
body.  It argues that summits facilitated these initiatives by providing a context 
for cooperative law-making in which non-state actors played a central role – a key 
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concern for public access proponents.  Yet states initiated and managed the 
process, and heads of state and government ultimately ratified the outcomes, so 
the public role in shaping outcomes did not threaten state authority – a key 
concern for access critics.  In the debate over the appropriate place for non-state 
actors in international lawmaking, the piece shows that summits can advance the 
legitimacy and democracy concerns that, at their core, appear to motivate the 
competing theoretical positions. 
Non-State Access to Global Climate Change Governance
27
 
This piece examined the role of non-state actors in promoting compliance 
with climate change instruments and finds that their contribution has been 
substantial.  The piece recounts their role in shaping and implementing the formal 
mechanisms for climate change governance that continue to evolve through 
agreements and institutions designed by states.  It also shows the utility – and 
creativity – of non-state actors in advancing climate concerns through a number of 
recent cases where NGOs have advanced climate change concerns before “non-
climate” institutions.  These cases not only illustrate the ability of non-state actors 
to promoting climate compliance (even where legal tools are not originally so 
designed or particularly well suited) but also provide models of how they might 
be engaged as climate institutions that continue to evolve.  I concluded that the 
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positive impact of non-state participation in advancing climate change concerns is 
an important feature of the evolving climate regime. 
Unifying Themes 
These dissertation pieces each deal with contexts that have unique features 
favoring the assertion of popular will.  The summits are a relatively new 
institutional phenomenon with flexible – sometimes ad hoc – decision-making 
processes that leave substantial openings for non-state entrepreneurs who wished 
to influence outcomes.  The examples I studied were from Latin America during a 
time of democratic transition where government representatives and broader 
constituencies were open to experimentalism and expressions of popular will.  
They were also supportive of moves to reform regional institutions in ways that 
would reflect their own democratic evolution.  The European process of 
negotiating and implementing the Aarhus Convention likewise occurred in a 
regional context of democratic transition.  The Convention itself was a vehicle to 
set standards for entrants into the EU from the newly-democratic east, and it 
reflected the ideals of popular sovereignty both in its terms and its genesis.  The 
provision in Article 3.7 calling for signatories to “promote the application of” the 
Convention’s principles (which embrace a fully participatory civil society) in 
international processes “and within the framework of international organizations 
…” is extraordinary in the abstract, but more understandable within the context of 
the political circumstances that animated the Convention.  The final example – 





participation in the context of addressing climate change is also an area where a 
motivated public is animated by a global issue that calls for new institutions and 
new approaches by existing institutions.  It is not difficult to see how non-state 
actors have permeated this broad and fluid creative process.   
All of these examples have taken place in a context where transportation 
and communication are facilitated by historically unparalleled technological 
advances.  Twelve years into the twenty-first century, any literate person with 
internet access (estimated to be almost one third of the planet’s population)28 can 
instantaneously communicate with any other similarly-situated person anywhere 
on the planet.  Air transport can deliver delegates and participants in any dialogue 
to almost any population center within 24 hours.  Ideas can be published, 
illustrated, power pointed, video enhanced and delivered in any language at little 
cost.  Empires have been built and sustained on far less efficient commerce, and 
in the past two decades these means have become available not just to emperors 
and their agents. 
Although I see the examples I studied as useful models of open institutions 
and processes, they remain limited in impact and scope.  The examples represent 
only a small range of public access mechanisms that are common in democratic 
states, and they were deployed in ways that can constrain opportunities for input 
or limit the assimilation of input into final decisions.  Also, participation was 
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typically by well-funded organizations, experts, or others not broadly 
representative of affected and interested populations.  These are not new 
challenges for democratic mechanisms, but they might be more easily addressed 
through permanent and transparent institutions that proceed from a different 
understanding of the “place” of non-state actors.  For example, public comment 
processes in the international regimes I have studied usually offer no opportunity 
for response or dialogue.  In contrast, notice and comment rulemaking in the 
United States requires that agencies respond to significant comments and explain 
changes to (and refusals to change) the proposal following public comment.  
Finally, the phenomenon I studied is far from universal.  For each of the examples 
I found of non-state access there are many more where inter-state relations 
proceed without any degree of openness. 
Findings 
A number of scholars have advanced arguments supporting a greater, 
perhaps preeminent, role for global citizens in global governance.  The arguments 
represent an extension of the idea of popular sovereignty that helped to shape 
constitutional projects and give rise to liberal democracies; but an idea that has 
been historically absent from international legal theory.  The idea makes sense 
within an international legal system called upon to address complex problems that 





that must be embraced by domestic populations).
29
  A greater non-state role has 
the potential to strengthen legitimacy and compliance – two central problems in 
international law – as well as reduce the democracy deficit that itself raises 
legitimacy concerns.  My research offers examples that demonstrate this potential 
by showing the role non-state actors have played in shaping and implementing 
international law and animating international institutions. 
To show that non-state actors have a growing instrumental role, however, 
is not to suggest that they are an alternative to the state or that states should lose 
their standing.  I did not set out to prove that there is a “fundamental discontinuity 
in the international system,”30 or that “states may simply no longer be the natural 
problem-solving unit,”31 and my findings do not presage the dissolution of the 
Westphalian model or the obsolescence of states.  I see, instead, a more modest 
shift within state-centric international systems to accommodate a public that acts 
with and through state-sponsored institutions in a cooperative manner. 
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My work challenges the idea that state sovereignty is absolute and 
impervious without rejecting state sovereignty outright.  My findings suggest a 
new paradigm that builds upon a continuing role for sovereign states as architects 
and executors while accommodating the emergence of non-state actors as 
collaborators and animators.  I have described what may be seen as a hybrid 
approach to international governance that is more consistent with a notion of 
common sovereignty and less a reflection of the divergent models of state and 
popular sovereignty inherited from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
I do not reject the need to rethink international law in terms of a global 
social contract that proceeds from popular will.  But, for now, shifts in 
international sovereign dynamics are occurring at a practical level, and they are 
less tectonic.  My work highlights models that have reinforced the authority of 
states even while making space for non-state actors.  These approaches thus gain 
some of the value of participatory governance in a way that is less disruptive of 
the international system.   
My findings also lead me to conclude that the failure to ground 
international sovereignty in the idea of popular consent has significant 
disadvantages.  The expansion of democratic and deliberative tools in domestic 
law (such as open meetings acts, notice and comment rulemaking, citizen 
advisory boards, and freedom of information laws) can be justified by the central 
idea of citizen sovereignty.  These tools have helped to sustain deliberative 





mechanisms such as these to international institutions has no such justification 
and deliberative approaches thus face greater resistance.  Tools of democratic 
engagement (mechanisms for greater openness, transparency, and participation by 
non-state actors) are still only tentatively deployed and too often accessible to 
limited groups of relatively well-financed participants.  By proceeding from a 
different understanding of the locus of sovereignty, international law is by 
definition more closed to innovations in democratic access that would increase 
opportunities and broaden the “franchise.”   The argument for expanding 
participatory mechanisms finds less purchase where the public is not seen as 
having a fundamental right to participate in the first place.  This limits the 
contributions of non-state actors and perpetuates legitimacy and compliance 







CHAPTER 2 A EUROPEAN COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL 





The idea of a European regional commitment to greater public access in 
environmental matters grew out of the ‘Environment for Europe’ process, which 
was inaugurated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN 
ECE) in the context of the region’s early 1990s economic and political 
transition.
33
 The idea gave rise to a regional dialogue on how best to advance 
environmental citizenship in ECE states,
34
 and this dialogue produced the 
Convention on Access to Information, Access to Decision-Making, and Access to 
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Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), which opened for 
signature in Aarhus, Denmark, in June 1998.
35
  
The Aarhus Convention is concerned primarily with participation at a 
domestic level—essentially a promise by parties to manage their internal 
environmental affairs more democratically. Yet the Aarhus Convention is not 
confined to its parties’ domestic concerns. Though its genesis is in Europe and 
most parties are European, the convention’s parties deliberately reach out to states 
and non-state actors from other regions,
36
 holding the accord out as a model and 
holding the door open for accession by non-ECE states. 
                                                 
35
 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, Denmark, 1998), UN Doc. 
ECE/CEP/43 (1998), <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf> [Aarhus 
Convention].  
36
 The term ‘non-state actor’ is used in this article in its broadest sense to include 
organizations, communities, groups, associations, institutions, and even individual actors 
(activists, scholars, or private sector entrepreneurs). While there is a tendency to group 
such actors together under the heading ‘non-governmental organization,’ ‘private 
voluntary organization,’ or ‘civil society organization,’ the term ‘non-state actor’ is used 
here for several reasons. It emphasizes neutrality in terms of the nature of actors’ legal 
form, purpose, and/or objectives. It includes communities and groups, such as indigenous 
communities and religious groups, who may or may not be organized or have formed an 
organization in a formal or recognized sense. It embraces individuals, including activists 
or academics who may act independently of a corporate form—even if they may have an 
institutional affiliation. It posits access claims by parliamentarians or legislators who are 
often keenly interested in the international conduct of their home states but who are not, 
depending on constitutional form, part of the government or the state and who may not be 
affiliated with the party that, at the time, forms or instructs the government. Finally, it 
focuses on an essential question in international law—the participation of actors who are 





The Aarhus Convention also reaches out in another direction. Article 3.7 
commits parties to ‘promote the application of the principles of this Convention in 
international environmental decision-making processes and within the framework 
of international organizations in matters relating to the environment.’37 This 
commitment is a unique feature of a unique international accord. Its provenance 
suggests a concern with whether Europeans can expect their governments to 
advance the principles of participatory democracy on the international stage and 
also a concern with the kind of ‘citizenship’ that non-state actors might hope to 
achieve when engaging international forums (understood broadly to include 
institutions, bodies, secretariats, meetings, and so on) on environmental issues. 
This article examines the Article 3.7 commitment and asks what 
implications it may have for two ongoing debates—first, a normative debate over 
the appropriate role of non-state actors as active constituents in international 
lawmaking and, second, a more practical debate over how best to engage non-
state actors in the work and oversight of international institutions. The article 
begins by outlining this debate and describing the key positions taken by those 
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who defend a strengthened role for non-state actors in international law and those 
who challenge the legitimacy of such a role. It also highlights the relevance of this 
broader debate for international environmental law in particular. The article then 
moves to a discussion of the ‘Environment for Europe’ process and the origins of 
the Aarhus Convention. This section also describes the origins of Article 3.7 and 
examines some of the normative and practical implications of the commitment to 
‘promote the application of’ Aarhus principles in international forums. The next 
section examines the guidelines for the implementation of Article 3.7, which were 
developed by the parties and approved at a Meeting of the Parties in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, and entitled the Almaty Guidelines on Promoting the Application of 
the Principles of the Aarhus Convention in International Forums (Almaty 
Guidelines).
38
 It is followed by a discussion on the efforts to implement the 
Almaty Guidelines. The final section concludes with observations about the effect 
of Article 3.7 and the commitment to promote the principles of the Aarhus 
Convention in terms of the normative and practical debates discussed at the outset 
of the article. 
International Governance and the Debate Over Non-State Actors 
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As non-state actors have become increasingly engaged in international 
decision making and international forums, two distinct but inter-related debates 
have arisen. The first is a normative debate over what role, if any, non-state actors 
should play in lawmaking and the second is a practical debate (though not without 
normative implications) over how best to engage them. 
The Role of Non-State Actors in Lawmaking 
The first debate touches on issues central to conceptions of the sovereign 
state and challenges ideas inherited from at least the time of the Westphalian 
peace.
39
 What order could be found in the chaos of international politics was 
pinned to the idea of territorially sovereign states as exclusive actors across 
geographic borders. Positive international law came to depend on state 
commitments, state custom, and state practice.
40
 Yet a number of theorists have 
sought to pierce this sovereign veil. While acknowledging the dominant role of 
states in formal lawmaking, they have argued that the formulation and application 
of law depends on a far more complex process of interaction among states and 
non-state actors. These theorists include Harold Koh, who has helped introduce 
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legal process theory to international law and has emphasized that lawmaking has 
not only a horizontal dimension (among states and others making up the 
‘international community’) but also a vertical dimension, where domestic 
processes and decisions inform international law and, at the same time, 
international law helps shape domestic laws and institutions.
41
 Margaret Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink have emphasized the role of ‘transboundary advocacy networks’ 
of non-state actors in shaping international law and in using international 
processes to inform dialogue with their own governments at a domestic level.
42
 
Peter Haas has called attention to the ‘epistemic communities’ of scientists and 
advocates who have helped, for example, to obtain a commitment from countries 




These scholars, and many others, have described the impact of non-state 
actors on international law and have helped discredit the idea of detached 
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international lawmaking among insular states.
44
 The point is not that international 
decision making is invariably an open and participatory process
45
 but, rather, that 
a conception of international law founded on some idea of an impenetrable inter-
state process is at odds with reality. International law is appropriately understood 
as the process, as well as the product, of an international and transboundary 
discourse among a range of stakeholders. 
Normative Claims about Public Participation 
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While arguments over public participation in international lawmaking are 
often founded on a descriptive narrative about positive law, a normative 
component can be found both in their challenge to what international law is—they 
argue that emerging international doctrine can be seen as law in part because of 
its participatory provenance—and in the more explicit claim that this participatory 
model tells us what law should be.
46
 We are told that doctrines emerging from a 
participatory process are more like law
47
 (more likely to be embraced both 
internationally and domestically by states and others intended to be bound)
48
 and 
that doctrines emerging without such a process are in a sense illegitimate (even if 
they hew to the formal structure of law) both in an instrumental and principled 
sense. 
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Counter arguments are raised from those who hold to a positivist view of 
international law and challenge the legitimacy of non-state participation in a 
process they see as reserved solely for state actors. Former acting US ambassador 
to the United Nations, John Bolton, for example, asserts that the inter-state 
dialogue is sacrosanct, basing his arguments, ironically, on what he sees as 
principles of democracy. He argues that citizens should have only one opportunity 
to influence their governments and that this opportunity is exclusively in the 
domestic arena. He complains that opening international processes to non-state 
actors ‘provides a second opportunity for intrastate advocates to reargue their 
positions, thus advantaging them over their opponents who are unwilling or 
unable to reargue their cases in international fora.’49 Bolton’s concerns have been 
echoed by others in government and in academia who appear to view the 
participation of non-state actors as some sort of intrusion on the sovereign 
prerogative, which is at best unhelpful and at worst a usurpation of right.
50
 Still 
others raise questions about the accountability of non-state actors, concerned 
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The Move to Engage Non-State Actors 
Against the background of this theoretical debate, non-state actors have 
made persistent demands for access to international lawmaking and institutions, 
and these demands have slowly but increasingly been met. Writing for a 
centennial edition of the American Journal of International Law in 2006, Steve 
Charnovitz catalogued one hundred years of growth in non-state participation, and 
his work demonstrates the variety and depth of access.
52
 Others have described 
the same phenomenon.
53
 While those who seek more open international decision 
making are not yet satisfied with the present scope of access,
54
 and questions 
about efficacy and impact remain largely unanswered,
55
 examples of public 
access to international forums increasingly abound. 
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These examples are more than simply a collateral or ultra vires exercise in 
accommodation. Aside from offering concrete (and sometimes effective) 
opportunities for non-state actors to respond to, and shape, international law and 
institutions, process theorists might argue that the examples in themselves have 
the potential to create a new normative imperative. Charnovitz has suggested that 
claims of political philosophers in the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries 
that ‘states have an obligation to listen to nongovernmental opinion and to take it 
into account when making decisions affecting other nations ... has become a 
clearer reality in our time.’56 While this argument has appeal, others would 
counter that the practice of engaging non-state actors is not sufficiently 
widespread and does not flow from a sense of obligation, or opinio juris, and thus 
cannot be seen as a part of customary law. Yet even if a claim of right is seen as 
premature, the persistence and formalization of access mechanisms suggest that 
such a right could, in time, be recognized. Thus, the practical steps to engage non-
state actors may be understood to advance a legal basis for public participation 
even as theoretical challenges remain. 
The Importance of Public Participation in International 
Environmental Law 
The theoretical debate and practical progress described earlier have 
particular relevance for international environmental law because much of the 
pressure for progress on the environment has originated with non-state actors and 
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many of the examples of participatory international models emanate from 
environmental law. Many theorists who argue that international lawmaking is 
more open and dynamic than admitted by a positivist model use environmental 
case studies to show that the public is increasingly at the table and that the 
practice has a measurable impact.
57
 Indeed, the environmental ‘movement,’ along 
with human rights and labour, is one of the most striking examples of a 
transboundary concern in international jurisprudence and legal literature. 
Aside from the many practical examples of international environmental 
frameworks that are shaped by non-state actors and make a space for non-state 
actors, environmental regimes have a strong claim to a transboundary subject 
matter that responds to the state sovereignty argument advanced by theorists such 
as Bolton and Anderson. Sovereignty has long been linked, at least since the 
emergence of nation states, to the idea of territorial integrity.
58
 Environmental 
law, along with human rights and labour law, faces the dilemma of enacting 
international frameworks that can legitimately reach into a state territory to apply 
(or influence a state to apply) a set of universal principles.
59
 International 
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environmental law is also concerned with transgressions that cross boundaries in a 
physical as well as moral sense. Its subject matter is often interstate, and, at times 
(as with oceanic and atmospheric regimes), it is outside the border of any state. 
Grotius’s argument for a mare liberum, which is beyond the control of any 
sovereign state, seems especially apt in many areas of international environmental 
law, and, even in those instances where immediate physical impacts or activities 
are localized within a state, the science underlying environmental law often shows 
that the effects do not remain local. Again, this is an argument about physical as 
well as moral effect, although questions of timing and causation may be complex. 
Thus, if there is any field that may be said to justify a conversation that is 
not limited to territorially constrained nation-states, environmental law is such a 
field. This is not to gainsay the transboundary concerns of human rights or labour 
law but merely to suggest that there is an added physical dimension to 
environmental questions, which often defies sovereign boundaries, and thus 
makes doctrine born from theories about national territorial sovereignty 
particularly vulnerable. 
The Aarhus Convention 
Against this emerging theoretical debate and the increasing opening of 
international mechanisms, European Community (EC) countries moved in the 
1990s to consolidate regional ideas about access to environmental matters and to 





states as well as those states seeking to join the EC in the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union’s breakup. 
 ‘Environment for Europe’ Process and Public Participation 
The idea of a regional commitment to public participation in 
environmental matters grew out of the ‘Environment for Europe’ process of 
regional dialogue on environmental concerns inaugurated in June 1991.
60
 
Inaugurated in Prague less than two years after the Berlin Wall fell and barely a 
year after the fall of authoritarian governments in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania,
61
 the ‘Environment for Europe’ 
process combined a new democratic energy from eastern Europe with a broader 
regional environmental agenda. From the outset, non-state actors, many from 
newly independent states finding a public voice for the first time, were an integral 
part of the process. Institutionalizing their participation in environmental matters 
was an integral objective. The Conclusions of the Conference ‘Environment for 
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Europe’  in Prague, which were ratified by participating environment ministers,62 
including the EC’s environment commissioner, ‘emphasised the importance of 
participation by a well-informed population in the decision-making processes on 
environmental matters or on matters that may have a significant effect on the 
environment.’63 
Two years later, at its second meeting in Lucerne in 1993, the assembled 
ministers and representatives issued a declaration, which called for 
[t]he elaboration of proposals by the UN/ECE for legal, 
regulatory and administrative mechanisms to encourage public 
participation in environmental decision making, and for cost-
efficient measures to promote public participation and to 
provide, in cooperation with the informal sectors, training and 
education in order to increase the ability of the public to 
understand the relevance of environmental information.
64
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At its next ministerial meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1995, the 
‘Environment for Europe’ process highlighted participation in environmental 
matters: 
We believe it is essential that ... States should give the public the 
opportunity to participate at all levels in decisionmaking 
processes relating to the environment, and we recognize that 
much remains to be done in this respect. We call upon all 
countries in the region to ensure that they have a legal 
framework and effective and appropriate mechanisms to secure 
public access to environmental information, to facilitate and 
encourage public participation, inter alia through environmental 
impact assessment procedures, and to provide effective public 
access to judicial and administrative remedies for environmental 
harm. We invite countries to ensure that in relevant legislation 
effective public participation as a foundation for successful 
environmental policies is being introduced.
65
 
The Sofia ministerial declaration embraced the ‘Draft Guidelines on 
Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental 
Decisionmaking’ (Sofia Guidelines), which outline a range of measures that 
governments should take at a national level to engage the public more fully in 
environmental matters.
66
 The Sofia Guidelines also call upon participating states 
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to consider ‘the development of a regional Convention on Public Participation’67 
with ‘the appropriate involvement of [non-governmental organizations] NGOs.’68 
It is important to note that the ‘Environment for Europe’ process not only 
pressed participating states to engage members of the public in environmental 
matters at the national level, but it also served as a model for participation at the 
regional level. Participants in the process have emphasized its relative 
transparency and the collaborative manner in which non-state actors (principally 
environmental NGOs) were engaged.
69
 The ‘Environment for Europe’ process 
thus provided an organic model that served as an example of participatory process 
and offered an opportunity for environmental NGOs to build networks among 
other NGOs and with their state counterparts. It also gave state officials, 
particularly those from formerly authoritarian countries, an opportunity to gain 
confidence with a more open and discursive approach as well as to build 
relationships with their non-governmental colleagues. 
Drafting Aarhus 
The Sofia commitment to a regional convention launched a formal process 
of consultation among governments and non-state actors who were active and 
highly coordinated. Initial negotiations were held by an ad hoc working group in 
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 See ibid. at para. 48. See also JoAnn Carmin and Stacy D. VanDeveer, EU 
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Geneva during June 1996. Twenty of fifty-five ECE countries sent representatives 
who were joined by about a dozen non-state participants, including six who 
represented a ‘delegation’ of Environmental Citizens Organizations (ECO).70 The 
ECO participated actively throughout the negotiation process and produced 
written reports of discussions and outcomes that provide far greater detail than the 
‘official’ reports prepared by the ECE Secretariat.71 Two governments, Poland 
and the Netherlands, invited ECO members to join their official delegations, and 
the ECE funded participation by an ECO member from Russia.
 72
 
The working group met on ten occasions to negotiate the details of a 
proposed convention, and the negotiations remained largely an open and 
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collaborative process. While an ECO rapporteur characterized as ‘disturbing’ a 
European Union
73
 decision to coordinate a regional negotiating position in 
secret,
74
 non-state actors generally had a high level of participation in negotiating 
sessions as well as access to delegations outside the sessions in less formal 
settings. The process seemed to foster interpersonal relations among government 
representatives and non-state participants, producing a degree of comradeship that 
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The working group produced a draft convention presented to the fourth 
Ministerial Conference ‘Environment for Europe,’ which was held in Aarhus, 
Denmark, in June 1998. The Aarhus Convention was opened for signature at the 
close of the conference on 25 June 1998 and entered into force in October 2001.
76
 
As of July 2008, there were forty-one parties to the convention.
77
 
The Aarhus Convention, as its full name implies, commits state parties to 
promote ‘[a]ccess to Information, Access to Decision-making, and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters.’78 The convention provides that ‘each Party 
shall guarantee the rights’ of access to information, decision-making, and 
justice,
79
 and parties agree to ‘take the necessary legislative, regulatory and other 
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measures’ to implement this commitment.80 The convention links procedural 
access rights and the public accountability of governments to the substantive 
objective of environmental protection.
81
 It also links environmental concerns to 
human rights, recognizing that ‘adequate protection of the environment is 
essential to human well-being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including 
the right to life itself.’82 And it has been found to have ‘had significant influence 
on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.’83 The convention 




Aarhus Convention parties have negotiated a protocol on the use of 
pollutant release and transfer registers (PRTR)s (with thirty-nine signatories and 
nine ratifications),
85
 which creates a binding commitment among parties to 
establish publicly accessible national inventories of hazardous pollutants released 
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at industrial facilities and other sources.
86
 Aarhus Convention parties have also 
drafted an amendment to the convention that would require ‘early and effective 
information and public participation prior to making decisions on whether to 
permit the deliberate release into the environment and placing on the market of 
genetically modified organisms.’87 As of July 2008, there are only sixteen parties 
to the amendment,
88
 and it has not yet entered into force.
89
 
Promoting Principles of the Aarhus Convention beyond the State: 
Article 3.7 
The Aarhus Convention is principally a vehicle for promoting public 
access at a domestic level, and it is seen as something of a regional baseline in 
Europe.
90
 Yet despite its European origin, proponents of the Aarhus Convention 
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have often looked explicitly at the possibility of exporting the agreement. Shortly 
after the Aarhus Ministerial conference in 1998, for example, while the thirty-four 
member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) were developing 
their own regional strategy on access to environmental matters, a representative of 
the Danish government joined an OAS-sponsored workshop in Kingston, 
Jamaica, to discuss the details of the Aarhus Convention and to promote its 
adoption in the inter-American system.
91
 While Western Hemisphere states have 
been unresponsive to the invitation to join the Aarhus Convention,
92
 there has 
been some receptivity among Central Asian states.
93
 
The ECE has also revealed what might be seen as global ambitions for the 
convention. An ECE Aarhus Implementation Guide, which was published in 
2000, states ‘[a]lthough regional in scope, the significance of the Aarhus 
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Convention is global.’94 The document notes that the convention is ‘open to 
accession by non-ECE countries, giving it the potential to serve as a global 
framework for strengthening citizens’ environmental rights’95 and argues that the 
upcoming ‘2002 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
marking the 10th anniversary of the Earth Summit would be a timely occasion to 
examine the relevance of the Aarhus Convention as a possible model for 
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strengthening the application of principle 10 [of the Rio Declaration]
96
 in other 
regions of the world.’97 
In addition to the extra-regional aspirations of its proponents, the Aarhus 
Convention itself contains a unique provision that would appear to be a call to a 
more international ambition. Article 3.7 of the Aarhus Convention provides that 
[e]ach Party shall promote the application of the principles of 
this Convention in international environmental decision-making 
processes and within the framework of international 
organizations in matters relating to the environment.
98
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This provision has its origin in the first draft of the convention, which was 
produced prior to the first ad hoc working group meeting in Geneva in 1996. 
Originally the draft text read: 
Each Party shall support the provisions of this Convention in 
international environmental decision-making processes 




The final text has two principal modifications. First, the commitment to 
‘support the provisions’100 became in the final version a commitment to ‘promote 
the principles.’101 The word ‘promote’ may be seen as a synonym for ‘support,’ 
although it may be a bit more pro-active and may well be interpreted to encourage 
a degree of active persuasion on the part of states party. At the same time, the 
promise (even if calling for a degree of salesmanship) now only relates to 
‘principles’ rather than ‘provisions’ of the convention. This distinction may be 
seen as a deliberate weakening of the text, although much of the debate over the 
language appears to have centred on the propriety of applying provisions aimed at 
domestic law in the international context. Thus, the change to ‘principles’ gives 
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some flexibility despite being a less concrete promise. It remains to be seen what 
difference this distinction makes in practice. 
The second modification appears more significant. In the original form, 
whatever ‘supporting’ the ‘provisions of the Convention’ was understood to 
mean, it was made clear that parties would have promised this support in 
processes involving non-parties. The meaning of this language caused some 
debate, even confusion, as the ECO report of the first meeting of the ad hoc 
working group details: 
The question of international decisionmaking was also discussed 
... under Article 2, para. 8, with some delegations puzzled as to 
why the latter paragraph focussed [sic] on processes involving a 
mixture of Parties and non-Parties to the Convention, without 
there being any reference to processes purely involving (at least 
as decisionmakers) Parties. ECO argued that ‘mixed’ processes 
as well as processes purely consisting of Parties should be 
addressed, though in different ways. In the former case, the 
Convention could only commit Parties to individually act in a 
certain way; in the latter case, the Convention could possibly go 
further and commit the international body or process itself. 
Belgium more or less supported this approach. Several countries 
(Denmark, UK, Greece) had doubts about applying the concrete 
provisions in the Convention to international environmental 
decisionmaking. It was suggested (by the Chair?) that the 
principles (rather than the provisions) of the Convention should 
apply, though this is a rather vague term.
102
 
                                                 
102
 ECO Report on the First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Proposed ECE 
Convention on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation In 
Environmental Decisionmaking, Geneva, 17–19 June 1996, at 3, 
<http://www.participate.org/archive/convention/eco_report_1_text.htm> [copy on file 
with author]. The official report of the first meeting contains no reference to this 
discussion. See ECE, Committee on Environmental Policy, Working Group for the 





This discussion presents interesting questions from the standpoint of 
international law. Does an international forum answerable (through its enabling 
treaty or otherwise) to a group of states have an obligation to comply with 
commitments made by each of the states that created and direct the forum? 
Setting aside questions of whether an international organization might act on such 
commitments in a manner parallel to a state,
103
 the form in which such an 
obligation might be transferred or inherited would remain uncertain. Absent 
explicit language in an organic treaty, or a subsequent protocol, how would the 
international forum take on the responsibilities of its states parties? Is there any 
argument that the responsibility might be automatic? Where committed states 
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make up only a part of an international forum, it seems clear that no obligation 
would be assumed by the forum automatically, and the question is whether those 
committed states have an obligation to advance their mutual commitment in the 
context of the international forum’s operations. 
These appear to be some of the questions with which negotiators 
struggled. As the proposed text was discussed at the third negotiating session in 
December 1996, some state delegations expressed concern about imposing a duty 
on states to act in a way that could be seen to interfere with the operation of an 
international forum. The United Kingdom, for example, ‘stressed that the parties 
to this Convention cannot purport to regulate an international meeting under the 
aegis of another organization.’104 Russia also reportedly opposed participation in 
‘international processes (including national policies which will be presented in 
international fora).’105 Denmark was said to be ‘dragging its heels on the notion of 
public participation in preparing legislation or in international decisionmaking.’106 
On the other hand, the Netherlands was seen as ‘[v]aguely supportive of ECOs on 
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international processes,’107 and other states, including Portugal and Slovenia, 
continued to broadly support the concept.
108




At the sixth negotiation session six months later, changes were made in 
Article 2.8 of the draft text, and the language that eventually became Article 3.7 
was adopted. The ECO reported that 
 
[t]he draft provision in Article 2 (General Provisions) requiring 
Parties to support the provisions of the Convention in 
international environmental decisionmaking processes involving 
parties who are not Party to the Convention was amended, with 
‘support the provisions’ changed to ‘promote the principles.’ 
Also, the restriction to processes ‘involving parties who are not 








 Ibid. at 25. 
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 Ibid. at 21–2. 
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 ECO Report on the Sixth Negotiating Session and Preparatory Meeting of the 
Working Group on the Proposed ECE Convention on Access to Environmental 
Information and Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, Geneva, 7–11 
July 1997, at 2, <http://www.participate.org/archive/ 
convention/eco_report_six_text.htm> [copy on file with author]. ECO representatives 
made another attempt at the meeting to obtain a separate and more definitive commitment 
from signatories to act under circumstances where an international convention or body is 
comprised entirely of co-signatories—a move apparently aimed specifically at EU 
institutions—though the effort was ultimately tabled. The ECO report states that ‘[t]he 
ECO coalition proposed a new sub-paragraph covering “international bodies under the 
control or made up exclusively of Parties.” This wording was included in square brackets 





The final language of Article 3.7 may be seen to reflect a reasonable 
approach to both the question of whether (and to what extent) international forum 
obligations can be made parallel to the obligations of the forum’s constituent 
states and also the question of whether any such obligations may transfer 
automatically.
111
 On the former question, drafters adopted the wording ‘promote 
the application of the principles’ instead of the wording of the first draft ‘support 
the provisions’ of the convention, and, thus, the language, while more vague, 
avoids the question of exactly how provisions designed for domestic application 
might function in the international context. With respect to the latter, once the 
commitment had shifted to ‘promot[ing] the application of principles,’ the drafters 
could safely drop the distinction between circumstances where an international 
convention, process, or organization was created by, and answered to, only 
Aarhus signatories and circumstances where non-signatories were also involved. 
The obligation was no longer one of ‘supporting’ direct application (with all of 
the attendant questions of how that could properly be done) but, instead, became 
                                                                                                                                     
Commission ... The ECOs presented the wording in the plenary but the Chair did not 
want to open a discussion, asking delegations to take it back to their capitals. (N.B. The 
wording proposed here was intended to cover EU institutions. It was later put to the 
ECOs outside the meeting that the EU institutions might not be under the control of the 
Member States and that a more explicit wording might be needed, either referring directly 
to the EU institutions or the institutions of economic integration organisations, or to 
international bodies to which Parties had transferred their authority).’ Ibid. at 6. 
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Normative and Positive Implications of Article 3.7 
Through the adoption of Article 3.7, parties to the Aarhus Convention 
appear to have adopted a normative position that non-state actor participation in 
international environmental decision making is a good thing, not only 
domestically but also internationally. By making the commitment through a 
formal convention rather than through a ministerial declaration or statement of 
principles (which is the more typical form for the expression of participatory 
rights),
113
 this commitment can be seen as a statement of positive law. Thus, 
Article 3.7 represents a critical point of departure for the continuing theoretical 
and practical debates described in the first section of this article regarding the 
propriety of public participation in the international arena. Parties to the Aarhus 
Convention, which, to date, include forty states plus the EC,
114
 can be seen to 
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 The term ‘evangelism’ is used in the sense of “zealous advocacy of a cause or 
doctrine.”  The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary, 3d.  ed. at 485 (1996).  The 
term has a religious connotation which is not meant literally here, though it may offer an 
interesting metaphor for Aarhus parties’ commitment to promote internationally the 
environmental democracy that they have embraced domestically. 
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 See, for example, Rio Declaration, supra note 96, Principle 10, which promotes 
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effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and 
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have taken a definitive stand on the importance of participatory rights in 
international matters. 
The Aarhus Convention provides a model of environmental citizenship, 
and Article 3.7 tells us this model is relevant at the international as well as 
domestic level. The convention thus contradicts the arguments of Bolton and 
others who would limit citizens in a democratic process to a single, domestic 
opportunity to speak with their government about environmental matters with 
international implications. Citizens can also, under the Aarhus Convention, claim 
a degree of citizenship at the international level—speaking with their own 
government and with other states about environmental concerns and interests. 
Methodological Implications of Article 3.7 
Article 3.7 not only places parties to the Aarhus Convention in a position 
that favours a more meaningful democratic process at the international level, but 
it would also appear to adopt a rather proactive stance in the promotion of this 
democracy—and in the construction of some form of global environmental 
citizenship. By resolving that ‘“mixed” processes as well as processes purely 
consisting of Parties should be addressed’115 not by separate obligations for these 
separate types of processes but, rather, by a more general commitment to 
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‘promote the application of the principles’ of the Aarhus Convention,116 the 
parties have offered a model of states working to increase opportunities for more 
democratic access in any number of ways. This could include, where a process is 
entirely governed by Aarhus states party, making formal changes to the organic 
commitments of the institutions or creating access protocols to establish more 
open and responsive procedures. It could also include, where parties to the Aarhus 
Convention are a majority of states to a convention or institution, using this 
majority status to move the forum in a more democratic direction. Where only a 
few Aarhus parties are participants, they could still make an effort to adopt 
informal mechanisms (such as including non-state actors in their delegations) 
even as they promote more formal mechanisms for consideration by the broader 
forum. Finally, it could include a commitment by Aarhus parties to adapt their 
foreign policy in matters relating to the environment (including policies that shape 
participation in trade agreements and international financial institutions as well as 
multilateral environmental accords) to assure that the state’s own delegations are 
open and transparent and that the positions taken and votes made by the state are 
consistent with the principles of the Aarhus Convention.
117
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 The World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, has considered the question of 
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This analysis suggests some far-ranging implications for a single sentence 
in a single regional environmental agreement, but these implications naturally 
flow from a fundamental decision to see international processes relating to the 
environment as necessarily participatory and democratic in nature. It is worth 
noting that this sentence, and this commitment, are a departure from the more 
domestically focused promise of Rio Principle 10.
118
  At the same time, they are 
consistent with, and in many ways a logical extension of, Principle 10.  
 
Implementing Article 3.7: The Almaty Guidelines 
Development of the Guidelines 
The efforts of Aarhus parties to wrestle with some of the normative and 
practical implications of Article 3.7 began in earnest four years after the Aarhus 
Convention was opened for signature, at the first Meeting of the Parties in Lucca, 
                                                                                                                                     
see also WTO General Council Slaps Appellate Body on Amicus Briefs 4(45) ICTSD 
Bridges (28 November 2000), <http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story1.28–11–
00.htm>. Yet Article 3.7 could be read as an obligation of Aarhus parties to actively 
support an interpretation of existing WTO rules to allow such briefs or to vote for a 
change in rules that would support such an interpretation. Article 3.7 might also (true to 
the idea of promoting rather than simply supporting) oblige member states to urge this 
position on their counterparts and/or fund efforts to educate their counterparts on the 
benefits of non-state participation in dispute resolution. 
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Italy, in October 2002.
119
 The Lucca Declaration suggested the need for 
guidelines on implementing Article 3.7,
120
 and the following year the Working 
Group of the Parties (the intersessional body responsible for the convention’s 
work program) requested that the Bureau of the Meeting of the Parties
121
 establish 
an ad hoc expert group to ‘consider the scope, format and content of possible 
guidelines and the appropriate process for their development.’122 The Secretariat 
invited experts designated by governments, NGOs, relevant international 
organizations, other UN ECE environmental conventions and multilateral 
environmental agreements
123
 to form the ad hoc group, which met during the 
latter half of 2004 and early 2005 to produce draft guidelines. This draft was 
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of the First Meeting of the Parties, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.1 (2 April 2004). 
120
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in Environmental Matters, Working Group of the Parties to the Convention, Report of the 
First Meeting, UN Doc. MP.PP/WG.1/2003/2 (26 November 2003) at para. 47. 
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 The expert group was comprised of legal scholars and environmental NGO 
representatives, including some from the same organizations that had been part of ECO 
and had participated in the negotiations on drafting the Aarhus Convention. The 





revised by the Working Group of the Parties and submitted to the second Meeting 
of the Parties in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in May 2005.
124
 
Scope of the Guidelines: Revisiting Forums Comprised of Non-
Parties 
The ad hoc expert group faced some of the same challenges that 
confronted negotiations over the Aarhus Convention, including questions 
regarding the manner in which Article 3.7 commitments might be differentiated in 
forums made up exclusively of states party and those in which non-parties 
participated. The issue restated is (1) whether Article 3.7 implies a commitment to 
secure access within international forums comprised entirely of Aarhus parties or 
comprised of a majority of Aarhus parties; and (2) whether Article 3.7 might 
impose some sort of duty of evangelism on Aarhus parties in forums where non-
parties are also present.
125
 The draft that emerged from a drafting committee 
formed following the first expert group meeting took a rather ambiguous stance 
on the former question: 
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 ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report 
of the Second Meeting of the Parties, Addendum, Decision II/4, ‘Promoting the 
Application of the Principles of the Aarhus Convention in International Forums,’ adopted 
at the second Meeting of the Parties held in Almaty Kazakhstan, on 25–27 May 2005 
[Decision II/4]; and Almaty Guidelines, supra note 38 at para. 31. 
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 An even more intriguing question, whether there is a de facto access commitment 
within forums composed entirely of Aarhus parties (some sort of duty transmitted, pari 
passu, from forum members to the forum) was not addressed by the drafting committee 





These guidelines are intended [possibly] to determine, [or at 
least influence,] albeit indirectly, the way in which international 
access is secured in international forums wholly composed of or 




On the latter question, the drafting committee suggested only that Article 
3.7 should ‘provide guidance’ to parties in what might be called ‘Aarhus-
minority’ forums—hardly a call one might associate with zealous evangelizing.127 
The drafting committee also proposed language that suggests both intra- and 
extra-regional aspirations that are not necessarily bound to parties to the 
convention, suggesting that the guidelines ‘serve as a source of inspiration’ for 
‘interested States’ forums and non-state actors.128 
The broader expert group accepted this ‘inspiration’ language with only 
modest changes
129
 but took steps to strengthen the language regarding the role of 
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 Draft Guidelines on Promoting the Application of the Principles of the Aarhus 
Convention in International Forums, prepared by the Chairman (of the Expert Group) in 
consultation with the small drafting group established at the first meeting of the Expert 
Group and with the assistance of the Secretariat (31 October 2004), 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ppif/PPIF.Gs.v.310ct.ntc.doc> at para. 5 [copy on file 
with author] [Expert Group Drafting Committee October Draft]. Note that the author of 
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Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
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2005 (Item 11 of the provisional agenda), Report of the Second Meeting of the Expert 





Article 3.7 in both Aarhus-minority forums and those composed of, or controlled 
by, parties. Yet the draft guidelines remained precatory on both counts—stopping 
well short of a legal obligation to implement Aarhus Convention principles in 
forums where Aarhus members dominate (an Aarhus majority)
130
 or even in those 
forums composed entirely of Aarhus parties (Aarhus only): 
These Guidelines are intended, through their application, to 
positively influence the way in which international access is 
secured in international forums in which Parties and Signatories 
to the Convention participate. In forums wholly composed of or 
controlled by Parties to the Convention, these Guidelines are 
[intended][expected], through their application, to be [more]
131
 




Final proposed guidelines were adopted at the fifth meeting of the 
Working Group of the Parties in May 2005
133
 and presented for adoption to the 
                                                                                                                                     
Promoting the Application of the Principles of the Aarhus Convention in International 
Forums, prepared by the Expert Group with the assistance of the secretariat, UN Doc. 
ECE/MP.PP/WG.1/2005/8/Add.1 (23 November 2004) at para. 3, 
<http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2005/pp/wg.1/ece.mp.pp.wg.1.2005.8.e.pdf> 
[Expert Group Final Draft Guidelines] [copy on file with author]  
130
 The term ‘majority’ is used for the sake of simplicity although one might posit a 
forum where Aarhus parties did not constitute a numeric majority yet were able to 
dominate or control the agenda, through financing or some other political or economic 
means.  
131
 Here the expert group included a footnote that read: ‘The Expert Group considered 
that the word “more” would be used in conjunction with the word “expected” but not 
necessarily in a conjunction with the word “intended.”’ Ibid. at para. 2, note 3. 
132
 Ibid. at para. 2. 
133
 The draft guidelines prepared by the expert working group were considered at the 





second Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention during the following 
month in Almaty.
134
 The proposed guidelines that emerged from the working 
group followed the ECE’s approach in drafting the Aarhus Convention as they 
drop the distinction (proposed by the expert group) between forums in which 
parties participate and those ‘wholly composed of or controlled by parties.’ The 
language of the Almaty Guidelines, as proposed by the working group and later 
adopted, reads simply: 
These Guidelines are intended, through their application, to 
positively influence the way in which international access is 




The Almaty Guidelines also embrace the aspiration of the draft text 
developed by the expert group that the ‘Guidelines may also serve as a source of 
inspiration to Signatories and other interested States.’136 
Content of the Guidelines 
The Almaty Guidelines generally affirm the instrumental arguments that 
motivated the Aarhus Convention in the first place, namely that ‘access to 
information, public participation and access to justice in environmental matters 
                                                                                                                                     
ended Bureau Meeting (28 February–1 March 2005), and at the fifth meeting of the 
Working Group of the Parties (22–3 May 2005). See narrative of the Aarhus Secretariat 





 Almaty Guidelines, supra note 38 at para. 6. 
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are fundamental elements of good governance at all levels and essential for 
sustainability’137 and that ‘[p]roviding international access ... generally improves 
the quality of decision-making and the implementation of decisions.’138 They also 
recognize the need to ‘adapt and structure international processes and mechanisms 
in order to ensure meaningful and equitable international access’139 but caution 
that ‘care should be taken to make or keep the processes open, in principle, to the 
public at large.’140 The guidelines encourage special measures to ensure balance 
and equity ‘[w]here members of the public have differentiated capacity, resources, 
socio-cultural circumstances or economic or political influence.’141 They also 
stress that 
[p]rocesses and mechanisms for international access should be 
designed to promote transparency, minimize inequality, avoid 
the exercise of undue economic or political influence, and 
facilitate the participation of those constituencies that are most 
directly affected and might not have the means for participation 
without encouragement and support.
142
 
These provisions speak directly to the unique challenges of structuring a 
‘democratic’ process in the unique circumstances of international decision making 
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The guidelines define ‘international forums’ broadly—without limitation 
to those controlled by the parties to the Aarhus Convention
144—so they can be 
read to encourage a proactive approach even in ‘mixed’ forums of parties and 
non-parties. Provisions on access to information call upon Aarhus parties to 
‘encourage international forums to develop and make available to the public a 
clear and transparent set of policies and procedures on access to the 
environmental information that they hold in order to make access by the public 
more consistent and reliable.’145 A similar call can be found in a provision on 
access to the process of decision making: ‘Efforts should be made to proactively 
seek the participation of relevant actors, in a transparent, consultative manner, 
appropriate to the nature of the forum.’146 And it can also be found in a provision 
on access to justice: ‘Each Party should encourage the consideration in 
international forums of measures to facilitate public access to review procedures 
relating to any application of the rules and standards of each forum.’147 
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The guidelines advance a range of well-known access mechanisms 
common to a growing number of domestic legal frameworks—with adaptations 
relevant to the international context. They call for information to be provided in a 
timely manner
148
 and encourage the designation of information officers.
149
 The 
guidelines create a presumption of access ‘at all relevant stages of the decision-
making process, unless there is a reasonable basis to exclude such participation 
according to transparent and clearly stated standards that are made available, if 
possible, in advance.’150 This emphasis on clearly stated standards for decisions to 
close a process is a feature of domestic systems,
151
 yet it is not a common element 
of international processes that often have a more informal and ad hoc approach to 
participatory rights.
152
 The guidelines also encourage broad participation, but they 
address some of the unique logistical and cost challenges of international access 
by proposing persons who should be seen as particularly ‘relevant stakeholders’ 
and thus particularly relevant to be engaged, including: 
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(a) the members of the public who are, or are likely to be, most 
directly affected; 
(b) representatives of public-interest organizations, such as 
environmental citizens’ organizations; and 
(c) representatives of other interests that might cause, contribute 




The guidelines note that restrictions on access if ‘necessary and 
unavoidable for practical reasons ... should take account of the nature and phase 
of the decision-making process and the form of participation sought, and should 
aim at ensuring the quality, efficiency and expediency of the decision-making 
process.’154 They also address concerns over international accreditation programs 
that may be used to exclude and caution that 
[w]here they are applied, accreditation or selection procedures 
should be based on clear and objective criteria, and the public 
should be informed accordingly. Such procedures should be 
transparent, fair, timely, accountable and accessible, and aimed 




The guidelines also encourage early and open access to documentation 
relating to meetings of international forums in order to assure that participation is 
meaningful
156
 and encourage the use of technology such as websites to help 
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overcome the burden of document distribution in an international setting.
157
 The 
guidelines address one of the greatest concerns of those working on strengthening 
participatory mechanisms (at the domestic and international level)—namely, the 
impact of an open and participatory process on decision making and its 
outcomes—by urging ‘[t]ransparency with respect to the impact of public 
participation on final decisions [including] the public availability of documents 
submitted by the public.’158 
The guidelines adopt in many respects the recommendations of the expert 
group and embrace a range of best practices drawn from national and international 
experience with public participation. Their principal failing is in the area of access 
to justice, where the guidelines reject a range of recommendations developed by 
the expert group through the drafting process relating to ‘[p]ublic involvement in 
international implementation review [and] [compliance] [and dispute settlement] 
mechanisms,’159 including: 
[p]roviding for participation of the public in the development of 
such mechanisms and [in the process of appointing the members 
of the relevant bodies (e.g. by providing an entitlement to 
nominate members), as well as] providing for the mechanism to 
be triggered by submission of petitions or communications, 
including amicus curiae briefs by the public.
160
 
The expert group also states that 
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[a] broad interpretation of the concept of ‘standing’ or its 
equivalent in the context of international forums in proceedings 
involving environmental issues could further the objective of the 




All of these suggestions were dropped from subsequent drafts developed 
by the parties. In their place, the final Almaty Guidelines include a single 
paragraph that calls on parties to 
[e]ncourage the consideration in international forums of 
measures to facilitate public access to review procedures relating 
to any application of the rules and standards of each forum 
regarding access to information and public participation within 
the scope of these guidelines.
162
 
This text lacks the detail of the earlier drafts, which might have been 
useful in working through the unique problems of access to justice in international 
environmental matters, though it does retain the outward-looking promotional 
aspect of the broader text. 
Implementing the Almaty Guidelines 
As the parties approved the Almaty Guideline,s they also created a Task 
Force on Public Participation in International Forums (PPIF Task Force) ‘to enter 
into consultations regarding the Guidelines’ with international forums and to 
report the results of these consultations to the Aarhus working group.
163
 The 
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parties also invited ‘Parties, Signatories, other interested States, non-
governmental organizations, interested international forums and other relevant 
actors’ to comment on the guidelines and on ‘their experience regarding the 
application of the Guidelines.’164 The PPIF Task Force and the Secretariat 
disseminated the Almaty Guidelines and a questionnaire to ninety-seven 
international forums seeking information about how these forums provide access 
to information, decision-making processes, and justice.
165
 The task force chose 
these ninety-seven forums from a much larger potential pool on the basis of five 
criteria: 
1. the number of members in a forum (‘a forum containing a larger 
number of participating States being considered higher 
priority’); 
2. the presence of Aarhus Convention parties in the forum (‘in 
general, the greater the participation of Aarhus Parties in a 
forum [based on the number of members and also on the 
intensity of their involvement], the higher priority that forum 
should be given for consultation’); 
3. the proportion of the forum’s decisions or actions that affect the 
environment (‘greater emphasis ... on consulting with forums 
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for which a sizeable proportion of decisions have environmental 
impacts’); 
4. the potential environmental significance of the forum’s 
decisions or actions (‘even if only some of a forum’s decisions 
or actions have environmental implications, these effects may 
be considerable [thus there is a] priority for consultation to 
some forums whose decisions or actions have the potential to 
most significantly affect the environment at the global or 
regional level’); and 
5. the need of the expressed civil society for having greater 
participation in a particular forum (‘higher priority to those 
forums in which the public most strongly identifies a need for 
greater participation.’)166 
It is important to note that the presence of Aarhus Convention parties in a 
particular forum was only one of these five criteria, and, even in this respect, 
gauging the ‘intensity of involvement’ was deemed as being just as important as 
the proportion of Aarhus members. This point reinforces the idea that the Almaty 
Guidelines are seen as a mechanism to promote participation on an extra-
convention or extra-regional basis because the questionnaire was aimed at forums 
with only passing regard to the number of Aarhus Convention parties involved in 
the forum. If one returns to the original question of whether Article 3.7 should 
have deliberately addressed ‘mixed’ forums, the decisions on consultation and 
follow-up post-Almaty seem to be answering the question affirmatively. This is 
not to suggest that the implementation plan was proceeding with a view to 
aggressive salesmanship. To the contrary, the work plan calls for these criteria ‘to 
be applied in a flexible and integrated manner and subject to each forum’s 
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willingness to engage in the consultation process.’167 Thus, despite a clear 
willingness to engage ‘mixed’ forums (and even those with no Aarhus party 
membership), the work plan acknowledges that ‘[u]ltimately, for any progress to 
be made, the momentum must come from actors within the forum itself, rather 
than from external forces.’168 
Questionnaire Responses 
The Secretariat received responses from sixty-five of the ninety-seven 
international forums identified as a ‘priority for consultation.’169 Of these, fifty-
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 ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
Seventh Meeting of the Working Group of the Parties, Geneva, 2–4 May 2007, Item 5 of 
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two agreed to take part in the consultation process,
170
 and forty-eight provided 
completed responses.
171
 The questionnaire asks relatively general questions,
172
 
and the responses were frequently lacking in detail.
173
 The Secretariat prepared 
synthesis reports highlighting the range of formalized rules and non-formalized 
practices used by the responding forums.
174
 The Secretariat also prepared a 
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172
 The questionnaire was comprised of five questions: 
Please provide any comments on the Guidelines, in view of your forum’s own processes, 
activities and particular characteristics. 
Does your forum have any formalized rules or procedures concerning access to 
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters? If yes, please provide an overview. 
Does your forum have any non-formalized practices concerning access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters? If 
yes, please provide an overview. 
Are there any current or future workplans of your forum that may affect the extent of or 
modalities for access to information, public participation in decision-making and access 
to justice in environmental matters? If yes, please provide an overview.  
In particular, what kind of challenges, if any, has your forum encountered with regard to 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters (for example, low involvement of civil society, or practical 
difficulties in managing public participation)? If appropriate, please provide a description 
underlining those experiences you think could be most useful to consider when reviewing 
the relevance and practicality of the Guidelines.’ Ibid. at para. 6. 
173
 A complete copy of all responses is available at the Aarhus Secretariat website, 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ppif-response.htm> [on file with the author].  
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 These reports are available at 





synthesis of ‘current and future work plans,’ ‘challenges’ to engaging the public 
as identified by respondents, and comments on the Almaty Guidelines.
175
 This 
article will not reiterate all of the findings set forth in the Secretariat’s synthesis 
papers, although a few observations relevant to this article’s focus on the Aarhus 
Convention and its commitment to global citizenship are pertinent. A review of 
the responses reveals that, for the most part, the responding forums profess an 
interest in improving public access to information and to the process of decision 
making at an international level. There is also conceptual support for the Almaty 
Guidelines and the efforts of the PPIF Task Force. 
The responses show that access to information is relatively widely 
available through the use of the Internet, although there are relatively few criteria 
to identify the range of relevant documents that should be made available, and 
Internet posting is more of a practice than a mandate. Criteria for the timely 
provision of relevant documents are also lacking. Access to the process of 
decision making is still relatively rare, with only a third of respondents indicating 
that they have a rule or formal procedure specifically giving a voice to non-state 
actors in their decision-making processes.
176
 Less than 20 percent of forums 




 Examples of forums allowing some speaking rights to non-state actors are the United 
Nations Environment Programme, the Secretariat to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and the UN ECE Timber Committee (ibid.). Many UN bodies indicated that 
they follow general United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) guidelines 





report that they offer a procedure for written comments.
177
 Only one forum 
reports providing a vote to non-state actors. A number of informal practices to 
promote participation were noted, but these often appeared to be ad hoc, and 
commitments to continuing or formalizing these practices were uncertain. With 
respect to access to justice, only two forums indicated that formal procedures 
were available to non-state actors,
178
 and only one indicated that it had a practice 
of allowing non-state submissions or petitions relating to its operations.
179
 
In short, the data show greater expressions of interest and desire than 
actual applications of participatory models, although these data are only a 
snapshot of largely self-described rules and practices. While the process of fact 
gathering through the questionnaire should be seen as an important first step, and 
the willingness of international forums to respond to the request from the PPIF 
Working Group and the Aarhus Secretariat is positive, more data are needed. 
The questionnaire represents an affirmative effort by the Aarhus 
Secretariat, operating under an ECE mandate, to implement the parties’ 
commitments to ‘promote the principles’ of the convention, and it is noteworthy 
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impact), the International Atomic Energy Agency (on draft safety standards), and the 
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Conferences of the Parties) (ibid.). 
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that this effort is taking place on an extra-regional scale. By simply engaging 
international forums in the conversation about participatory approaches, the 
Secretariat and the PPIF Working Group are advancing the principles of the 
convention, and, by asking questions about policies and practices, they are 
causing a beneficial degree of self-assessment and self-scrutiny. The answer of 
these forums to the questionnaire’s ‘what do you think of the guidelines’ question 
also provides some evidence that the participatory norm is resonating—even if 
only rhetorically for the present. 
The Secretariat and PPIF Working Group took the further step of inviting 
international forums to examine the questionnaire responses and of discussing the 
next steps at a meeting entitled Involving the Public in International Forums 
dealing with Matters Relating to the Environment, which was held in June 2007 in 
Geneva.
180
 The meeting offered a further opportunity to promote Article 3.7 and 
the Almaty Guidelines and to discuss challenges that international forums face 
when seeking to engage non-state actors.
181
 
                                                 
180
 A provisional agenda for the meeting is available at 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ppif/Provisional%20annotated%20agenda%20for%20web
site%20%2007.06.2007.pdf> [on file with the author]. A participant list and documents 
distributed at the meeting are also on file with the author and available at 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ppif.htm#Internationalworkshop>.  
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 ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Eighth 
Meeting of the Working Group of the Parties to the Convention, Geneva, 31 October–2 
November 2007, Item 5 of the Provisional Agenda Public Participation in International 





While these steps arguably fall short of the change needed to make 
international forums truly open and responsive to the public, they do represent 
incremental advances in the process of affirming and implementing a normative 
and positive commitment to more participatory international lawmaking. More 
rigorous assessment tools are needed for gauging where meaningful access is 
available (‘meaningful’ as described by the Almaty Guidelines). These tools 
could not only provide a better picture of the state of access at present but also 
offer a baseline against which progress could be measured. Ultimately, any effort 
to monitor the implementation of Article 3.7 will require measuring changes in 
access that occur at the international level. It will also require some effort to 
discern how the regional process sparked by Article 3.7 is affecting any move 
towards greater access. This ‘causal’ question may be difficult to answer, but it is 
worth designing assessment tools that document outreach efforts by Aarhus 
parties as well as progress towards greater access in international forums. 
Whether relationships are seen as coincidental or causal may remain subject to 
debate, but at least some measure of effort and change can be recorded. It would 
also be interesting to better understand how ‘embraced’ this regional strategy 
really is within the international forums and whether there is a sense of 
appreciation for efforts by European leaders on the issue, or whether resistance 
                                                                                                                                     
Matters Relating to the Environment, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/WG.1/2007/L.8 (24 August 
2007), <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ppif/ece_mp_pp_wg_1_2007_1 _8_e.pd> [on file 





can be seen among non-Aarhus states or within the international forums 
themselves. 
Conclusion 
Article 3.7 of the Aarhus Convention, seen in the context of the normative 
and practical debate over participatory models and citizenship in international 
law, reveals a European position that favours public participation in making and 
implementing international law relating to the environment. On the normative 
debate, concerns over accountability and the ironic argument that more 
participation may be somehow less democratic are answered in part by a 
commitment explicitly constructed as a means to increase accountability and 
democratic dialogue. Concerns about the equity of access (whether international 
forums might be subject to over representation, or even capture, by a small or 
‘unrepresentative’ group of civil society actors) <not clear to me?> are addressed 
in the Almaty Guidelines—but they are treated as a question of how to open the 
doors of international processes, not whether those doors should be opened in the 
first place. 
Even the normative concern about preserving state sovereignty in the face 
of public international discourse is answered through continuing state control over 
final decisions under both the Aarhus Convention and the Almaty Guidelines. 
Article 3.7 was certainly born of a broad public discourse, but it was debated, 
edited, and ultimately adopted by states. It was not imposed by the pitchfork-





theorists. In sum, the conversation surrounding Article 3.7 and the Almaty 
Guidelines did nothing to challenge any state’s prerogative to accept or reject any 
of the arguments made during that conversation. 
A normative investment in democratizing international environmental 
decision making and a willingness to establish a positive (though still modest) 
legal framework to secure that investment is thus evident in Aarhus 3.7 and the 
Almaty Guidelines, particularly when viewed in combination with the process 
that European states followed in developing these instruments. The practical 
debate over how best to engage a global public in international environmental 
matters continues, and the challenges of fairness, equity, and meaningful access 
are highlighted but not resolved by the Almaty Guidelines. Yet the debate is 
certainly advanced by the guidelines, and the willingness of Aarhus parties to 
confront practical obstacles rather than recite them as a basis for paralysis is 
significant. 
The long-term effect that this European position on international access 
may have on the structure and operation of international forums is less certain. 
Article 3.7 provides impetus for Aarhus parties to promote conceptions and 
mechanisms of citizenship at the international level, but there are grounds for 
caution in anticipating the impact they can have. The Working Group of the 
Parties to the Aarhus Convention reflected caution in planning for consultations 





If a forum does decide to be involved, its level of interest and 
commitment will be fundamental to the success of the process. 
Ultimately, for any progress to be made, the momentum must 




Whatever distinction this implies between a forum and the ‘actors within’ 
a forum, Aarhus parties should not view themselves as being ‘external’ to the 
international forums they create and control, even where they share this control 
with states that have not acceded to the Aarhus Convention.
183
 In a sense, the 
debate that began in the working groups that drafted the Aarhus Convention will 
be played out by each Aarhus state party in each forum to which it belongs. 
The effect of Article 3.7 will need to be assessed over time with respect to 
each of the three kinds of forums that concerned the proponents of Article 3.7: 
First, forums comprised entirely of Aarhus parties (Aarhus only); second, forums 
dominated or controlled by Aarhus parties (Aarhus majority); and, finally, those 
forums in which Aarhus parties do not have the ability to control or direct (Aarhus 
minority). Though early efforts to draft an explicit distinction among these 
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 ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Sixth 
Meeting of the Working Group of the Parties to the Convention, Geneva, 5–7 April 2006, 
Report of the Sixth Meeting, Addendum 1, ‘Work Plan, Including Plan of Consultation on 
the Guidelines on Promoting The Application of the Principles of the Aarhus Convention 
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 Indeed, the mandate should hold where only a single Aarhus signatory is a party to a 





categories in the context of the Article 3.7 obligation failed, there remain 
important factual and perhaps legal distinctions that must be tested over time. 
With the first category, the question may be asked whether a legal 
commitment by all of the members of a forum can be seen as a per se legal 
commitment of the forum itself. With both the first and second, one might ask 
whether there is an obligation to use control (whether political or economic) to 
advance, or even impose, the legal commitments of the controlling group. For 
each of these categories, one might ask about moral as well as legal compulsion. 
In the final category, the question is whether parties to the Aarhus Convention 
have embraced some duty to evangelize or spread the ‘good word’ of open 
democratic process in any forum where they may find themselves. Should (or 
will) Aarhus parties, for example, take a lead in the controversy over non-state 
amicus briefs before the World Trade Organization and promote a more open 
process before dispute resolution panels and appellate bodies? Beyond these 
category-specific questions, because the Aarhus Convention is in its origin a 
European (at least an ECE) convention, one might ask the broader question of 
what kind of leadership Europe is willing to show in advancing environmental 
citizenship and promoting greater democratic participation in international 
environmental matters. 
The existence of Article 3.7 is not a direct answer to these questions, and 
the Almaty Guidelines do not resolve the broader debate over a normative or 





evidence to those in search of such a standard, and Aarhus parties committed to 
the letter and spirit of Article 3.7 can certainly take it as a positive prescription to 
advance the debate incrementally, forum by forum. In the meantime, if one 
accepts the views of transboundary and process theorists about the nature of 
international law and lawmaking, then the efforts of the parties to the Aarhus 
Convention to determine how (and how effectively) non-state actors are becoming 
citizens in international forums, and to promote the Almaty Guidelines, can 
themselves be seen as transformative. And even if one takes a narrower, strictly 











The rising dispute over greater public access to the machinery of 
international law features two rival camps, each raising a flag of democracy, and 
each claiming that the other threatens that flag.  They represent competing models 
of global governance.  One camp sees a vital constitutive role for non-state actors 
in lawmaking.  The other views states as exclusive and autonomous international 
protagonists.  Yet despite these polar positions, each claims the mantle of the 
“more democratic.”  This article joins the debate and examines international 
summits as an emerging phenomenon that offers a potential bridge between the 
two positions.  Summit meetings of heads of state and government are public 
forums where transboundary constituencies engage state leaders even as those 
leaders engage one another.  Lawmaking, though only a ceremonial fraction of 
summit meetings themselves, is advanced by planning and implementing summit 
commitments; in these interstices non-state actors work to inform outcomes and 
shape institutional agendas.  This Article examines the role of non-state actors in 
summits and asks whether they can be viewed as contributors to the lawmaking 
process.  This Article studies inter-American summits as a case in point, focusing 
on efforts to advance a regional “democracy agenda” through the catalysis of the 
summit process.  Case studies include a U.S. proposal for a regional public 
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DEPAUL L. REV. 1-68 (2009).  Citations to the material in this chapter should be to that 





participation strategy, a Peruvian initiative to discourage and respond to coups, 
and a Canadian measure to increase citizen access to the region’s chief political 
body.  The Article shows that summits facilitated these initiatives by providing a 
context for cooperative lawmaking in which non-state actors played a central 
role—a key concern for public access proponents.  Yet states initiated and 
managed the process, and heads of state and government ultimately ratified the 
outcomes, so the public role in shaping outcomes did not threaten state 
authority—a key concern for access critics.  In the debate over the appropriate 
place for non-state actors in international lawmaking, the author thus concludes 
that summits can advance the legitimacy and democracy concerns that, at their 
core, appear to motivate the competing positions.  While summits are not a basis 
for lasting peace between the camps, they are seen as an emerging mechanism 
that offers common ground. 
The Debate Over Non-State Access 
In the ongoing debate about mechanisms through which international law 
is made and administered, a number of scholars have argued that non-state 
actors,
185
 often acting within networks that include subsidiary state agencies and 
                                                 
185
 The term “non-state actor” is used in this chapter 
in its broadest sense to include organizations, communities, groups, 
associations, institutions, and even individual actors (activists, scholars, 
or private sector entrepreneurs).  While there is a tendency to group such 
actors together under the heading “non-governmental organization,” 
“private voluntary organization,” or “civil society organization,” the term 
“non-state actor” is used here for several reasons.  It emphasizes 





inter-state institutions, have an important jurisgenerative role.
186
  Peter Haas, for 
example, has described epistemic communities of scientific and policy experts 
that worked to address problems such as the transboundary pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea
187
 and threats to the ozone layer.
188
  Haas argues that these 
communities act as “channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to 
                                                                                                                                     
objectives . . . . [Moreover], it focuses on an essential question in 
international law—the participation of actors who are not state 
sovereigns in processes designed by and for states that have traditionally 
been the province of states. 
 
Eric Dannenmaier, A European Commitment to Environmental Citizenship: Article 3.7 
of the Aarhus Convention and Public Participation in International Forums, in 18 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 32, 33 n.4 (Ole Kristian 
Fauchald et al. eds., 2007). 
186
 The question of what is jurisgenerative in international law is bound up in a broader 
theoretical debate about the nature of international law; the importance of processes that 
give shape to positive legal commitments; and the significance of less formal 
instruments, institutions, and networks.  See generally THE METHODS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2005) (presenting 
a collection of articles previously published in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW that explore alternative theoretical frameworks for international 
law).  These questions are explored in greater depth in Part VII of this Article 
(Jurisgenerative Potential).  See infra notes 486 to 513 and accompanying text.  
187
 See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter?  Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control, 43 INT’L ORG. 377, 384-87 (1989).  The term “epistemic 
communities” was earlier offered by John Ruggie to describe the communities that form 
around common policy ideas.  See John Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to 
Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 569–70 (1975) (analogizing to 
what Michele Foucault referred to as “‘epistemes,’ through which the political 
relationships” acted out on the international stage “are visualized”).   
188
 See Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to 





governments as well as from country to country,”189 and that they are an 
important means to solve multilateral problems and promote world order.
190
   
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have described how non-state actors 
work though transnational advocacy networks that “interact with each other, with 
states, and with international organizations” to “change the behavior of states and 
international organizations.”191  Keck and Sikkink point to the growing influence 
of these networks, which they portray as 
 [s]imultaneously principled and strategic actors, they “frame” 
issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to 
attract attention and encourage action, and to “fit” with 
favorable institutional venues.  Network actors bring new ideas, 
norms, and discourses into policy debates, and serve as sources 
of information and testimony.
192
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 See id. at 27–28; see also Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic 
Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 
INT’L ORG. 367, 370-71 (1992) (describing the instrumental value of epistemic 
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While these networks engage government officials in an expansive policy 
community,
193
 participants are frequently non-governmental, and their agendas 
reflect the policy priorities of an even broader public.
194
 
In a 2006 Centennial Anniversary article for the American Journal of 
International Law, Steve Charnovitz traced the history and discussed the 
relevance of non-state actor contributions to international lawmaking.
195
  He 
concentrated on the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
196—
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 See id. at 31.  The term “government officials” is used in this Article in a broad sense 
to encompass a range of senior, mid-level, and junior diplomats and bureaucrats (at each 
level including career employees as well as political appointees), not just senior officials 
who may be answering directly to a head of state. 
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 Id. at 7–8.  Networks comprised principally of governmental officials are also actively 
engaged in defining international priorities and shaping law outside of the traditional 
structure and formal hierarchies of foreign ministries.  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
have described “transgovernmental” activity “among sub-units of different governments 
that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives 
of those governments.”  Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental 
Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974).  Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has detailed how these “[n]etworks of government officials—police 
investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators—increasingly exchange 
information and coordinate activity to . . . address common problems on a global scale.”  
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 1 (2004). 
195
 See generally Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International 
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Nongovernmental 
Organizations].  Charnovitz has also authored an earlier, more extensive catalogue of 
non-state actor participation.  See generally Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of 
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183 (1997) 
[hereinafter Charnovitz, Participation]. 
196
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a dominant species of non-state actor—and argued that they “promote 
accountability by monitoring what government delegates say and do,” and that 
they “communicate that information to elected officials and the public.”197  
NGOs, he noted, “help assure that decision makers are aware of the sympathies 
and interests of the people who will be affected by intergovernmental 
decisions.”198  These scholars and others make the case that non-state actors have 
an increasingly important affirmative role in international governance.
199
  They 
                                                                                                                                     
tanks, business groups, individuals, and for-profit organizations—and sometimes not.  As 
discussed above, this Article is concerned with the broader universe of non-state actors.  
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.  Yet NGOs are an important class of non-
state actor, and they are frequent protagonists and thus frequently studied, so literature 
about NGOs is both abundant and relevant to the broader inquiry. 
197




 See generally, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under 
International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005) at 93-111, 111 (examining the legal capacity of 
NGOs to behave as states do in international law and concluding that there is “much 
more reason for concern about the negative impact of ‘irresponsible’ governments than 
about ‘irresponsible NGOs’”); Eric Dannenmaier, Trade, Democracy, and the FTAA: 
Public Access to the Process of Constructing a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1066, 1115 (2004) (describing a process through which non-state 
actors engaged negotiators of a regional trade accord in dialogue regarding societal 
priorities in areas such as the environment, labor, and combating corruption, and 
concluding that “the principles of participation far outweigh the principles of secrecy 
when multilateral [trade] policies are [ultimately] applied at the national level”); David 
Wirth, Public Participation in International Processes: Environmental Case Studies at 
the National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 38 (1996) 
(analyzing competing policies of openness and secrecy in international environmental 





also highlight the normative value and instrumental advantage of an engaged 
public, and they are sympathetic to, and often proponents of, increasing access to 
the processes they describe.
200
 
Others contest this scholarship and reject its normative implications.  They 
hold to a more traditional Westphalian idea of international lawmaking that is 
reserved to autonomous and insular sovereign states.  Former Interim Permanent 
Representative of the United States to the United Nations John Bolton
201
 is a 
prominent critic of an international governance role for civil society.
202
  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                     
level can undermine the legitimacy of government at the national level in those cases 
“international institutions are vehicles for domestic policy making in the first instance”). 
200
 See Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 195, at (368-72); David 
B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental Standards at 
International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437, 456–57 (2008). 
201
 Bolton was appointed by President George W. Bush in a recess appointment after 
Bolton failed to receive confirmation from the Senate, and he served from August 2005 
until December 2006.  He resigned when his recess appointment would have ended.  See 
Helene Cooper, Bush Drops Bid to Keep Bolton as UN Envoy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 
5, 2006, at 1.  
202
 See generally John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 205, 215-218 (2000) [hereinafter Bolton, Global Governance] (allowing civil 
society's “intrastate advocates to reargue their positions” in international forums “raises 
profoundly troubling questions of democratic theory that its advocates have almost 
entirely elided.”); John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30–31 (2000) [hereinafter Bolton, Is There 
Really Law?] (questioning the conceptual legitimacy of “international ‘civil society’” 
because it is a “collection of advocacy NGOs” which are “far different” from the 
“associations that make up domestic ‘civil society’” and challenging the tactics of 






Kenneth Anderson has decried the threat that non-state actors, principally 
international NGOs, pose to “the sovereignty of democratic states.”203  Bolton, 
Anderson, and other critics reject transnational collaboration outside traditional 
diplomatic channels as an unaccountable, illegitimate, and even undemocratic 
threat to vital conceptions of sovereignty.
204
  One key metaphor that Bolton uses 
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 Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: 
Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International 
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 372 (2001); see also Kenneth 
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 See Bolton, Is There Really Law, supra note 202, at 30–31 (“What actually seems to 
be happening is that the international NGOs are becoming an alternative to national 
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democracies.”); Anderson & Rieff, supra note 203, at 37; The Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Gilbert 
Guillaume, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 216, 287-88 (July 8) (suggesting that the I.C.J. “could have 
considered declining to respond to the request for an advisory opinion” because the 
request from the U.N. General Assembly “originated in a campaign conducted by” 
NGOs, criticizing the “pressure brought to bear” by NGOs, expressing concern over the 
continued “independence” of governments and intergovernmental institutions in the face 
of this pressure); Serge Surs, Vers Une Cour. Pénale Internationale: La Convention de 
Rome entre les ONG et le Conseil de. Sécurité, 103 R.G.D.I.P. 29, 35-36 (expressing 
concern over the “excessive NGO role” at the 1998 Rome Conference that created the 
International Criminal Court).  In the context of a broader claim about the “problem” that 
international law is undemocratic, Jed Rubenfeld echoes the concerns of many access 
critics when he argues, 
In the last ten years or so, it became common for internationalists to 
reply to this problem by pointing to the growing influence of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in international law circles, as if 





when challenging non-state access to international process is a claim that this 
access provides a “second bite at the apple.”205  Presumably, Bolton means that 
citizens are provided sufficient domestic access to the formulation of foreign 
policy, and they should thus leave the table sated, when he asserts that “[c]ivil 
society’s ‘second bite at the apple’ raises profoundly troubling questions of 
democratic theory that its advocates have almost entirely elided.”206  A metaphor 
that portrays democratic discourse as a perishable and finite comestible that is 
diminished (consumed) rather than strengthened by its participants seems even 
more profoundly troubling, but an explanation is entirely elided. 
While it may seem ironic to charge that making international law more 
participatory will actually make it less democratic these are nevertheless the terms 
in which some see the issue.  The debate has become more heated as non-state 
access and the role of NGOs have grown, and it touches on a central problem in 
international law: the advancement of means for cooperative—and, when needed, 
coercive—global governance in a system of autonomous sovereign states.  State-
                                                                                                                                     
somehow exemplified world public opinion, and as if the antidemocratic 
nature of international governance were a kind of small accountability 
hole that these NGOs could plug. 
Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2018 
(2004) (footnote omitted); see also Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American 
Constitution, 55 NAT’L INT. 30, 37 (1999) (“NGOs never have to face voters or bear any 
sort of accountability.”). 
205







centrism is, for now at least, the system we have.  A pragmatist must admit wide 
latitude to the sovereign prerogative and anticipate its forceful defense.  But this 
Article argues that such latitude should not be seen to irretrievably foreclose the 
potential of non-state actors to inform, shape, and police international law.  Their 
access to decision-making process is not an assault on state autonomy.  In many 
cases, non-state actors may play a role in lawmaking that access proponents find 
vital, without threatening the legitimacy and democracy values that they share in 
common with access critics. 
Summits as an Entry Point 
This Chapter examines one such case.  It explores an emerging 
phenomenon in international relations—international summits207—that may serve 
as a bridging mechanism between the two positions, at least when certain process 
features are present.  Unlike traditional diplomatic discourse, which is often 
sequestered and problem-specific, summits convene national leaders on a highly 
public stage in a transparent and frequently expansive policy dialogue.  Summit 
agendas cover a broad range of technical and policy issues that are cooperatively 
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 Heads of state and government are called by diverse names—prime minister, emir, 
king, and president, for example—as are meetings among them.  This Article will use the 
terms “international summit” and “summit” to refer to a forum of heads of state from 
more than two countries who are meeting to discuss common interests in regional, 
economic, or security matters.  This definition excludes ad hoc meetings that may take 
place from time to time to address this same range of issues and focuses instead on 





developed by specialized subsidiary state agencies that are capable of working 
across borders in collaboration with inter-state and non-state actors. 
This Article argues that summits may be fertile ground for the sort of 
productive non-state input described by Charnovitz, Kamminga, Wirth, and 
others,
208
 while operating within the context of transboundary networks such as 
those described by Haas, Keck, and Sikkink, among others.
209
  Yet summits 
ultimately direct this cooperation and input through participating states’ chief 
political authorities in a way that responds to the state-centered critique that is 
advanced by access critics such as Bolton and Anderson.
210
  While non-state 
actors operate through transboundary networks to inform and shape outcomes, 
ministries and executive offices that are directly accountable to the state’s 
principal political authority still review and approve final policy declarations and 
action plans.  Heads of state and government must ultimately sign the 
commitments that must be ratified (in the case of formal obligations) or at least 
implemented (in the case of less formal promises) by domestic institutions of 
government.   
Having helped to shape and advance specific outcomes, transboundary 
networks are positioned and motivated to support implementation, and this 
                                                 
208
 See Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 195; Kamminga, supra 
note 199; Wirth, supra note 199; Dannenmaier, supra note 199. 
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 See Haas, supra notes 187 and 189; Keck & Sikkink, supra note 191. 
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 See Bolton, Global Governance, and Is There Really Law, supra note 202; Anderson, 







 and increases the likelihood of compliance,
212
 
both of which are important instrumental contributions to the process of 
international lawmaking.  Participation by non-state actors also offers the 
normative value associated with deliberative democracy, such as promoting 
practices of mutual respect and encouraging public spiritedness.
213
  Yet state 
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 See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 
(1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS] (arguing that nations are 
more likely to obey laws with a high degree of perceived legitimacy, and that legitimacy 
is reinforced by elements of “determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and 
adherence”); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: 
International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 94 (2006) 
[hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy of Power] (arguing that “determinacy,” or “that which 
makes [the rule’s] message clear or transparent” is perhaps the most important of these 
legitimacy-reinforcing elements).  Engaging non-state actors in international processes 
not only increases process transparency and the clarity of outcomes but also better 
positions non-state actors to support adherence in a domestic context; see also infra Part 
VII (arguing that engaging non-state actors in the summit process has increased the 
jurisgenerative potential of summits). 
212
 See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) 
(advancing a “managerial” model of treaty compliance that relies on a continuing 
dialogue between the parties, international officials, and NGOs); see also infra notes 493 
to 494 and accompanying text (describing the propensity of summits to “promote 
conforming behavior” among state institutions and to place societal actors in a position to 
monitor implementation). 
213
 See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 10–
12 (2004) (arguing that mutual respect and public spiritedness are important in dealing 
with moral disagreement that can otherwise undermine legitimacy in governance); see 
also infra notes 490 to 492 and accompanying text (summarizing how summits engage 
interested parties, including vocal dissidents, in dialogue and consensus building) and 





commitment and state resources remain essential to fulfilling promises that are 
made through the summit process. 
In recent years, international summits have advanced substantially in 
profile as well as productivity, though they remain largely unstudied outside the 
circle of diplomats and specialists who manage their processes.  Although ad hoc 
high level meetings abound, this article is concerned with periodic and 
“institutionalized” summits where an iterative planning process drives outcomes, 
and where these outcomes rely on institutions or institutional features for 
implementation.
214
  This Article studies the inter-American summit process as a 
case in point, focusing on efforts to strengthen democratic practices and 
institutions among Organization of American States (OAS) member states over 
the past decade.  It finds that the inter-American process features a relatively 
flexible and inclusive mechanism through which epistemic communities—usually 
loose coalitions of state and non-state actors—have made modest but measurable 
progress in advancing this regional policy agenda.
215
  In each case, inter-
American summits provided a platform for states and inter-state networks to 
negotiate interests and shape regional approaches.  And in each case, the 
outcomes were overseen by officials reporting to heads of state, and the outcomes 
                                                                                                                                     
models and the potential of summits to change the context of interaction within regional 
policy institutions). 
214
 For examples of nineteen global and regional summits that were organized around 
social, economic, or security interests, see infra notes 251 to 269 and accompanying text. 
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themselves were ultimately endorsed by heads of state.
216
  In fact, it is often 
difficult to separate the agendas of state officials from those of non-state actors, at 
least as negotiated through and transformed by the deliberative process.
217
 
Although most inter-American summit “commitments” are not, in and of 
themselves, binding law in a positivist sense,
218
 the process has a normative push 
that can drive more formal commitments.
219
  Summit agreements frame the 
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 Formal summit outcomes, in the form of declarations and plans of action, are typically 
signed by the heads of state and government who participate in the summit meetings.  
The exception is the most recent summit in Trinidad in April 2009, where a consensus 
document was signed by the chair rather than participating state leaders.  See infra note 
315 and accompanying text. 
217
 This outcome is seen as a positive feature of deliberative democracy, which seeks to 
combine preferences “in various ways that are efficient and fair” through a process that 
“tells citizens and their representatives to . . .  reason together.”  GUTMANN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 213, at 13, 20.   
218
 Even calling summit statements “commitments” might be contested, although that is 
the term commonly used among negotiators and bureaucrats when describing the 
imperative language of summit documents.  Inter-American summit documents are 
variously called “declarations” or “plans of action,” and the text is usually couched in 
terms that state the signatories “will” accomplish a set of aims, which can vary from 
statements of principle to concrete programs.  See, e.g., Third Summit of the Americas, 
Quebec City, Can., Apr. 22, 2001, Plan of Action [hereinafter Quebec Plan of Action], at 
1, available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/59664.htm (“[will] recogniz[e] the 
relationship among democracy, sustainable development [and] the separation of 
powers”); id. at 6 (“[will] establish an inter-American program within the OAS for the 
promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants”).  The word “commitment” 
will thus be used in this Article not to imply a binding legal obligation, but for ease of 
reference to provisions of summit documents that are more than merely precatory. 
219
 Summit commitments can be seen as advancing the lawmaking process and, by some 
theorists, as a type of soft law.  There are some summit outcomes that can be seen as 





agenda for key institutional actors and stimulate negotiations over details—such 
as trade agreements
220—that encourage prescriptive adaptation.  Moreover, 
summits can engage a broad spectrum of non-state actors and address wide-
ranging social concerns—including the environment, human rights, gender 
discrimination, indigenous rights, and trade—in a dynamic and transparent way 
that may strengthen the legitimacy of summit outcomes and related regional 
projects.
221
  As a consequence, inter-American summits have strong 
jurisgenerative potential, and the public process through which summit agendas 
are developed serves to strengthen that potential.
222
  Moreover, because summits 
feature transparency, openness, and inclusive agenda setting that emphasizes 
collaboration among states and their domestic constituencies, outcomes are more 
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 Negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas, for example, were called for in 
the Miami Summit.  See infra note 285 and accompanying text.   
221
 Legitimacy in outcome and process may be viewed in different ways, but here I use 
the term legitimacy in the sense that Thomas Franck has described as “the capacity of a 
rule to pull those to whom it is addressed toward consensual compliance.” Franck, 
Legitimacy of Power, supra note 211, at 93.  The case studies presented in this Article 
suggest that inter-American summit commitments are reached through a process that 
values transparency and public access in a way that satisfies common normative concerns 
of national constituencies that are concerned with the subject matter of summits.  This 
does not suggest that the process is ideal or could not stand improvement, but it does help 
strengthen the legitimacy of summit outcomes as international legal norms; see also 
David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of 
Democratic Authority, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND 
POLITICS 173, 173–74 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (outcome legitimacy 
derives in part “from the epistemic value … of the procedure that has produced it.”).    
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likely to be drawn into domestic legal agendas through transboundary legal 
process mechanisms such as those described by transboundary process 
theorists.
223
  Evidence of this is found in domestic legislation that directly reflects 
summit commitments, in state behavioral adaptations, and in those instances when 
states commit funds and institutional resources to implement summit promises.
224
  
Even the tension and discord in evidence at the most recent summit in Trinidad 
and Tobago
225
 suggest that there is a very real connection between summit 
outcomes and domestic concerns.  The unwillingness of some leaders to embrace 
summit promises that are inconsistent with domestic priorities, and the strong 
rhetorical connection between regional and domestic discourses, are as indicative 
of the potential power of the summit process as they are of the fractious state of 
regional politics. 
This chapter concludes that, by embracing transparent and participatory 
process features, inter-American summits have produced a mutually reinforcing 
phenomenon: the jurisgenerative potential of summits increases as public access 
to the insular world of international decision making expands.
226
  Where these 
features are present, summits can, in a sense, “democratize” without being 
antidemocratic.  They might thus be seen as mechanisms that can bridge the 






 See infra notes 312 to 318 and accompanying text. 
226





distance between those who embrace transboundary networks and those who fear 
that they overreach, which is perhaps one step in the direction of reconciling an 
important theoretical divide. 
Part two describes international summits as an emerging institutional 
phenomenon.
227
  It offers a partial catalogue of summits that have become 
regularized opportunities for heads of state to meet and affirm commitments to 
broad policy goals that can then be carried forward by state-bound institutions.   
Part three explores the history of inter-American summits in particular, 
offering a brief background on how these regional meetings have emerged since 
the first contemporary Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994 to create 
cooperative networks, shape institutional agendas, promote normative solutions, 
and facilitate monitoring and compliance.
228
  
Part four reviews non-state actor access to inter-American summit 
preparations, including the formulation of summit commitments and mandates.
229
  
It examines the unique process features that allow non-state actors to become 
engaged with foreign ministries and expert government agencies so that policy 
priorities are not discussed in a vacuum.  Policy actors in the Inter-American 
System, both state and non-state, have taken advantage of these unique features to 
advance policy and normative goals through a process that is deliberative, and 
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thus more democratic from an access proponent perspective, yet never outside the 
oversight or control of states, and thus no less democratic from an access critic 
perspective.  The institutionalization of participatory norms within the inter-
American summit has reinforced two types of summit outcomes.  The first is a 
largely hortatory call for greater democracy within the region.
230
  The second is a 
series of commitments to reform regional institutions in order to make them more 




Part five addresses the first and more general of these two outcomes.
232
  It 
examines inter-American summit commitments to promoting principles of 
democratic governance and public participation at a regional and national level.  
This Part traces the language of inter-American summit agreements from 1994 to 
present that promote regional efforts to advance a “democracy” agenda among 
OAS member states.
233
  It also outlines commitments to greater participation in 
development decision making, both among and within OAS member states, along 
with prescriptive and institutional advances relating to these commitments.
234
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Part six addresses specific summit outcomes.  It presents four case studies 
of democratic commitments that emerged from the inter-American summit 
process:  (1) the formulation of the Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of 
Public Participation in Sustainable Development Decision-Making (ISP), which 
addressed public participation at the regional and national level;
235
 (2) the 
development of an Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), which would in 
part discourage internal extra-constitutional challenges to elected governments;
236
 
(3) the increase in openness and transparency of negotiations to create a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA);
237
 and (4)  the engagement of non-state 
actors in the OAS through a program of accreditation.
238
  Each example shows 




Part seven discusses the jurisgenerative potential of inter-American 
summits in light of the outcomes discussed in the prior two Parts.
240
  Inter-
American summits have placed lawmaking and implementation in a more 
transparent institutional and procedural context, and they have opened the process 
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in a way that introduces important deliberative features.  While this Article shows 
some cases in which the summit process has had a discernable impact on positive 
law that emerged from the inter-American system, it does not claim a linear or 
direct causal connection between summit outcomes and prescriptive 
commitments.  Instead, it argues that the process through which inter-American 
summits are managed and executed has a role in substantiating normative claims 
and shaping positive legal frameworks.  This Article does not directly enter the 
debate over the nature of international law and the importance of soft law and 
legal process versus positive law, but the phenomenon it describes is certainly 
relevant to that debate.  Even if summit outcomes are not understood as law, they 
should be understood as part of lawmaking, and the inclusionary or exclusionary 
manner in which these outcomes are formulated matters.   
Part eight concludes that a participatory and institutionalized inter-
American summit process has served a mutually reinforcing function:  increasing 
the legitimacy and prescriptive potential of summits even while providing a 
vehicle for bringing the concerns and agendas of non-state actors closer to the 
process and institutions of international law.
241
  The format and impact of 
summits vary widely, and no claim is made that the inter-American summit 
process represents a universal model.  Summits do, however, possess the common 
dimension that they periodically convene heads of state on a public stage to 
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address issues of public concern.  The summits with which this Article is 
concerned also have an institutionalized multilateral framework within which 
those issues are discussed and outcomes are derived.  To the extent that summits 
possess or may come to possess the key features explored in this Article, they 
offer a mechanism for engaging non-state actors that can satisfy divergent claims 
about how to advance democratic ideals through international process. 
The Summit Phenomenon 
International summits are an important, although under studied, post-
World War II institutional trend that has grown in scope and impact in the post-
Soviet era.  As more commonly studied international institutions such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank have matured, at least twenty-one global and 
regional head of state forums have also evolved;
242
 a few have been singular 
events, but most are planned and held on an annual or biennial basis.  Summits 
address issues ranging from global concerns (such as climate change, human 
rights, and terrorism) to parochial concerns (such as trade and economic 
integration) to local concerns (such as Indonesian forest fires and the need to 
promote women to positions of authority in African states).  While summits fulfill 
the public diplomacy role of providing a world stage to national leaders, their 
                                                 
242
 This count includes the following: seventeen continuing forums, each of which has 
included dozens of separate summit meetings; three stand-alone forums, namely the 2005 
U.N. Summit, the 1992 and 2002 Sustainable Development Summits, and the 1955 and 
2005 Asian-African Summits; and one new forum that was inaugurated in 2005, the East 





substantive impact should not be discounted.  Summits provided a context and 
platform for the formation of the Organization for African Unity;
243
 helped to 
advance the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (the 1955 Asian-African 
Conference);
244
 provided a platform for concluding the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 (concluded at 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development or “Earth 
Summit”),245 and almost offered an opportunity for exile to Saddam Hussein a 
                                                 
243
 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (signed May 25, 1963; 
entered into force Sept. 13, 1963) (signed by “the Heads of African States and 
Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia”). 
244
 See GEORGE MCTURNAN KAHIN, THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE: BANDUNG, 
INDONESIA, APRIL 1955, (1956) (describing from a journalistic perspective the meeting 
of leaders from twenty-nine Asian and African countries and reproducing key speeches 
and final agreements).  The Final Communiqué from Bandung included provisions for 
economic and cultural cooperation, the promotion of human rights and self 
determination, and the promotion of peace and security cooperation.  Id. at 76-85.  
Participants created a basis for continuing cooperation through a commitment to appoint 
“Liaison Officers … for the exchange of information on matters of mutual interest.”  Id. 
at 78.  Participants also signed a Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and 
Cooperation which called for “respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all 
nations,” abstention from aggression, abstention from interference in domestic affairs, 
“equality of all races and nations,” peaceful dispute settlement, and “promotion of mutual 
interests and cooperation.”  Id. at 83-85. 
245
 See Shanna L. Halpern, Academic Council for the UN Sys., The United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development: Process and Documentation, at 12 (1992), 










As the power and legitimacy of international law are debated in a newly 
multi-polar international political context, the emergence of summits appears to 
have been underappreciated, or at least under studied.  Efforts to construct a “new 
world order,”247 to deconstruct global administrative law,248 and to seek greater 
democratic access to international decision making
249
 might each benefit from a 
close study of the phenomenon of summits.  Summits might not currently be 
viewed as formal international institutions, but as they become institutionalized 
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 In the days before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, then-President George W. Bush 
announced, “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal 
to do so will result in military conflict.”  CNN reported that there were  
=xt 
some private maneuverings among some Arab leaders to try to forestall the U.S. invasion.  
. . . [R]oughly three weeks before the first U.S. strike, Saddam Hussein agreed in 
principle to accept an offer of exile.  The offer came from the United Arab Emirates and 
was presented to other Arab leaders during a summit of the Arab League in Egypt.  The 
proposal . . . was never acted upon.  
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The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Nov. 2, 2005), available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0511/02/sitroom.03.html (last visited July 30, 
2009). 
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 Slaughter, supra note 194 at 15–17. 
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 See Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1495, 1561–62 (2006). 
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and begin to shape institutional agendas, they might offer an opportunity to meet 
the concerns of those who wish to see international law become more democratic. 
The following table of recent regional and global summits provides an 
idea of the extent of the summit phenomenon.  While these meetings do not all 
share the same process features as the inter-American summits, they fit the basic 
definition of periodic meetings of heads of state and government.
250
  Although 
this article focuses only on the inter-American process, these other meetings 
might also warrant study as they become increasingly institutionalized 
international forums.  
Table 1: Partial Catalogue of Recent Summits 
1. Andean Community (ANCOM) (17th) Tarija, Bolivia 2007251  
2. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (16th) Singapore 2009252 
3. Arab League (20th) Damascus, Syria 2008253  
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 See supra note 207, and accompanying text. 
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 Declaration of Tarija: Seventeenth Regular Meeting of the Andean Council of 
Presidents, Traija, Bol., June 14, 2007, 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documents /tarija.htm (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2009).   
252
 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Peru and APEC, 
http://www.apec2008.org.pe/apecperua ndapec.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).   
253
 The 2008 Arab League Summit, http://www.middleeastprogress. org/2008/03/the-





5. Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (7th) Beijing, China 2008255 




7. African Union (AU) (13th) Sirt, Libya 2009257 
8. European Union (EU ) Brussels, Belgium 2009258 
9. Group of Eight (G-8) L’Aquila, Italy 2009259 
10. Group of Twenty (G-20) United Kingdom 2009260  
                                                                                                                                     
254
 14th ASEAN Summit, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thail., Feb. 28–Mar. 1, 2009, Chairman’s 
Statement of the 14th ASEAN Summit: “ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples”, 
http://aseansec.org/22328.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).   
255
 Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM Summits: Overview, 
http://www.aseminfoboard.org/page.phtml?code=Summits# (last visited July 30, 2009).  
256
 This second Asian-African Summit was held fifty years after the inaugural edition.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Asian-African Summit 2005 and the 
Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Asian-African Conference 1955, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/anno unce/2005/4/0419.html  (last visited Oct. 15, 
2009).   
257
 African Union, Summit 2009 Sirt—Libya, 
http://foreign.gov.ly/online/ausummit2009/en/ (last visited June 27, 2009).   
258
 Brussels European Council, Brussels, Belg., June 18–19, 2009, Presidency 
Conclusions (June 19 2009), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108 622.pdf (last 
visited July 30, 2009).  
259
 G-8 Summit 2009, http://www.g8italia2009.it/G8/Home/G8-G8_Layout_locale-
1199882116809_Home.htm (last visited July 30, 2009).   
260
 The London Summit, Apr. 2, 2009, Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, 
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/final-communique (last visited July 
30, 2009).  Note that the G-20, formally known as the “Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance 





11. Inter-American Summit (5th) Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago 2009261 




13. Non-Aligned Movement (15th) Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt263  
14. Rio Group (20th) Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 2008264  
15. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (15th) 
Colombo, Sri Lanka 2008
265
 
                                                                                                                                     
purpose is “to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing 
economies to discuss key issues in the global economy.”  g-20.org, What Is the G-20, 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).  The G-20 has 
only met twice at the head of state and government level. 
261
 The Inter-American Summit is affiliated with the OAS.  The Fifth Summit of the 
Americas was held in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, June 17–19, 2009.  See 
http://www.summit-americas.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).   
262
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Summit Meetings of Heads of State and 
Government, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2009/0904-summit/index.html (last visited 
July 30, 2009).   
263
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt, XV Summit of the non-Aligned Movement, 
http://www.namegypt.org/en/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). 
264
 Twentieth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group, Santo 
Domingo, Dom. Rep., Mar. 7, 2008, Santo Domingo Declaration, 
http://www.minfor.gov.gy/tsite/images/minfor_docs/rio_group/200 
8/santo_domingo_declaration.pdf (last visited Jul 30, 2009).   
265
 Fifteenth South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation Summit, Colombo, Sri 
Lanka, Aug. 2–3, 2008, Declaration: Partnership for Growth for Our People, 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/summit15/summit15declaration.htm (last visited July 30, 














18. United Nations (UN) New York 2005268 




A Brief History of Inter-American Summits 
In 1994, presidents and heads of state from thirty-four of the thirty-five 
Western Hemisphere states met in Miami for the First Summit of the Americas.
270
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 Dr. Tomaz Augusto Salomão, Southern African Development Community Executive 
Secretary, Address on the Occasion of the Pre-Summit Diplomats Briefing (Aug. 5, 
2008), available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/96 (last visited July 30, 2009).   
267
Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) (Central American Integration 
System), Regional Summits, 
http://www.sica.int/busqueda/Reuniones%20Grupo%20de%20Autoridades.aspx?IDItem
=37556&IDCat=9&IdEnt=401&Idm=1&IdmStyle=2 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
268
 United Nations, The 2005 World Summit, http://www.un.org/summit2005/ (last 
visited July 30, 2009).   
269
 The latest edition of this summit is a follow up to the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, or “Earth Summit.”  World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Background and Resources, http://www.bccaorg/ief/wssd.htm (last visited 
July 30, 2009).   
270
 Cuba is the only state in the Western Hemisphere that does not participate in inter-
American summits.  Cuba remains a member of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), but was prevented from taking its seat in the OAS General Assembly pursuant to 





                                                                                                                                     
placed itself outside the inter-American system.”  Eighth Meeting of Consultation of 
Foreign Ministers, Punta Del Este, Uru., Final Act, at 14, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.8, doc. 
68, (Jan. 22–31, 1962), available at 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/meetings%20OF%20consultation/actas/acta%208.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2009) (hereinafter 1962 Cuba Exclusion Resolution).  The relevant part of 
that resolution reads, 
1. That adherence by any member of the Organization of American 
States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American 
system and the alignment of such a government with the communist 
block breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemisphere.  
2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified 
itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the 
principles and objectives of the inter-American system.  
3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Government of Cuba 
from participation in the inter-American system. 
Id.  Until 2009, Cuba’s non grata status in the General Assembly and within OAS organs 
left it presumptively excluded from regional activities held under OAS auspices, and the 
OAS is a core institutional sponsor of inter-American summits.  Cuba’s status changed in 
June 2009 when the OAS adopted a resolution at its 39th General Assembly in Honduras 
rescinding the 1962 Cuba Exclusion Resolution. AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09) 
OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.5006/09 rev. 1 (29 September 2009) at ¶ 1 available at 
http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_09/AG04689E10.DOC (last visited Nov. 
6, 2009).  The 2009 Resolution states that Cuba’s participation in the OAS going forward 
“will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of 
Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.”  Id. at 
¶ 2.  This means that a key formal barrier to Cuba’s return to the regional political 
system, and thus the inter-American summit process, has been removed.  But the actual 
return of Cuba would require a petition from its government along with commitments to 
reform political and economic policies to accord with the OAS charter and other basic 
documents.  Cuba’s initial response to the resolution has been to reject the idea of 
rejoining what its official government newspaper, Granma, calls the “graveless cadaver” 
of the OAS.  Frances Robles, Cuba Says it Won't Join OAS, Sun-Sentinal (Ft. 





In fact, it was the third meeting of heads of state in the Americas following the 
Second World War.  Although prior meetings had convened in 1956 and 1967,
271
 
the third meeting was considered the first meeting of the modern era, and it has 
launched a series of meetings that has been perpetuated to this date.  Depending 
on how one counts, there have been either five or seven inter-American summits 
since 1994.  Five formal, or numbered, summits
272
 have taken place, the most 
recent in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in April 2009,
273
 along with two special, or 
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 See Richard E. Feinberg, The Summit of the Americas: An Architecture for Inter-
American Relations, Address Before the Inter-American Dialogue (Sept. 20, 1994), in 
ADVANCING THE MIAMI PROCESS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS 
41, 42 (Robin Rosenberg & Steve Stein eds., 1995).  At the time of his address Feinberg 
was Special Assistant to the President of the United States and Senior Director for Inter-
American Affairs on the National Security Council.  Id. at 41; see also Org. of Am. 
States, Declaration of the Presidents of the American Republics in Panama (July 22, 
1956), available at  http://www.summit-americas.org/declarat%20presidents-
panama%201956-eng.htm (last visited July 30, 2009) (discussing the history of Western 
Hemisphere Summits); Org. of Am. States , Declaration of the Presidents of the 
Americas, Meeting of American Chiefs of State, (April 14, 1967), available at  
http://www.summit-americas.org/declaratpresidents -1967-eng.htm (last visited July 30, 
2009) (describing the outcome of the 1967 Summit); Summit of the Americas 
Information Network, the Summit Process, http://www.summit-
americas.org/eng/summitprocess.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (providing history of 
Western Hemisphere summits provided by the OAS through its summit web site). 
272
 The titles of these summits are preceded by ordinal numbers—for example, first, 
second, and so on—in official documents.   
273
 Records relating to the Port of Spain Summit can be found at http://www.summit-





thematic, summits: a Summit on Sustainable Development in Santa Cruz, Bolivia 
in 1996,
274
 and a Special Summit in Monterrey, Mexico in 2004.
275
 
The confusion over numbering the meetings speaks in part to the relatively 
ad hoc—one might say flexible—and evolving structure for summit planning in 
the Western Hemisphere.  In 1996, the Santa Cruz Summit, second in time 
(1996), dealt specifically with issues of sustainable development.  For a range of 
reasons—some perhaps owing to the desire of governments not to elevate the 
theme too highly—Santa Cruz was not granted an ordinal number and remains 
known as the “sustainable development summit” rather than the “second 
summit.”276  Similarly, although the 2004 Monterrey Summit had not been 
planned as part of the summit sequence, some governments in the region sought 
to expedite a meeting after the time and place for the officially numbered “fourth” 
summit had already been announced for 2005 in Brazil.
277
  The government of 
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 The summit web site maintained by the OAS provides a summary and history of each 
summit, including the “special” summits.  See http://www.summit-






 The United States, for example, was a chief proponent for holding an earlier meeting.  
Many observers speculated that the White House was seeking an opportunity for then-
President George W. Bush to join his Latin American counterparts on an international 
stage early in a campaign year and to show some initiative in the region while he 
remained in office, rather than potentially ceding the process to a successor.  The author 
was one of several moderators for civil society preparatory meetings hosted by the 
Organization of American States and the Government of Mexico as part of the Monterrey 





Brazil reportedly did not wish to advance the date of its summit, or to relinquish 
the privilege of holding the next official summit, so a compromise was reached: 
Mexico would host a non-numbered Special Summit, or Cumbre Extraordinaria, 
in Monterrey in January of 1994.
278
 
The summits are institutionally tied to the OAS, and this connection has 
become stronger over time.  The OAS serves as the summit secretariat and has 
seen its own agenda increasingly shaped by summit commitments.  Yet summit 
agenda setting and implementation are still technically independent of the OAS.  
The process of negotiating and shaping summit agendas is managed by the 
Summit Implementation and Review Group (SIRG), which is chaired by the 
upcoming summit’s designated host country and steered by past summit host 
                                                                                                                                     
Society in the Processes of Hemispheric Integration, in the context of the Special Summit 
of the Americas held in Monterrey, Mexico, in November 2003, and the Dialogue 
between Plenipotentiaries and Civil Society Representatives, held in Monterrey on 
January 11, 2004, the day before the opening of the Summit.  See Civil Society in the 
Processes of Hemispheric Integration, in the context of the Special Summit of the 
Americas, Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 24–25, 2008, http://www.summit-
americas.org/Quebec-CivilSociety/RegionalForum/bulletin-eng.pdf; Summit of the 
Americas Information Network, http://www.summit-
americas.org/SpecialSummit/CivilSociety/Mainpage-eng.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 
2009).  The information provided in this note was gathered during these meetings and 
during many informal discussions among the author and the participants in the Monterrey 
Summit and in other aspects of the preparatory process. 
278
 This information is based on conversations by the author with diplomats from Canada 
and the United States who were involved in summit planning, although it does not appear 







  An institutional tripartite committee, which includes the OAS, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the UN Economic Commission for 




The inter-American summits have typically featured one to three days of 
presidential plenary sessions and side meetings among heads of state and their 
delegations.  Official documents have traditionally been signed by participating 
heads of state.
281
  These include “declarations,” which are essentially a broad 
statement of principles, and “plans of action,” which are more detailed lists of 
commitments that state leaders will pursue in order to advance the principles on 
which they have agreed.
282
  The action plans are often general and vague, but in 
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 For those interested in more background on inter-American summits generally, the 
OAS maintains a web site at http://www.summit-americas.org; see also ADVANCING THE 
MIAMI PROCESS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (Robin Rosenberg 
& Steve Stein eds., 1995) (highlighting the goals and outcomes of the early summit 
process and reprinting many of the original preparatory documents). 
280
 See, e.g., Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago de Chile, Chile, Apr. 18–19, 
1998, Santiago Declaration and Plan of Action [hereinafter “Santiago Plan of Action”], 
reproduced at 37 I.L.M. 947, 958 (1998). 
281
 The 2009 Port of Spain Summit marked an exception to this tradition.  See infra note 
315 and accompanying text. 
282
 These two documents were issued for the summits in Miami, Santa Cruz, Santiago, 
Quebec City, and Mar del Plata.  See discussion infra notes 320 to 353, 361 to 365 and 
accompanying text (detailing outcomes from each of these summits).  At the 2004 
Special Summit (Cumbre Extraordinaria) in Monterrey, no plan of action was issued; 
instead, heads of state signed the Declaration of Nuevo León, which was largely a 





some cases they include more concrete commitments to work toward social 
goals.
283
  The declarations and action plans are negotiated through the SIRG in a 
relatively transparent process that offers both formal and informal opportunities 
for non-state actors to offer advice, including advice about specific language, and 
to comment on elements of the documents.  Non-state actors also work informally 
with the tripartite committee institutions, especially the technical units of the 
OAS, to conduct research and develop reports and recommendations that inform 
the preparation of summit documents.
284
 
                                                                                                                                     
typically found in a plan of action.  Special Summit of the Americas, Monterrey, Nuevo 
León, Mexico, Jan. 13, 2004, Declaration of Nuevo León, available at 
http://www.summit-americas.org/sp_summit/sp_summit_dec_en.pdf (last visited July 30, 
2009).  At the most recent summit in Port of Spain, heads of state signed no final 
document.  Instead, Trinidad’s Prime Minister, as summit host, signed a declaration of 
commitment on behalf of the heads of state.  Declaration of Commitment of Port of 
Spain, OEA/Ser.E, CA-V/DEC.1/09 (April 19, 2009) available at CA-V/DEC.1/09 (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2009) (hereinafter Port of Spain Declaration).  See infra notes 366 to 386 
and accompanying text (discussing the context and outcomes of the Port of Spain 
summit).  
283
 These goals have included promoting universal primary education, establishing 
cooperative networks or institutions, and pursuing binding legal instruments.  Frequently, 
plans of action also include instructions to regional institutions, often the OAS or one of 
its organs, directing them to pursue a project, prepare a report on an issue of concern, or 
both. 
284
 Secretary General’s Report on the Summit of the Americas Process (2004) [copy on 
file with author]; see also Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Council for Integral Dev., Inter-
American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in Decision Making for 
Sustainable Development, (2001) [hereinafter ISP Final Report], available at 
http://www.oas.org/dsd/PDF_files/ispenglish.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009) (official 
report of the formulation of the OAS participation strategy, which includes accounts of 





The subject matter of inter-American summits has varied widely to cover 
a range of security, economic, and social interests in the region.  A commitment 
to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) emerged at the First 
Summit in Miami,
285
 and greater economic integration remained a subject of 
many subsequent summit commitments until an impasse over the creation of a 
new regional free trade zone emerged in Quebec, which has hardened in 
subsequent summits.
286
  In addition to serving as a platform for the discussion of 
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 See ORG. OF AM. STATES, 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SUMMIT PROCESS FROM 
MIAMI TO SANTIAGO 213–40 (1998); Summit Report 2001–2003: Advancing in the 
Americas, Progress and Challenges, Organization of American States Summits of the 
America Secretariat 62 (2004), available at  http://www.summit-
americas.org/pubs/summit_report_II_en.pdf (copy on file with author); First Summit of 
the Americas, Miami, Fl., Dec. 11, 1994, First Summit of the Americas: Declaration of 
Principles and Plan of Action, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995).  The Miami 
Declaration and Plan of Action are available at http://www.summit-
americas.org/miamidec.htm and http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm, 
respectively. 
286
 Venezuela noted reservations regarding the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) in the final Declaration of the Quebec Summit in 2001.  See Third Summit of the 
Americas, Quebec City, Can., Apr. 20–22, 2001, Declaration of Quebec City, at 6,  
available at  http://www.oas.org/dil/Declaration_of_Quebec_City.pdf [hereinafter 
Quebec Declaration].  Venezuela’s opposition to the FTAA at the Monterrey Summit in 
2004, along with objections by Brazil, scuttled hopes for a commitment to complete the 
trade accord on a specific timetable.  See Robert Collier, Modest Gains for Bush at 
Summit of Americas; Sweeping Promises, Sharp Divisions as 34-Nation Meeting Ends, 
S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan 14, 2004 at A1.  At the Fourth Summit in Mar del Plata in 2005, the 
language in the Declaration regarding the proposed FTAA was equivocal, noting that 
“some member states” remain optimistic about the FTAA and that these states instruct 
their trade officials through the Declaration to resume negotiations in 2006.  See Fourth 





competing trade agendas, summits have addressed concerns over education, labor 
                                                                                                                                     
Plata, ¶ 19A, available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/56901.htm (last visited July 28, 
2009).  The Mar Del Plata Declaration also states that  
other member states maintain that the necessary conditions are not yet in 
place for achieving a balanced and equitable free trade agreement with 
effective access to markets free from subsidies and trade-distorting 
practices, and that takes into account the needs and sensitivities of all 
partners, as well as the differences in the levels of development and size 
of the economies.   
Id. ¶ 19B.  While the Declaration does not identify the dissenting states, press accounts 
reported that Venezuela, which continued to object to the FTAA as a neo-imperial 
project, was joined by states of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), which 
consists of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay as full members, and Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru as associate members.  See American Society of 
International Law Reports on International Organizations, available at 
http://www.asil.org/rio/mercosur_sum09.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).  These states 
objected to a trade agreement unless it addressed U.S. agricultural subsidies.  See Patrick 
J. McDonnell & Edwin Chen, Bush Exits Summit as Trade Talks End in Disagreement, 
L.A. TIMES Nov. 6, 2005, at A1; Julie Mason & John Otis, Summit of the Americas; 
Clash of Ideology in Street, at Forum, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 5, 2005, at A1.  The 
unusual bifurcated text offered some measure of compromise that would allow trade 
ministers to return to the negotiating table.  During the Hong Kong WTO meeting in 
December 2005, an agreement was finally reached on agricultural subsidies, calling for 
their elimination by 2013.  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 
December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min05_e/ final_text_e.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2009).  While this might have offered an opportunity for the MERCOSUR 
countries to join continued FTAA negotiations, trade discussions have instead proceeded 
on a bilateral and subregional basis.  J.F. HORNBECK, A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE 
AMERICAS: MAJOR POLICY ISSUES AND STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE (2008), available at  http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS20864 (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2009).  The idea of the FTAA was not even mentioned in the final 
document to emerge from the Port of Spain summit.  Port of Spain Declaration, supra 
note 282.  See also infra notes 366 to 386 and accompanying text (discussing the context 





rights, gender discrimination, human rights, the environment, democracy, 
transparency, health, and urban development, among others.  
Non-State Access to Inter-American Summits 
To understand how non-state actors have engaged in and influenced 
summit planning and outcomes, it is useful to begin with an analysis of the 
summit process itself because it offers a view of how rhetoric about participation 
accompanied a normative shift toward a more open and participatory process.  
The precedent was set when the preparations for the Miami Summit—including 
the preparation of background papers and the negotiation of documents to be 
signed by heads of state, integrated NGOs, academics, and other interested non-
state actors—exposed OAS member states and the OAS itself to a level of 
participation that had not been seen in prior regional policy making processes.
287
  
In the time leading up to the Miami Summit, the U.S. administration had made a 
decision to involve non-state actors in the summit process, and as the “host 
government,” it sponsored a series of roundtables and workshops among NGOs 
from throughout the region to discuss the summit agenda.
288
  These workshops 
were attended by OAS officials and summit negotiators from a number of OAS 
member states, mostly foreign ministry representatives, but in some cases 
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 For a description of the level of participation, including copies of a number of NGO 
submissions and the results of NGO consultations, see generally ADVANCING THE MIAMI 







representatives from ministries with responsibilities for the subject areas of the 
summit, such as education, environment, and health.  The United States also 
tapped a congressionally funded think tank at the University of Miami, the North-
South Center, to serve as an unofficial non-governmental host of the summit.  The 
North-South Center held a number of meetings on summit issues that were 




This participatory approach continued over the next two years in the 
process leading up to the Santa Cruz Summit.  The Bolivian Government 
welcomed the participation of non-state actors in the formulation of the Santa 
Cruz Summit agenda;
290
 for example, as host of the upcoming summit, it 
participated in a regional dialogue hosted by the Government of Uruguay on 
“enabling responsible participation,” “strengthening representative 
organizations,” and “expanding avenues for participation” (collectively the 




 At the time, the government of Bolivia was experimenting with democratic reform at a 
national level, having just passed a new national law on democratic participation—the 
Ley de Participación Popular (Popular Participation Law) Ley No. 1551, 20 Apr. 1994, 
(Bol.), available at  http://www2.ids.ac.uk/logolink/resources/downloads/regionalreports/ 
RegionalReportLatinAmericaAnnex%20final%20.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).  It was 
essentially a decentralization law, recognizing hundreds of new municipalities and local 
and indigenous communities as Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (Base Territorial 
Organizations), and giving them some input on national budget expenditures at a local 
level.  For a description of how the Popular Participation Law operated, see MERILEE S. 
GRINDLE, AUDACIOUS REFORMS: INSTITUTIONAL INVENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN 





Montevideo Dialogue) the outcomes of which were offered to Bolivia and other 
OAS members states as input for the Santa Cruz summit agenda.
291
  This dialogue 
attracted over 150 participants including government representatives from twenty-
three of the thirty-four OAS member states, along with non-state actors from 
throughout the region,
292
 and it produced a recommendation to pursue a regional 
strategy for participation in development decision making that was adopted as 
part of the Santa Cruz Summit Plan of Action.
293
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 See INTER-AMERICAN SEMINAR ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS, (1996) [hereinafter MONTEVIDEO REPORT] 
(on file with author).  Uruguay was at the time serving as the “responsible government” 
for follow-up on summit agenda items relating to democracy and participation, and the 
seminar was co-sponsored by the OAS and USAID, among others.  Id. at 1.  See also 
Advancing Sustainable Development In The Americas: U.S. Civil Society 
Recommendations for the 1996 Summit Conference on Sustainable Development, Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia at 3, available at www.brazilink.org/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=7 (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2009) (discussing the Bolivian government’s “full support and 
participation” in the Montevideo conference); Eric Dannenmaier, Democracy in 
Development: Toward a Legal Framework for the Americas, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11–
14 (1997) (describing the Montevideo meeting in detail); CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE 
SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS: Nine Years of Experience of the Network of Civil Society 
Organization of the Americas, Corporación Participa (March 2006), available at 
http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Publicación%20Cumbre%209%20años%20ing.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009) (describing the decision to adopt Montevideo recommendations 
regarding the formulation of a regional strategy for public participation). 
292
 Montevideo Report at 1. 
293
 The Montevideo meeting recommendation was reflected in the final Plan of Action 
from Santa Cruz, which called for the design of an “inter-American strategy for public 
participation in sustainable development decision-making” (ISP).  See Summit of the 
Americas on Sustainable Development, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bol., Dec. 7–8, 1996, 





The Bolivian Government contracted with the World Resources Institute 
(WRI), a U.S.-based NGO, to provide advice on creating a plan of action for 
sustainable development,
294
 and the U.S. Government again financed a series of 
NGO consultations leading up to the Santa Cruz Summit, including the 
Montevideo Dialogue.
295
  The Declaration and Plan of Action adopted in Santa 
Cruz incorporated the principal recommendation from the Montevideo Dialogue:  
                                                                                                                                     
Santa Cruz Plan of Action] available at http://www.summit-
americas.org/boliviaplan.htm; see also infra notes 393 to 310 (describing the 
development of the ISP). 
294
 See Aaron Zazueta, Draft Plan of Action for Santa Cruz Summit, (1995) (on file with 
author); see also AARON ZAZUETA, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & ENV’T, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA: BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITIES (XX 
PINCITE) (1993) (XX EXPLANATORY PARENTHETICAL).  While Zazueta’s role as 
an outside NGO advisor to the Bolivian government was not well publicized at the time, 
it is documented in contemporary intergovernmental communications and in his 
professional biography.  As of September 2009, Zazueta serves with the Monitoring and 
Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility (GEF).   His biography sheet 
published by GEF includes the following entry:  
 [Zazueta] was appointed by Vice President Al Gore on to a Special 
Commission to assist the Bolivian President to incorporate sustainable 
development into the policies and programs carried out during his 
administration.  He co-chaired the technical commission that drafted the 
Hemispheric Agenda for Sustainable Development, ultimately adopted 
by thirty two heads of state of the Americas in December 1996.”   
GEF, Evaluation Office Staff Directory, 
http://www.gefweb.org/gefevaluation.aspx?id=23144 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).  The 
“Hemispheric Agenda” referred to in Zazueta’s GEF biography is the 1996 Santa Cruz 
Summit Plan of Action.  Id. 
295





to formulate an “inter-American strategy for the promotion of public participation 
in sustainable development decision-making.”296 
The practice of public consultation continued with the Santiago Summit in 
1998 as the Government of Chile, with financial support from Canada and the 
United States, contracted a Santiago-based NGO, Corporación Participa, to host a 
series of NGO consultations for input into the Santiago Declaration and Plan of 
Action.
297
  Corporación Participa facilitated civil society consultations on three of 
the four principal topics of the summit—education, democratic governance, and 
poverty, but not hemispheric trade—with government officials who were 
negotiating the text sitting alongside civil society participants on panels and 
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 Santa Cruz Plan of Action, supra note 293, at 14.  The actions taken following the 
Santa Cruz Summit to implement this part of the Plan of Action are more fully described 
infra at pages 150-56. 
297
 See Project Results: Citizen Participation in the Context of the Summit of the 
Americas (1999) (on file with author), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABR033.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2009); see also 
Yasmine Shamsi, Mutual Misgivings: Civil Society Inclusion in the Americas, North-
South Institute 2003, at 26-31, available at http://www.un-
ngls.org/orf/cso/mutual_misgivings.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2009); Ambassador Ellen 
Bogle of Jamaica, Statement to Workshop on the Role of Public Participation in 
Santiago, Chile, (Nov. 5–7, 1997), (on file with author).  After describing consultations 
with civil society throughout the region during the three years following the Miami 
Summit and highlighting the role of civil society organizations in preparations for the 
Santiago Summit, the Ambassador concluded, “Indeed, it may well be that, following this 
meeting, Jamaica and Uruguay [coordinators for civil society in the summit process] can 
present to the Coordinator of the Santiago Summit, Chile's Ambassador Juan Martabit, a 
new and more meaningful text which will reflect the efforts of the stakeholders.”  Bogle, 







  As with Santa Cruz, there is evidence that some of the NGO 




NGO participation continued in the subsequent summits in Quebec City, 
Canada (2001), Monterrey, Mexico (2004), Mar del Plata, Argentina (2005), and 
Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (2009),
300
 and has been supported by an OAS 
Civil Society Office, established following the 1996 Santiago Summit.
301
  A 
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 Agenda of Workshop on the Role of Public Participation, Santiago, Chile (Nov. 5–7, 
1997) (copy on file with author). 
299
 The Santiago Plan of Action stated that “governments will [p]romote, with the 
participation of civil society, the development of principles and recommendations for 
institutional frameworks to stimulate the formation of responsible and transparent, non-
profit and other civil society organizations . . . .”  Santiago Plan of Action, supra note 280 
at ¶III.A.III.  The Santiago Plan of Action then refers to the Inter-American Strategy for 
the Promotion of Public Participation in Sustainable Development Decision-Making 
(ISP)—which had been pursued by the OAS with substantial civil society participation 
following the Santa Cruz Summit—and states, “[A]s soon as possible, Governments will 
adopt work plans to implement legal and institutional frameworks based on the principles 
and recommendations in their respective countries.”  Id.  This language was proposed by 
the OAS Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment and the NGOs working 
with the Unit to develop the ISP.  See infra notes 408 to 410 and accompanying text. 
300
 A brief description of activities undertaken to engage civil society in connection with 
each of the summits is provided at the Summits of the Americas web site maintained 
jointly with the OAS at http://www.summit-americas.org/cs.html#Hemisphere (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2009).  This site offers hyperlinks to official web pages maintained by 
host countries for each of the summits.  In each case the country web site offers a 
summary of civil society activities sponsored or hosted by governments in connection 
with the summit. 
301
 This office was created as part of a broader institutional reform aimed at engaging 





coalition of NGOs, led by Corporación Participa from Chile, the Canadian 
Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), and the U.S.-based Partners of the 
Americas and the Inter-American Democracy Network (IADN), has worked with 
the OAS Civil Society Office and summit host governments to facilitate 
workshops, seminars, and other forms of outreach as a means of incorporating 
input from non-state actors into the summit process.
302
  Funding from the U.S. 
government has continued—although it was reduced and refocused under the 
Bush administration
303—principally through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  Funding from the Canadian Government has also 
                                                                                                                                     
efforts to create NGO accreditation rules for the OAS).  Following its creation, the office 
was moved into the OAS Department of International Affairs.  See http://www.civil-
society.oas.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) (as of the time this Article went to press this 
web site serves as the principal formal point of entry for non-state actors to the OAS). 
302
 See, e.g., the discussion of summits and civil society input into the summit process on 
the websites of Corporación Participa, www.participa.cl (last visited July 28, 2009); 
Canadian Foundation for the Americas, www.focal.ca (last visited July 28, 2009); 
Partners of the Americas, www.partners.net (last visited July 28, 2009); Interamerican 
Democracy Network, http://www.redinter.org  (last visited July 28, 2009); Civil Society 
Participation in OAS Activities, ewww.civil-society.oas.org (last visited July 28, 2009); 
Summits of the Americas, www.summit-americas.org (last visited July 28, 2009), 
303
 When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, his administration shifted 
emphasis from participatory democracy and the integration of NGOs into the summit 
process to the promotion of electoral democracy and an effort to ensure the continued 
exclusion of non-democracies—notably Cuba—from the summit process and inter-
American institutions generally.  See infra note 434 and accompanying text (discussing 
U.S. regional priorities and policy toward Cuba in the context of developing the Inter-









Non-state participation has thus become de rigueur, even routine, in inter-
American summitry.  Governments have largely welcomed an increasing dialogue 
with non-state actors both in formal and informal settings.  For their part, non-
state actors have embraced the process even where they do not embrace the 
motivations or goals of the state leaders who gather for the summits, and this 
counter-current is tolerated—sometimes even sponsored by—governments 
against which it runs.  For example, in addition to funding dialogue with civil 
society organizations about the formulation of the summit agenda at Quebec in 
2001, the Canadian government also funded a parallel event, the self-titled 
People’s Summit, which was largely a protest meeting held outside the security 
zone of the official summit.
305
 
At Mar del Plata in 2005, a parallel protest event at a soccer stadium 
featured President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, who left the official proceedings 
to deliver an anti-trade, anti-neoliberal, anti-U.S. rant that lasted more than two 
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 Interviews with staff of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) and 
Corporación Participa.  Notes on file with author. 
305
 The website for the People’s Summit in Quebec (a similar event had taken place in 
Santiago) describes its purpose as creating “a space and an opportunity for progressive 
civil society from north and south, to come together as equals. During the Summit we 
will debate, define new strategies for the Americas and create new alliances. The Summit 
will be another crucial step in the process of developing Alternatives.”  Quebec City—
Protest the Summit of the Americas, http://www.web.net/comfront/quebec.htm (last 





hours before an estimated crowd of 20,000.
306
  While Chavez has become 
notorious for his unorthodox and contrarion approach to diplomacy,
307
 the 
willingness of host government Argentina to permit such a public forum is 
noteworthy.  In addition, one should not discount the importance of giving voice 
to a message of protest in the company of a large, seemingly receptive, 
audience
308
 in close proximity to a head of state meeting devoted to pursuing 
some of the very goals which were the subject of protest.  Professor Richard 
Feinberg has criticized the Mar del Plata summit as a “shambles” in part because 
of “a duplicitous host government [and] an out-of-control Hugo Chávez.”309  
Feinberg’s credentials and experience in Western Hemisphere affairs give his 
insights regarding Mar del Plata special weight,
310
 yet his critique speaks more to 
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substantive challenges of inter-American relations than to any procedural debility 
of summits as a public forum.  The counterproductive use of a public forum by a 
self-styled populist like Chavez (who would find a platform in any event) does 
not discount the need for, or importance of, public non-state forums held in 
connection with the summit.  Chavez may have stolen headlines—a feat of which 
he has proven capable even in the more traditional diplomatic cloisters of the 
United Nations in New York
311—but engaging the public more quietly in 
debating summit priorities and outcomes through public forums institutionalized 
through the summit process deprived Chavez of any claim to monopoly on public 
discourse.  Put another way, Chavez cannot maintain that he is the only regional 
leader speaking to the people about their interests in regional political and 
institutional priorities. 
By the time the 2009 Port of Spain summit convened, Inter-American 
politics had shifted in ways that would create even greater challenges to 
substantive outcomes for a common regional agenda.  Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua elected populist leaders with a socialist leaning
312
 which 
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was anathema to some of the core regional integration goals that had defined the 
summit agenda since Miami,
313
 and Chavez was thus joined at Port of Spain by 
heads of state who could match his substantive concerns if not his rhetoric.  While 
Chavez had been reduced to noting exceptions to earlier summit agreements
314
 
these new ideological partners added enough weight to undermine support for 
outcomes which depend upon consensus.  A single state dissent in a summit of 
thirty-four states will produce exceptions, but not necessarily scuttle a consensus 
document.  But five dissenting states can change the dynamics of consensus.   
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The Port of Spain summit thus produced a declaration signed by the chair 
rather than participating heads of state,
315
 and the substance of the declaration’s 
text relating to democracy appears to reflect the parties’ lack of substantive 
agreement on what exactly is meant by democracy.
316
   But non-state actors 
remained a part of the Port of Spain summit, both in the preparatory meetings 
where the summit agenda was debated and at the summit itself.
317
  Non-state 
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participants were afforded an opportunity to engage diplomats formally and 
informally in shaping a regional agenda even if the agenda had become captive to 
new regional politics.
318
  Whether these new politics represent an anomaly or a 
trend that will overshadow the broader cooperative agenda of the summit process 
is uncertain.  But even a rising disagreement about the nature of democracy at 
Port of Spain did not lead states to retreat from the tradition of non-state access 
that has become part of the summit process. 
Commitments to Democratic Governance and Public 
Participation 
Democratic governance and public participation have been consistent 
inter-American summit themes, and the rising dispute over how best to address 
these themes at a regional level
319
 only serves to highlight their importance as 
summit objectives.  The following outlines commitments made to advance both 
electoral and participatory democratic models in summits held to date. 
Miami (1994) 
The Miami Declaration affirmed that “[d]emocracy is based, among other 
fundamentals, on free and transparent elections and includes the right of all 
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 See supra notes 312 to 316 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of 
Venezuela’s objection to summit language regarding democracy in the context of the 
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citizens to participate in government.”320  The Declaration called for making 
“democratic institutions more transparent and accountable,” and it expressed an 
interest in ensuring “public engagement and commitment.”321  The Miami Plan of 
Action asserted that “[t]he strengthening, effective exercise and consolidation of 
democracy constitute the central political priority of the Americas,”322 and it 
called on the OAS “to promote and consolidate representative democracy.”323  







 Protocols to the OAS 
Charter,” each of which added commitments to representative democracy to the 
OAS Charter.
327
  The Miami Plan of Action also called for regional institutional 
reform, including strengthening the ability of a technical office of the OAS, the 
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Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec. 5, 
1985, 25 I.L.M. 527, 527–530 (1986) [hereinafter Protocol of Cartagena de Indias]. 
325
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Unit for Promotion of Democracy, so that it could provide assistance to 




The Miami Plan of Action also highlighted the importance of public 
participation, including civil society’s access to information and the decision-
making process.  The plan states that “a vigorous democracy requires broad 
participation in public issues.  Such activities should be carried out with complete 
transparency and accountability, and to this end a proper legal and regulatory 
framework should be established to include the possibility of obtaining technical 
and financial support, including from private sources.”329  This language points, 
albeit obliquely, to the need to develop frameworks for the operation and 
financing of NGOs, which was a relatively new phenomenon in the Americas in 
the early 1990s.  The Plan of Action also calls for increased access to information 
as a means to combat official corruption, which was a perennial inter-American 
summit theme.  Heads of state pledged to “[e]nsure proper oversight of 
government functions by strengthening internal mechanisms, including 
investigative and enforcement capacity with respect to acts of corruption, and 
facilitating public access to information necessary for meaningful outside 
review.”330 
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In a later part of the Miami Plan of Action dealing with environmental 
issues and sustainable development, heads of state again expressed support for 
participatory models.  They pledged to “[s]upport democratic governmental 
mechanisms to engage public participation, particularly including members of 
indigenous communities and other affected groups, in the development of policy 
involving conservation and sustainable use of natural environments.”331   
Santa Cruz (1996) 
Held two years after the Miami Summit, the Santa Cruz Summit on 
Sustainable Development echoed the themes of democratic governance and public 
participation.  The Santa Cruz Declaration pledges that states “will support and 
encourage, as a basic requisite for sustainable development, broad participation by 
civil society in the decision-making process, including policies and programs and 
their design, implementation, and evaluation.  To this end, we will promote the 
enhancement of institutional mechanisms for public participation.”332  The Santa 
Cruz Declaration and Plan of Action called for public participation in a range of 
development areas, from watershed management to the use of forests and the 
conservation of biological diversity.
333
  The Plan of Action also called for the 
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OAS to “assign[ ] priority to the formulation of an inter-American strategy for the 
promotion of public participation in decision-making for sustainable 
development.”334 
Santiago (1998) 
In 1998, at the inter-American summit in Santiago, Chile, heads of state 
again highlighted the importance of participatory democracy, both in principle 
and through commitments to institutional reform.  The Santiago Declaration states 
that: 
The strength and meaning of representative democracy lie in the 
active participation of individuals at all levels of civic life. The 
democratic culture must encompass our entire population. We 
will strengthen education for democracy and promote the 
necessary actions for government institutions to become more 
participatory structures. We undertake to strengthen the 
capabilities of regional and local governments, when 




Heads of state also pledged that “[t]he FTAA negotiating process will be 
transparent,” and they “encourage[d] all segments of civil society to participate in 
and contribute to the process in a constructive manner, through our respective 
mechanisms of dialogue and consultation and by presenting their views through 
the mechanism created in the FTAA negotiating process.”336 
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The Santiago Plan of Action included a pledge by states to “intensify our 
efforts to promote democratic reforms at the regional and local level.”337  The 
OAS had been working to develop the Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion 
of Public Participation in Sustainable Development Decision-Making (ISP) since 
the Santa Cruz Summit two years earlier,
338
 and the Santiago Plan of Action reads 
like an endorsement of the ISP’s terms of reference.  Heads of state agreed to 
[p]romote, with the participation of civil society, the 
development of principles and recommendations for institutional 
frameworks to stimulate the formation of responsible and 
transparent, non-profit and other civil society organizations, 
including, where appropriate, programs for volunteers, and 
encourage, in accordance with national priorities, public sector-
civil society dialogue and partnerships in the areas that are 
considered pertinent in this Plan of Action.  In this context the 
Organization of American States (OAS) may serve as a forum 
for the exchange of experiences and information.
339
 
The Santiago Plan of Action goes on to state that the process of 
strengthening participatory mechanisms should “draw upon existing initiatives 
that promote increased participation of civil society in public issues, such as . . . 
the Inter-American Strategy for Public Participation, among others.”340  The Plan 
of Action also pledges that, “[a]s soon as possible, Governments will adopt work 
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plans to implement legal and institutional frameworks based on the principles and 
recommendations in their respective countries.”341 
Quebec City (2001) 
In 2001, the Quebec City Summit Declaration acknowledged “the 
contributions of civil society”342 to the summit process and “affirm[ed] that 
openness and transparency are vital to building public awareness 
and legitimacy.”343  The Quebec Plan of Action noted that “good governance 
requires . . . transparent and accountable government institutions at all levels,” as 
well as “public participation.”344  Heads of state agreed to  
 [w]ork jointly to facilitate cooperation among national 
institutions with the responsibility to guarantee the protection, 
promotion and respect of human rights, and access to and 
freedom of information, with the aim of developing best 
practices to improve the administration of information held by 
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The Plan of Action also committed to “[c]reate and implement programs 
with the technical and financial support, where appropriate, of multilateral 
organizations and [multilateral development banks], to facilitate public 
participation and transparency . . . in decision-making processes.”346  The Quebec 
Plan of Action also noted that “men and women have the right to participate, with 
equality and equity, in the decision-making processes affecting their lives and 
well-being,”347 and heads of state pledged to “[p]romote participation of all 
minority groups in forging a stronger civil society.”348 
Additionally, the Plan of Action addressed participation at a local level, 
pledging to “[p]romote mechanisms to facilitate citizen participation in politics, 
especially in local or municipal government.”349  It also addressed regional 
institutions, agreeing, for example, to “[e]nsure the transparency of the 
negotiating process, including through publication of the preliminary draft FTAA 
Agreement in the four official languages as soon as possible and the 
dissemination of additional information on the progress of negotiations.”350  The 
Quebec Plan of Action called for greater openness of the FTAA process.  
Specifically, states agreed to  
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 [f]oster through their respective national dialogue mechanisms 
and through appropriate FTAA mechanisms, a process of 
increasing and sustained communication with civil society to 
ensure that it has a clear perception of the development of the 
FTAA negotiating process [and] invite civil society to continue 
to contribute to the FTAA process.
351
 
While this language hints at the marketing of the FTAA,
352
 it suggests a 
degree of transparency and openness to public dialogue about the content of the 
proposed Agreement. 
Finally, and significantly, the Quebec Declaration took note of “threats to 
democracy,” an indirect reference to the then-evolving constitutional challenges 
in Peru,
353
 and called for the preparation of an Inter-American Democratic Charter 
(IADC).  Although more concrete commitments are usually reserved for action 
plans, the Quebec Declaration, in language that is unusually specific and action-
oriented, reads: 
Threats to democracy today take many forms.  To enhance our 
ability to respond to these threats, we instruct our Foreign 
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Ministers to prepare, in the framework of the next General 
Assembly of the OAS, an Inter-American Democratic Charter to 





At Monterrey, Mexico, heads of state did not produce a Plan of Action, 
but only a statement of principles entitled the Declaration of Nuevo León.
355
  One 
of the summit’s three central themes was democratic governance, and a number of 
provisions in the Declaration supported participatory processes.  The Declaration 
of Nuevo León calls for the “full application of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, which constitutes an element of regional identity, and, projected 
internationally, is a hemispheric contribution to the community of nations.”356  
Heads of state also pledged to “foster a culture of democracy and development 
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based on pluralism and the acceptance of social and cultural diversity.”357  In 
addition, the Declaration of Nuevo León committed to increased transparency in 
international organizations,
358
 and heads of state undertook to “institutionalize 
meetings with civil society and with the academic and private sectors.”359  The 
Declaration also asserted that 
 [a]ccess to information held by the State, subject to 
constitutional and legal norms, including those on privacy and 
confidentiality, is an indispensable condition for citizen 
participation and promotes effective respect for human rights. 
We are committed to providing the legal and regulatory 
framework and the structures and conditions required to 
guarantee the right of access to information to our citizens.
360
 
Mar del Plata (2005) 
The Declaration from the most recent inter-American summit, held in Mar 
del Plata, Argentina, claims that heads of state “are convinced that representative 
democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development 
of the region.”361  It also acknowledges that “[i]ncreased participation by citizens, 
communities, and civil society will contribute to ensuring that the benefits of 
democracy are shared by society as a whole.”362  The Declaration goes further to 




 Id. at 10. 
359




 Declaration of Mar de Plata, supra note 286, ¶ 58.  Venezuela noted a reservation to 
this provision. 
362





link democratic governance to a range of benefits, including economic prosperity, 
“decent jobs and good employment,” and the security of the state.363  The Mar del 
Plata Plan of Action offers only limited new initiatives for democratic 
governance, instead calling for greater commitment to regional security, increased 
effort to combat corruption, and development of a regional extradition network, 
ironically all under the general heading of “Strengthening Democratic 
Governance.”364  The Plan of Action instructs the OAS Summit Implementation 
Review Group (SIRG) to continue to “coordinate the participation of civil 
society” in summit planning and implementation.365 
Port of Spain (2009) 
The 2009 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad occurred against the backdrop 
of a global economic downturn that had a severe impact on the Americas.
366
  The 
summit also followed the ascendance of new left-leaning presidents in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
367
  These new heads of state joined 
Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez in rejecting some of the fundamental ideas 
that had driven regional political relations, and the summit agenda, since Miami in 
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  Port of Spain also marked the first inter-American summit of the 
administration of U.S. President Barack Obama, and much of the early 
preparatory work had been done under the guidance of political appointees of his 
predecessor, George W. Bush.  While this context may have had a profound 
impact on summit negotiations and outcomes, analyzing this impact is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  What can be reported that is relevant to this Article is that 
summit commitments to fundamental democratic concerns of electoral process 
and public participation—commitments to expand participatory rights at a 
regional and domestic level, including calls for the ISP
369
 and the IADC,
370—
stalled in Port of Spain.
371
 
A “Declaration of Commitment” signed “on behalf of heads of state and 
government” by summit host, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Patrick 
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  The Port of Spain Declaration included a section on “Strengthening 
Democratic Governance,”373 which addresses poverty,374 decentralization,375 
corruption,
376







 “all forms of discrimination,”380 indigenous rights,381 the protection 
of children,
382
 and the role of the OAS in promoting peace,
383—ostensibly as 
these concerns relate to strengthening democracy.  These are important social 
concerns that should not be discounted, but they notably do not address core 
issues of electoral or participatory democracy at the domestic or regional level. 
It is difficult to say whether the abandonment of these core issues at Port 
of Spain reflects a new regional emphasis or simply a passing artifact of regional 
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political interests or tensions.
 384
  But participatory democracy issues are not dead 
to inter-American summits. Although Port of Spain did not produce new 
initiatives specifically dealing with these issues, broader commitments made 
under the heading of “democratic governance”—especially language concerning 
corruption and access to information concerning government finances
385—
respond to core democratic concerns, and commitments to access mechanisms 
made at prior summits continued to be pursued in the broader regional 
institutional context.
386
   
Commitments to Democracy:  Four Case Studies 
The preceding Part catalogues the extent to which inter-American summits 
have embraced the rhetoric of democracy, including ideas of participatory 
democracy and governance through open, transparent, and inclusive processes.  
Yet much of the language is merely precatory, expressing statements of principle 
or wishes and desires that do not call for specific action.  A cynical view would 
hold that summit declarations and plans of action are not even aspirational: they 
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are just smokescreens for inaction.  Political leaders, from this perspective, are 
simply making statements that allow them to claim some moral high ground, even 
as they ignore deeper challenges and avoid taking the difficult policy steps that 
might advance the causes that they purport to champion. 
To be sure, summit documents include a good deal of language about 
promoting democracy that is beyond the capacity or will of signatories to act.  Yet 
the summit commitments also call for the development of specific programs and 
institutional responses that can begin to support the higher democratic ideals of 
summit rhetoric.  The call for an Inter-American Democratic Charter in Quebec 
City, which would have binding elements,
387
 was quite concrete, as was the 
agreement reached in Santa Cruz to create a program to design the ISP.
388
 
Statements in Miami, Santa Cruz, and Santiago summit agreements about the 
importance of civil society and the role of the OAS as a public forum served as 
tangible reference points for a later OAS General Assembly resolution that 
advanced a program of NGO accreditation in the OAS.
389
 Even the call in Miami 
for securing participatory rights through “proper legal and regulatory 
framework[s],”390 while more rhetorical than programmatic, may have 
significance beyond its symbolic value.  Even rhetoric, when stated publicly and 
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plainly, has an enduring value with the potential to transform attitudes and alter 
institutional behavior, at least in a context where interested parties can refer to and 
build upon that rhetoric in pursuit of more concrete programs.  As James Madison 
once noted about the Bill of Rights, which he privately claimed did not need to be 
set forth affirmatively,
391
 “political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire 
by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they 
become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of 
interest and passion.”392 
What, then, has been the utility of the inter-American summit claims and 
commitments about democratic governance and public participation?  By placing 
the language in context, an answer begins to emerge.  In a number of cases, 
summit commitments have grown out of regional or domestic initiatives that were 
championed by specific governments or by non-state actors working with 
governments, and the summit has helped to advance those initiatives through 
official acknowledgement and institutional action.  The following four cases are 
illustrative.  
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Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public 
Participation in Sustainable Development Decision-Making 
(ISP) 
In the months prior to the 1996 Santa Cruz Summit in Bolivia, an informal 
working group of governmental officials and non-state actors met to discuss how 
public participation issues should be addressed in the context of the upcoming 
summit.  Participants included representatives of the government of Uruguay,
393
 
the OAS, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well 
as a representative of World Resources Institute (WRI) who had been tapped by 
the Bolivian government to offer advice on the formulation of a summit 
agenda.
394
  This informal working group facilitated the design of a regional 
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 Uruguay had been designated as the “responsible coordinator” for follow-up on 
summit commitments regarding democratic governance.  The system of “responsible 
coordinators” was developed following the 1992 Miami Summit as a means of 
identifying “countries or international organizations [to] volunteer to coordinate 
implementation of individual action items, taking the lead in developing an 
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working group in his capacity as an advisor to U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and participated in much of the subsequent planning and 
development of the ISP.  Information regarding participation in the meetings is based on 
the author’s recollection and on documents—including agendas, correspondence, and 
working papers—that are on file with the author.  The work of the informal group, like 
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consultation held in Montevideo, Uruguay and co-hosted by the governments of 
Bolivia and Uruguay in August 1996.  The consultation resulted in a series of 
recommendations for consideration in planning the 1996 Santa Cruz Summit.
395
 
 The Montevideo meeting convened over 150 participants, 
including representatives of more than twenty governments from the region and a 
range of NGOs and academics.
396
  Participants used an informal workshop 
approach to develop recommendations for the heads of state who would meet in 
Santa Cruz later in the year.  The principal recommendation was that heads of 
state should commit to the formulation of an inter-American strategy for public 
participation.
397
  This recommendation was adopted verbatim at the subsequent 
summit, and the outcomes of the Montevideo meeting were cited in the Santa 
Cruz Plan of Action as a point of guidance in the development of the strategy.  In 
a section entitled “Public Participation,” the Santa Cruz Plan of Action stated, 
15. In order to support the specific initiatives on public 
participation contained in the Plan of Action, entrust the OAS 
with assigning priority to the formulation of an inter-American 
strategy for the promotion of public participation in decision-
making for sustainable development, taking into account the 
recommendations of the Inter-American Seminar on Public 
Participation held in Montevideo in 1996. 
                                                 
395
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16. The strategy should promote the exchange of experiences 
and information among government representatives and civil 
society groups with regard to the formulation, implementation, 
and improvement of sustainable development policies and 
programs, legal and institutional mechanisms, including access 
to and flow of information among the relevant actors, training 
programs, and consultation processes used at the national level 
to ensure civil society involvement. Establish consultation 
processes at the regional level, such as regular fora for 
government-civil society dialogue at relevant high-level 
meetings convened by the OAS, and when necessary support the 
integration and strengthening of national sustainable 
development councils, drawing on the experience of Central 
America and other existing councils in the Hemisphere.
398
 
 Because the OAS had been involved in the formulation of this 
proposal from the beginning through an arm of its Permanent Secretariat, the Unit 
for Sustainable Development and Environment (UDSE),
399
 it was positioned to 
respond to this summit commitment quickly.  Within a year of the Santa Cruz 
Summit, the USDE had formed a technical advisory group to begin developing a 
regional participation strategy.
400
  With the support of the ISP Technical Advisory 
Group, the OAS USDE also formed a separate Project Advisory Committee that 
included seven representatives from OAS member states—two each from North, 
South, and Central America, and one from the Caribbean—and seven non-
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as the OAS Department of Sustainable Development.  See http://www.oas.org/dsd/ (last 
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governmental representatives who were nominated and selected by NGOs of the 
region from seven areas of work.
401
   
During 1997 and 1998, the Technical Advisory Group, with guidance 
from the Public Advisory Committee, hosted a series of public workshops, funded 
pilot studies, and sponsored research regarding frameworks and mechanisms, 
including legal and regulatory frameworks, in order to help frame the ISP and 
promote public participation in the region more generally.
402
 More than $1 million 
in funding support was provided collectively by USAID, the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), and the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(UNESCO).
403
  The work resulted in a fifty-one page strategy document that was 
given the same name as the project, the Inter-American Strategy for the 
Promotion of Public Participation in Decision-Making for Sustainable 
Development.
404
  This strategy document was adopted by the OAS Inter-
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 The seven NGO areas of work were Business, Trade and Economic Growth; 
Environmentally Sustainable Development; Socially Sustainable Development; Women’s 
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Participation in Decision-Making for Sustainable Development, OEA/Ser.D/XXIII.1 
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American Council on Integral Development (CIDI) on April 20, 2000.
405
  While 
the document does not purport to bind OAS member states to specific actions, it 
does include a series of recommendations for implementation by member states at 
a national level.  In a section entitled “Legal Frameworks,” the ISP recommends 
that OAS member states “[c]reate, expand, and implement legal and regulatory 
frameworks that ensure the participation of civil society in sustainable 
development decisions.”406  It also includes a section entitled “Institutional 
Procedures and Structures,” recommending that OAS member states “[d]evelop 
and support institutional structures, policies, and procedures that promote and 
facilitate, within all levels of government and civil society, interaction in 
sustainable development decisions, and encourage change within existing 
institutions to pursue a basis for long-term direct dialogue and innovative 
solutions.”407 
These recommendations were developed over a two-year period through a 
process that included the participation of government officials—usually a 
combination of foreign ministry officials and those from technical ministries, such 
as ministries of the environment, at whom the recommendations were aimed—
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alongside NGO participants, scholars, and OAS staff.
408
  They were adopted in 
draft form at a regional meeting that included representatives from most OAS 
member states, and they were vetted at a national level by technical ministries 
following the regional meeting and prior to CIDI approval of the ISP.
409
  Thus, 
the recommendations were vetted at a national level by relevant officials through 
a process that offered ample opportunity for non-state actors to influence the 
thinking of these officials and give shape to the final ISP.  Moreover, throughout 
the process, draft language of the ISP was presented at public meetings and the 
details were discussed and debated among participants from civil society and 
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 Non-state actor input was facilitated by the Technical Advisory Group, which oversaw 
the two-year process and helped draft much of the final language of the ISP, as well as 
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government agencies.  The suggestions of participants in these meetings, both 
state officials and non-state actors, regularly found their way into the ISP draft.
410
 
Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) 
Although the twentieth century history of Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been characterized by authoritarian regimes and violent transfers of 
power, the region saw a pronounced shift toward electoral democracy in the 
1980s and this move became consolidated, or at least stable, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.
411
  Despite a number of “irregular disruptions”412 and moves by 
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some leaders to amend constitutional term limits in order to extend their 
opportunities for re-election,
413
 all but one state in the region is now a nominal 
democracy.
414
  While the recent history of electoral democracy in the region is 
difficult to describe as stable, a tradition of political change by military coup has 
largely given way to change through the electoral process.  Honduran President 
Ernesto Zelaya was ousted by elements of the Honduran army in late June 
2009,
415
 ending almost two decades of respite since the last successful military 
coup in the region, which occurred in Haiti in 1991.
416
  But the Honduran coup 
had the explicit support of the country’s Supreme Court and legislature,417 and 
occurred after the President had taken what many in the country claimed were 
extra-constitutional steps when no constitutional process for impeachment 
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  Despite universal regional condemnation of Mr. Zelaya’s ouster,419 the 
move by his country’s military was itself alleged, perhaps ironically, to have been 
taken in defense of Honduras’ constitutional order.420  During the eighteen years 
between the 1991 coup in Haiti and the 2009 coup in Honduras, and perhaps even 
despite recent events in Honduras, it can be argued that civilian-led constitutional 
systems have taken root in most countries despite instances of unrest.
421
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In an effort to secure democratic practices and electoral transitions in the 
region, the OAS General Assembly approved the Santiago Commitment to 
Democracy and the Strengthening of the Inter-American System at its 1991 
meeting in Santiago, Chile, and it embraced the idea of collective response to any 
illegal or sudden interruption of democratic rule.
422
  The Santiago Commitment 
was supplemented at the same General Assembly by a Resolution on 
Representative Democracy, known as Resolution 1080, the purpose of which was 
                                                                                                                                     
followed by his vice president, Carlos Mesa, who resigned in June 2005 and was 
succeeded by the President of the Bolivian Supreme Court until elections were held in 
December 2005).  An April 2005 article about the resignation of Ecuador’s president 
after a “constitutional coup” provides a further “brief catalogue of irregular changes of 
government” in the region that includes the examples above as well as the 1999 
presidential resignation in Paraguay and the 2001–2002 presidential successions brought 
on by economic woes in Argentina.  See “Constitutional Coup” by Congress Ousts 
Gutierrez on Wave of Popular Protests, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Apr. 26, 2005, at 1–3.  
In each of these cases, succession occurred under established constitutional procedures, 
and the military was a minor player or notably absent, usually remaining quartered while 
civilian authorities worked through succession procedures and later held elections.  Some 
have argued that even the recent Honduras coup is hard to categorize as an overthrow of 
civilian power, despite its obvious constitutional challenge, because the military acted 
after key national civilian institutions, the country’s supreme court and congress, raised 
serious concerns about a third branch’s extra-constitutional behavior.  See Vargas, supra 
note 420; see also infra note 499 (discussing more recent developments in Honduras). 
422
 See Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American 
System OAS GA, Santiago Chile, 3d plenary sess., June 4, 1991, OAS Proceedings, 
Volume I, OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (20 Aug 1991) at 1-3, available at 
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/agres/ag03805E01.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2009); see also 
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States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 
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to “promote and consolidate representative democracy” in the region by creating a 
response mechanism “in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or 
irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the 
legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any 
OAS Member State.”423  A year later, a special session of the OAS General 
Assembly approved an amendment to the OAS Charter, known as the Washington 
Protocol, which calls for the suspension of any OAS member state whose 
government is overthrown by force.
424
  
While these instruments supported the ideal of elected government, they 
failed to provide a concrete mechanism that responded to internal assaults on 
elected governments.  The Santiago Commitment offers only precatory language, 
and although Resolution 1080 provides a basis for consultation, at least where a 
threat is external or clearly extra-constitutional, it offers no real basis for 
response.  Instead, it merely calls for the “immediate convocation” of the OAS 
Permanent Council to “examine the situation” and to convene foreign ministers 
                                                 
423
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5, 1991), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm (last visited 
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  While it provides for a meeting of the General 
Assembly to “look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions deemed 
appropriate, in accordance with the OAS Charter and international law,”426 there 
is no real guidance on what course of action the General Assembly might 
appropriately take.  Thus, Resolution 1080 allows for the kind of joint 
deliberation that would likely occur in any event, but does not create a meaningful 
procedural response.  Even the Washington Protocol, which would punish a 
successful coup with membership suspension, does little more than state the 
obvious course of action because a suspension would likely be sought even absent 
the Charter amendment, and it gives no hope of immediate relief to a legitimate 
government under pressure or to a state whose government has stepped outside of 
constitutional bounds.  Resolution 1080 only addresses external challenges to 
power, but it does not deal with cases in which an elected government seeks to 
remain beyond its constitutional tenure or in which an election is stolen. 
These debilities became apparent during Peru’s 2000 election cycle when 
its president, Alberto Fujimori, decided to run for a constitutionally questionable 
third term and then won in what was widely regarded as a corrupt electoral 
process.
427
  Although the country and the region had tolerated Fujimori’s 1992 
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“self-coup,” in which he suspended the Peru’s constitution and dissolved the 
country’s congress and the supreme court in order to give himself latitude to fight 
the Shining Path guerilla insurgency, local and international constituencies loudly 
protested his 2000 election.  In 2000, a series of scandals involving his 
intelligence chief, Vladimir Montesinos, eroded Fujimori’s remaining support at 
home and abroad, and, in the face of unrelenting pressure, Fujimori left office 
later in November of year.
428
  He fled Peru, sought asylum in Japan, and 
submitted his resignation.  The resignation was rejected by Peru’s congress, 
which instead approved a resolution finding Fujimori “permanently morally unfit” 




Paniagua learned a great deal about the inter-American framework’s 
inability to protect democratic governments from this experience.  The terms of 
                                                                                                                                     
Tapia, En Elecciones Peruanas, MENSAJERO, Apr. 19, 2000, at 8 (describing election 
irregularities); A Second Chance for Toledo, and Peru, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 2000, at 
31–32 (describing the context of the election). 
428
 See Rick Vecchio, Fujimori Renuncia, MENSAJERO, Nov. 22, 2000, at 1. 
429
 Id.; see also Clifford Krauss, Peru Congress Says Fujimori Is “Unfit” and Picks 
Successor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A12 (describing the steps taken by Peru’s 
congress to transfer power to Mr. Paniagua following Fujimori’s resignation and 
departure from the country).  The appointment of Paniagua was an appropriate 
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Analysis of Alberto Fujimori’s Policy Reversal of 1990, GEORGETOWN CTR. FOR LATIN 





Resolution 1080 had not fit the circumstances of the stolen election in Peru, and 
the OAS had been unable to agree to invoke the resolution during a meeting of the 
General Assembly in June 2000 in Windsor, Canada.  Instead, the OAS sent a 
high level mission comprised of “the Chair of the General Assembly and the 
Secretary General of the OAS” to Peru in order to explore “options” to strengthen 
democracy and to make recommendations for democratic reform.
430
  Some credit 




Informed by its experience, Paniagua’s transitional government called for 
the creation of an Inter-American Democratic Charter in part to ensure that the 
Inter-American System would respond when a democratic state is “perverted from 
within” and in part to strengthen the mechanisms for response.432  For Paniagua 
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and Peru, the timing of the upcoming Quebec City Summit was auspicious.  The 
agenda for the April summit was taking shape as Paniagua took office in 
November 2000, and it was finalized during the early months of 2001.  Peru 
found support from its neighbors in South and Central America; from Canada, 
which had been directly involved diplomatically in the crisis engendered by 
Fujimori’s election and the Montesinos scandal;433 and from the incoming Bush 
administration, which may have seen a democratic charter as a means to further 
secure the lock-out of Cuba from the inter-American system as a means of 
pressing for political change in Cuba.
434
  There was something of a groundswell 
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of support for Peru’s initiative, and the final Declaration from the 2001 Quebec 
Summit agreement included a “democracy clause” that stated,  
We acknowledge that the values and practices of democracy are 
fundamental to the advancement of all our objectives. The 
maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict 
respect for the democratic system are, at the same time, a goal 
and a shared commitment and are an essential condition of our 
presence at this and future Summits. Consequently, any 
unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic 
order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable 
obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the 
Summit of the Americas process.  Having due regard for 
existing hemispheric, regional and sub-regional mechanisms, we 
agree to conduct consultations in the event of a disruption of the 




The Quebec Declaration went further, calling for the development of a 
binding regional Inter-American Democratic Charter to restate regional 
democratic values, to help OAS member states “respond to” democratic 
challenges, and “to reinforce OAS instruments for the active defense of 
representative democracy.”436 
The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) was negotiated in the 
months following the Quebec Summit, and a draft was presented by Peru to the 
OAS General Assembly in June 2001, although a final agreement could not be 
reached.
437
  Negotiations continued through the summer of 2001, and a final text 
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was accepted by all OAS member states except Venezuela.
438
  Venezuela 




While it cannot be claimed that the IADC owes its existence to the summit 
process alone, the timing and the process of the Quebec Summit helped advance 
the agreement.  The fact that earlier summits had dealt with the theme of 
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 Venezuela’s stated reasons for objecting were that the Charter should refer to 
“participatory” rather than “representative” democracy and, echoing the Cold War 
socialist bloc theme in the human rights field, that a charter on “social rights” should be 
made an integral part of any effort to define regional political rights.  See HENRY J. 
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, 237-38 (2d 
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subsequent OAS General Assembly meeting in 2004 in Quito, Ecuador, Venezuela’s 
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democracy a ‘social content,’ because the continent has had ‘enough of elitist 
democracies.’”  Venezuela: Highlights of Radio Nacional de Venezuela (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports June 7, 2004) (Global News Wire June 8, 2004).  Venezuela’s 
persistence paid off: the OAS called for the formulation of a social charter at its 2004 
General Assembly.  See OAS G.A. Res. 2056, 4th Plen. Sess., OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2056 
(XXXIV-O/04) (June 8, 2004).  The new Secretary General of the OAS—Jose Miguel 
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Assembly renewed the call to draft a social charter.  See OAS G.A. Res. 2139, OAS Doc. 
AG/RES. 2139 (XXXV-O/05) (June 7, 2005).  The OAS began the process of developing 
the Inter-American Social Charter with a ministerial meeting in Caracas in August 2005.  
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Calls for “Understanding” with USA, (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, Aug. 29, 2005) (Global News Wire Aug. 31, 2005). 
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democracy and that a constituency of state and non-state actors looked to the 
summit process to advance democratic themes cannot have hurt.   
Some observers have made the connection more directly.  A policy brief 
written by the Liu Institute for Global Studies at the University of British 
Columbia, an Institute headed by former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy, asserted that 
[t]he idea of a Charter might have been ignored and forgotten 
had it not been taken up by the organizers of the Summit of the 
Americas in Quebec City, which instigated the negotiations 
leading to the signing of the Charter in September 11, 2001. The 
negotiation process that culminated in the Charter was led by a 





 As international trade agreements have been constructed in recent 
years, calls for greater transparency and public access to the trade process have 
increased, including access to negotiations on the texts of agreements and to 
dispute resolution processes.  This has been exemplified at the global level by a 
growing discourse on NGO participation in the processes of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and growing claims for access.
441
  These claims have, in 
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some respects, begun to yield results in opening the WTO to non-state actors, 
although the results have been quite modest and generally limited to the right to 
“attend” Ministerial Conferences,442 to participate in certain technical or 
informational forums, and to submit amicus briefs to dispute resolution panels.
443
  
No real institutional effort has been made to open the WTO negotiating process to 
actors, although some delegations have occasionally posted negotiating positions 
                                                                                                                                     
creation of formal opportunities for participation); Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and 
Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 709, 
719 (1998) (arguing that an “expanded role for NGOs, particularly environmental groups, 
in the workings of the international trading system, would not only address public choice 
problems that might otherwise diminish the legitimacy of WTO decision-making, but 
would offer the prospect of broader political support for trade and investment 
liberalization”); John H. Jackson, The Linkage Problem—Comments on Five Texts, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 118, 120 (2002) (noting the apparent agreement among five scholars 
contributing to a symposium edition on the WTO “that the WTO as an institution is 
seriously flawed, in some cases because of important institutional defects such as lack of 
democratic input, transparency, public participation, and relationship with 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”); Gabrielle Marceau & Peter Pedersen, Is the 
WTO Open and Transparent? A Discussion of the Relationship of the WTO with Non-
Governmental Organizations and Civil Society's Claims for More Transparency and 
Public Participation, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 37 (1999) (discussing the “state of affairs” 
of claims for greater access to WTO work and noting some limited opportunities for 
access to trade dispute settlement processes); Eric Stein, International Integration and 
Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L 489, 504–06 (2001) (discussing 
criticism of “the way the GATT/WTO had used its power and the democratic deficit and 
lack of transparency and legitimacy”). 
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 Marceau & Pedersen, supra note 441, at 5, 12. 
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 See James Cameron & Stephen Orava, WTO Opens Disputes to Private Voices, NAT’L 
L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at B5–B6; Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental 





or specific proposals on their web sites.
444
  This measure of transparency at least 
informs public positions and allows non-state actors to think strategically about 
where allies and obstacles may lie. 
 Similar claims for access greeted negotiations for the proposed 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  Unlike the WTO, which has grown as 
an autonomous economic integration body, the FTAA proposal had its origins in 
the inter-American summit process, having been conceived at the Miami 
Summit,
445
 and advanced and promoted in subsequent summits.  FTAA 
negotiations stalled following the Eighth Annual Ministerial Conference in Miami 
in 2003, and for a number of reasons, the FTAA proposal has not been revived.
446
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 See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 115 (2002).  This reflects the general 
attitude that access to the process of making trade policy should be at the national level.  
See General Counsel Decisions, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-
Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162 ¶ 6, (July 23, 1996), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
445
 See Miami Plan of Action, supra note 285, at 11. 
446
 Negotiations were suspended after the Miami Ministerial Meeting for a number of 
reasons.  A principal impasse involved agricultural subsidies, and negotiations were 
halted in part so that this difficult issue could be worked out first in the WTO.  The issue 
was addressed at the 2005 WTO meeting in Hong Kong, thus clearing an obstacle to 
continuing the FTAA discussions.  A second obstacle was the policy position taken by 
Venezuela.  President Hugo Chavez has stridently opposed the FTAA on more or less 
philosophical grounds as a neocolonial or neoliberal project. Perla Noguera, Chavez, en 
vez del ALCA el ALBA, (Feb.  21 2003), available at 
http://ecuador.indymedia.org/es/2003/02/1772.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) (quoting 
Chavez as saying “el camino del neoliberalismo no es el correcto, ese modelo neoliberal 





While regional trade negotiations may or may not be revived, the degree of 
transparency and public access to the negotiation process was clearly on the rise 
prior to suspension.   As described below, this access was informed by summit 
commitments and efforts to implement those commitments. 
At the Santiago Summit in 1998, heads of state explicitly called for greater 
transparency and participation in FTAA negotiations:  
The FTAA negotiating process will be transparent . . . in order 
to create the opportunities for the full participation by all 
countries.  We encourage all segments of civil society to 
participate in and contribute to the process in a constructive 
manner, through our respective mechanisms of dialogue and 
                                                                                                                                     
antineoliberal,” author’s translation: “The path of neoliberlaism is not correct, this 
neoliberal model failed because, morally, it has no substance and our Constitution is 
antineoliberal.”); Perla Noguera, El ALCA es un mecanismo para la desintegración de 
nuestros pueblos, Nov. 26, 2003 (available at 
http://www.nuestraamerica.info/leer.hlvs/2634 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) (quoting 
Chavez as stating: “el ALCA constituye un mecanismo para la desintegración de nuestros 
pueblos y Repúblicas,” author’s translation: The FTAA constitutes a mechanism for the 
disintegration of our people and republics”).  The Venezuelan delegation was apparently 
isolated in this position at the Miami Ministerial Meeting, but subsequent events 
demonstrate that some other Latin American leaders are rethinking the advisability of any 
potential free trade agreement.  At the Mar del Plata Summit in 2005, the four full 
member states of MERCOSUR—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—joined 
Venezuela in opposing continued negotiations for an FTAA.  The other participating 
states agreed to a U.S. proposal to resume negotiations, and this resulted in a statement 
that “some member states” remain optimistic about the FTAA.  See Declaration of Mar 
del Plata, supra note 286, ¶ 9A.  At the 2009 summit in Port of Spain the question of an 






consultation and by presenting their views through the 
mechanism created in the FTAA negotiating process.
447
 
While this commitment is aimed in part at the participation of smaller 
states whose capacity to engage in complex and protracted trade negotiations is 
limited, it also contemplates a degree of openness to non-state actors.  The 
mechanism referred to is the Committee of Government Representatives on the 
Participation of Civil Society (SOC), which was created as part of a broader 
scheme to receive input from civil society on a range of issues, and which 
convened for the first time several months after the Santiago Summit.
448
 
Heads of state renewed their commitment to a transparent process at the 
Quebec Summit in 2001 by pledging to 
 [e]nsure the transparency of the negotiating process, including 
through publication of the preliminary draft FTAA Agreement 
in the four official languages as soon as possible and the 
dissemination of additional information on the progress of 
negotiations.
 449 
The negotiating text of the FTAA was released three months later, and two 
subsequent revisions were released in the days preceding the annual meetings of 
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of Civil Society (SOC) and its proceedings can be found on the official FTAA web site at 
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449





trade ministers, which punctuate the negotiating process.
450
  The Quebec Summit 
Plan of Action also includes a pledge by states to  
 [f]oster through their respective national dialogue mechanisms 
and through appropriate FTAA mechanisms, a process of 
increasing and sustained communication with civil society to 
ensure that it has a clear perception of the development of the 
FTAA negotiating process [and to] invite civil society to 
continue to contribute to the FTAA process.
451
 
While this language appears partly aimed at marketing the FTAA to civil 
society—communications are intended to “ensure” clear perceptions rather than 
to invite meaningful input—it also includes a call for non-state actors to 
contribute to the process.  These contributions have largely been managed by the 
SOC, although the negotiating process at trade ministerial meetings has also been 
opened to some extent. 
The SOC created a public input mechanism that invited NGOs to make 
“submissions” on any area of concern that was raised by the proposed FTAA.452  
This mechanism has been criticized for being a somewhat one-way “post office 
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 The current draft text can be found on the official FTAA website at http://www.ftaa-
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box” approach to public input that creates no real basis for dialogue.453 
Nevertheless, since its inception, it has evolved to some extent, and the SOC now 
collates and summarizes submissions for trade delegations, so that at least this 
one-way flow of information is a bit more accessible.  Between 2003 and 2004, 
the SOC also hosted a series of three “issue meetings” on agriculture, services, 
and intellectual property rights.
454
 While these themes reflected the concerns of 
governments more than those of the NGO community—NGO concerns relate 
more to environmental, labor, and other social issues—the meetings at least 
provided an opportunity for direct interaction between non-state actors and 
responsible government officials, including negotiators and representatives of 
technical ministries.  The SOC was also charged with designing a proposal for a 
“civil society consultative committee within the institutional framework of the 
FTAA,” as called for in the eighth ministerial meeting in Miami in 2003,455 but 
efforts to develop the proposal have not proceeded since the FTAA negotiation 
process was suspended. 
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The last two FTAA Ministerial Meetings, in Quito in 2002 and in Miami 
in 2003, also provided opportunities for direct interaction between trade 
negotiators and interested civil society participants.  In both cases, the issues that 
NGOs brought to the table were related to the broader social concerns raised by 
the FTAA proposal.  In Quito, trade ministers held a brief direct meeting with 
non-state actors who had participated in three separate non-governmental forums.  
The first, on indigenous and labor concerns, was hosted by a loose coalition called 
the Hemispheric Social Alliance.
456
  The second, on environmental sustainability, 
was hosted by two Ecuadorian NGOs and their counterparts from the region.
457
  
The third, on trade policy more generally, was hosted by a Latin American 
coalition of parliamentarians.
458
  In Miami, a coalition of NGOs from the region 
organized a forum called the Americas Trade and Sustainable Development 
Forum (ATSDF) and, at the invitation of the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, hosted a three-day workshop inside the “security perimeter” that 
was established to contain street protests.
459
  The ATSDF included parallel 
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workshops on nine areas: trade and agriculture; trade, democracy, and human 
rights; trade and environment; trade and smaller economies; trade, participation, 
and access; trade and sustainable livelihoods; trade, corruption, and transparency; 
trade, knowledge, and intellectual property rights; and trade and investment.
460
  
More than three hundred NGO participants from over twenty countries attended, 
and representatives from trade ministries of at least eight countries were present 
for at least part of the proceedings.
461
 
While each of these mechanisms is imperfect, and although considerable 
obstacles still prevent the opening any future regional trade negotiations to 
meaningful participation by non-state actors, a framework is evolving that offers a 
greater degree of access than can be found in comparable negotiations related to 
other trade accords. 
NGO Accreditation Rules for the OAS 
Non-state actors have for many years worked in an informal manner with 
the OAS and its technical units, but until the 1990s, no formal status was afforded 
to NGOs before the political bodies of the organization.
462
  The Canadian 
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 In 1971, the OAS issued a set of standards that approved relations with NGOs willing 
to provide advisory services or carry out programs for the OAS.  But the standards 
included no reference to the status of NGOs as interest groups that might seek to 
influence the programs or policies of the OAS or its member states.  OAS G.A. Res. 57, 





government became interested in creating an NGO accreditation mechanism, and 
in 1994 made a formal request to the OAS Permanent Council that the question of 
NGO status be studied.
463
  The request was approved, and in the ensuing years, 
Canada worked through the summit process and through the organs of the OAS to 
create an accreditation mechanism.
464
 
In 1994, the OAS began slowly creating a Working Group to Study the 
Possibility of Granting Status to Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) in the 
OAS through the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the Permanent 
Council.
465
  The Working Group catalogued NGOs with which the OAS had 
cooperative agreements, interviewed OAS Secretariat staff about their work with 
NGOs, and looked to comparative examples of NGO participation in some UN 
                                                                                                                                     
available at http://www.oas.org/legal/english/CoopRelations/CoopRelations1.htm (last 
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  Yet the Working Group took over two years to conclude its 
efforts, offering a final report to the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs 
in July 1997.
467
  Rather than offering a plan for NGO accreditation, the report 
recommended new measures that could have limited the potential for NGO 
consultations on substantive issues, at least where those consultations were sought 
with technical bodies of the OAS.
468
 




 See Org. of Am. States, Comm. on Juridical and Political Affairs, Report by the 
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs on the Status of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in the OAS, OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2946/97 (July 11, 1997) 
[hereinafter Report on Juridical and Political Affairs], available at http://www.civil-
society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-doc-2946-97-Dixon.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2009). 
468
 Id.  It is not clear that the Committee intended to propose limitations on NGO access, 
and in fact its report lauded the relations that NGOs generally had with the OAS.  But the 
Committee’s draft resolution failed to create any accreditation program and did not speak 
to how NGOs might become more actively engaged with the political bodies of the OAS.  
It focused instead on the OAS Technical Secretariat.  In addition, the draft resolution 
proposed that the General Secretariat “draft practical guidelines to ensure consistency and 
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app. 2 ¶ 2.  Defining “selection criteria” to “ensure consistency and enhancement or 
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actors in the workings of the OAS.  See OAS Permanent Council CP Res. 704, 
OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 704 (1129/97) (July 24, 1997), available at http://www.civil-
society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-RES-704.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).  
This language was endorsed verbatim by the Committee on Juridical and Political 





 With progress on NGO accreditation stalled in the OAS technical 
and political organs, Canada was able to turn to the summit process.  Summits had 
produced written commitments to increase civil society participation at the 
regional level,
469
 as well as a growing epistemic community of NGOs that were 
engaged in OAS processes and interested in greater participation.  In June 1998, 
at the OAS General Assembly meeting following the Working Group report, a 
Canadian proposal was approved that went well beyond the modest and 
potentially limiting proposals of the Committee on Juridical and Political 
Affairs.
470
   The proposal, Resolution 1539, made specific reference to the Miami, 
Santa Cruz, and Santiago Summit language about the “importance of civil 
society,” and to Santiago Summit Language about the role of the OAS as a 
“forum for the exchange of experiences and information.”471  In essence, 
                                                                                                                                     
Comm. On Juridical & Political Affairs on the Status of Non-Governmental 
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 OAS G.A. Res. 1539, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1539 (XXVIII-O/98) (June 2, 1998) 
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Resolution 1539 re-tasked the Permanent Council to address the issue of civil 
society access to the OAS.  The General Assembly resolved 
 [t]o instruct the Permanent Council to examine ways to increase 
the degree to which appropriate nongovernmental organizations 
and civil society organizations may become more closely 
involved in, and contribute to, the activities of the Organization, 
and ways to implement the tasks entrusted to the OAS in the 
Santiago Plan of Action with respect to civil society.  In this 
process, representatives of civil society organizations may be 
asked for their views on the matter.
472
 
The Permanent Council was also instructed to report on progress at the 
following General Assembly meeting in June 1999.
473
 
Acting pursuant to Resolution 1539, Canada convened an informal 
working group of NGOs and government representatives in Washington to make 
recommendations for an NGO accreditation framework.
474
  The group examined 
accreditation practices at the UN and discussed how to design an accreditation 
program for the OAS that would provide maximum openness for NGOs while 
creating some limits that would allow governments to constrain participation by 
groups operating contrary to the principles of the OAS Charter, such as the 
Shining Path rebels in Peru.
475
  The group also discussed how to ensure access to 
working documents for accredited organizations, how to finance costs associated 
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with the program, and how to ensure that an accreditation system did not 
discourage or limit existing avenues of access by NGOs, particularly to the 
technical units of the OAS.
476
   
The results of this work, including draft guidelines for accreditation, were 
presented to a Special Joint Working Group of the Permanent Council and CIDI 
on the Strengthening and Modernization of the OAS, chaired by Canada.
477
  This 
Special Joint Working Group, which was formed to address a broader range of 
institutional reform issues within the OAS, reported favorably on the accreditation 




In response to the report, the General Assembly approved a resolution in 
1999 (Resolution 1661) that created a Committee on Civil Society Participation in 
OAS Activities within the Permanent Council and that instructed the Permanent 
Council “to prepare, by way of that committee, and bearing in mind the 




 The author discussed these results with representatives of the Permanent Mission of 
Canada to the OAS. 
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attachment to the report presented by the Permanent Council, guidelines for civil 
society participation in OAS activities, for adoption before December 31, 
1999.”479  In support of Resolution 1661, the General Assembly quoted at length 
from language of the Miami and Santiago Summits.
480
   
The Permanent Council created a Civil Society Committee in the 
following weeks and issued accreditation guidelines on December 15, 1999.
481
  
The Civil Society Committee’s functions were later merged with the OAS Office 
of Summit Follow-up and are now managed by the OAS Department of 
International Affairs within the Secretariat of External Relations.
482
  The OAS 
accreditation program and summit-related issues are now managed by the 
Permanent Council Committee on Inter-American Summits Management and 
Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities (CISC).
483
  The CISC’s functions 
are defined as follows: 
a. With respect to the Summit process: 
                                                 
479




 OAS G.A. Res. 759, OAS Doc. OEA/SER.G, CP/RES.759 (1217/99) (Dec. 15, 1999), 
available at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-RES-759.htm 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2009). 
482
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i. To coordinate OAS activities in support of the 
Summits of the Americas process; 
ii. To coordinate follow-up and implementation 
activities relating to mandates assigned to the 
Organization by the Summits; 
iii. To request and receive contributions from civil 
society, relating to its participation in the Summit 
process, for consideration by the Summit 
Implementation Review Group (SIRG); 
iv. To study topics relating to the Summit process that 
are assigned to it by the Council or the General 
Assembly and to make recommendations thereon to 
the Permanent Council; 
v. To consider the reports prepared by the Executive 
Secretariat for the Summit Process and the technical 
dependency responsible for ministerial meetings and 
other sectoral meetings linked to the Summits 
process. 
b. With respect to civil society participation in OAS activities: 
i. To implement the Guidelines for the Participation of 
Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities and to 
present to the Permanent Council such amendments 
as the Committee deems pertinent;  
ii. To design, implement, and evaluate the necessary 
strategies to increase and facilitate civil society 
participation in OAS activities; 
iii. To promote the strengthening of relations established 
between civil society organizations and the bodies 
and dependencies of the OAS within the scope of the 
functions conferred upon the Permanent Council by 
the OAS Charter; 
iv. To study matters relating to civil society participation 
in OAS activities that are presented to it by civil 
society organizations or entrusted to it by the 





make recommendations thereon to the Permanent 
Council; 
v. To analyze and transmit to the Permanent Council 
applications presented by civil society organizations 




The merging of summit and civil society liaison functions reflects the fact 
that the OAS agenda, at the broadest political level, is increasingly driven by the 
summit process, and that the facilitation and management of input from non-state 




Jurisgenerative Potential of Summits 
These four case studies show that summits advanced the international 
lawmaking process in the Inter-American System, and in some cases they 
produced international legal commitments that even a strict formalist could 
recognize as positive law.  Inter-American summits nurtured institutional reforms 
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 Org. of Am. States, Permanent Council, Rules of Procedure of the Permanent Council 
of the OAS, at 6, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.1112/80 rev. 4 corr. 1 (Aug. 27, 2003), 
available at scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_03/CP11732E07.DOC (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2009); see also Org. of Am. States, Permanent Council, Work Plan of the 
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 An examination of the OAS Civil Society web site demonstrates how these functions 
overlap.  It also shows how important partnerships with NGOs and NGO networks have 
become to the Summit process and to the OAS.  See http://www.civil-society.oas.org/ 





both in the process for negotiating a regional trade accord and the process for 
engaging non-state actors in the OAS.  Summits also gave rise to the IADC, 
which has positive legal features.  While these instruments and institutional 
reforms have yet to be fully deployed, they owe their genesis to summits and the 
unique framework for access and interaction that summits offer. 
Evidence of a shift in state practice tied to a summit commitment can be 
seen in the fact that both Argentina and Mexico enacted laws on access to 
information in the years that followed the approval of the Inter-American Strategy 
for Public Participation which was approved in 2000.
486
  The call for a domestic 
commitment to greater access to information was one of the principal 
recommendations of the ISP that emerged from the summit process.
487
  It cannot 
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 See Decreto No. 1172/03, Dec. 3, 2003, B.O. (Arg.); Ley Federal de Transparencia y 
Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental, [Federal Law of Transparency and 
Access to Public Governmental Information], Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O], 11 
de Junio de 2002 (Mex.). 
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 See ISP Strategy Document, supra note 404, at 5–6. 
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 As discussed supra notes408 to 409, the author served as a member of the Technical 
Advisory Group that helped shape the ISP process and draft its language over the course 
of two years, and in that capacity worked closely with foreign and environment ministry 
officials from Argentina and Mexico, who regularly monitored the process of developing 
the ISP.  As discussed supra note 409, the Mexican government hosted the final meeting 
in which the language of the ISP was debated.  Argentine and Mexican NGOs also played 
a prominent role in formulating the ISP, and the participation of non-state actors from 





From a legal process perspective, summits play a role in determining 
“international society’s values” and thus legitimize and substantiate normative 
claims.
489
  Summits are highly public events where government leaders seek both 
to affirm and to define societal values through dialogue and consensus.  Non-state 
actors reflecting a broad cross-section of civil society collaborate in summit 
preparatory meetings and agenda setting.  At times, governments invite non-state 
                                                                                                                                     
Participant lists of ISP meetings and notes of meetings, including the Mexico City 
meeting, are on file with author.  While causal claims cannot be proved, the participation 
of government officials and non-state actors from both countries as an integral part of the 
ISP development process over the course of two years leaves open at least the possibility 
that they were influenced, inspired, or at least informed by the process.  The ISP certainly 
facilitated the formation and strengthening of an epistemic community of governmental 
and non-governmental actors concerned with greater public access to development 
decision-making in both of these countries, and connected them with others from 
throughout the region with similar interests.  While offering proof of the mechanisms 
through which such a community worked is beyond the scope of this Article, the NGO 
community’s potential to affect policy outcomes should not be discounted. 
489
 For a discussion of new international legal process theory, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
New International Legal Process, in RATNER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 186, at 84–86; 
see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-86 (1996) (discussing transnational legal process as 
the “theory and practice of how public and private actors … interact in a variety of public 
and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, 
internalize rules of transnational law”).  While the case studies discussed above focus on 
regional policy and international norms, the impact of summits on domestic policy is also 
worth exploring.  An argument might be made that summit attention to participatory 
democratic mechanisms has led to increased interest in these mechanisms at the national 
level, a claim that transnational process theorists such as Harold Koh might find 
interesting.  See id. at 205 (“Once nations begin to interact, a complex process occurs, 
whereby international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in 





actors to participate directly as ex oficio members of negotiating teams.
490
  Even 
some arenas of public protest against summits or their agendas have been funded 
and sanctioned by government.
491
  This speaks less of co-option than of an effort 
to engage interested parties, including vocal dissidents, in the dialogue on 
regional values and policies.  The most radical dissenters—those who outright 
reject summit initiatives and turn to street rallies or violence to convey their 
message—also use summit venues to stage their theatre, thus implicitly 




                                                 
490
 The author has spoken with several individuals who have served in this capacity, 
including individuals invited by the governments of Canada, Germany, and the United 
States.  See also UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board Communique (January 2009) 
at 2, available at 
http://www.unaidspcbngo.org/pcb/blog/UNAIDS_PCB_NGO_Delegation_Communique
_on_the_23rd_PCB_mtg_final%20(1).doc (last visited October 31, 2009) (noting that 
some states included civil society in their own national delegations at a UN conference on 
HIV in 2008); Taking Issue: The Sustainable Development Issues Network Volume 5, 
Issue 10 (April 15 2005) at 1, available at http://www.bpwnl.nl/archief/th4_sust/050415-
TI.doc (last visited October 31, 2009) (noting that, since the Johannesburg World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, “the Dutch have included a Youth, a Women and a NGO 
representative in their national delegation”). 
491
 Canada partially funded the People’s Summit as an alternative to the official summits 
both in Santiago in 1998 and Quebec City in 2001.  Interviews by author with 
representatives of Canada’s Permanent Mission to the OAS.  President Hugo Chavez of 
Venezuela was a keynote speaker at the People’s Summit in Mar del Plata in 2005.  See 
Terminó la Cumbre de los Pueblos, NACIÓN (Arg.), Nov. 4, 2005, available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=753463  (last visited October 31, 2009). 
492
 For example, regional firebrand Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, used the 





The cases also suggest that summits promote conforming behavior among 
state agencies and regional organizations through interaction and the 
internalization of norms.
493
  Linking these institutions to civil society actors lays a 
foundation for cooperative follow-up, and it produces expectations among societal 
demandeurs who are in a position to monitor implementation and promote further 
progress.
494
  This may strengthen the propensity of states to comply with 
                                                                                                                                     
outside of the formal diplomatic proceedings.  The rally was aimed at generating public 
sentiment in favor of his own government’s policy positions and against those of his 
favorite target, the United States.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, In Latin America, Messy Foray 
for Bush, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/world/americas/06iht-letter.html (last visited 
October 31, 2009); Jordana Timerman, Chávez and Maradona Lead Massive Rebuke of 
Bush, NATION, Nov. 5, 2005, available at http://www.thenation.com. 
493
 For a discussion of the importance of these factors in shaping normative responses, see 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2400 
(1991). 
494
 Even more aspirational statements of principle embodied in summit commitments can 
promote expectations which, over time, can be converted to hard commitments through 
the efforts of interested state and non-state actors.  These statements formed part of the 
basis for claims for greater access to the FTAA negotiation process by organizers of the 
Americas Trade and Sustainable Development Forum (ATSDF), who were able to cite 
summit commitments dating back to 1994 in their effort to open up the trade ministerial 
meetings in Quito in 2002 and Miami in 2003.  See supra notes 447 to 451 and 
accompanying text.  Non-state actors involved in the summit process have also been 
involved in summit follow-up projects, which monitor compliance with summit 
mandates.  See, e.g., The Summits Must Not End Up As Empty Promises: Hemispheric 
Report 2006-2008, Active Democracy Citizen Network For Governmental Compliance 
with the Summits (April 2009) available at http://www.civil-
society.oas.org/documents/123_ENG_informe%20hemisf%C3%A9rico%20(ingl%C3%
A9s).pdf (last visited October 31, 2009) (report of a summit commitment monitoring 





obligations by putting NGOs in a better position to perform “parallel and 
supplementary” monitoring functions.495  
Summits also provide a mechanism that can reinforce state efforts to 
advance policy goals when these goals are both consistent with the value-laden 
currents of the summit process and supported by the summits’ epistemic 
communities.  Peru, for example, sought regional affirmation to secure the 
position of its elected leaders at a critical moment in its history, and its interim 
President, Valentín Paniagua, used the summit process to advance the IADC and 
bolster fragile domestic institutions after eight years of autocratic rule.
496
  After its 
former President, Alberto Fujimori, had threatened to return and rule his country, 
Paniagua used a moment of democratic respite to secure some assurances from 
Peru’s neighbors, through the IADC, against the possibility that Fujimori might 
make good on his threat.  Peru was substantially aided by the historical summit 
rhetoric of democracy and an array of pro-democracy groups and like-minded 
countries that had coalesced around the summit process to form a supportive 
epistemic community.
497
  While the IADC remains a relatively young instrument, 
and it has yet to be tested by a returning exile like Fujimori, it did appear to 
                                                                                                                                     
Government through the National Endowment for Democracy, and by the Canadian 
International Development Agency and the OAS). 
495
 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 212, at 250–53. 
496
 See supra notes 427 to 439 and accompanying text. 
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operate as designed in the first two cases that arose after its adoption.
498
  More 
recently, following the military ouster of Honduran President Ernesto Zelaya in 
June 2009, IADC procedures were invoked and OAS member states presented a 
largely unified front by suspending Honduras membership and by cutting off aid 
and other financial flows to the country.
499
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 The IADC was invoked in response to the coup attempt in Venezuela in April 2002.  
See Denis Paradis, Secretary of State For Latin America and Africa, Statement to the 29th 
Special Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (April 
18, 2002), available at http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=02-0347 (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2009).  It was not invoked in Haiti in February 2004, despite the 
arguments by some, including Jean Bertrand Aristide, that what took place was 
effectively a coup.  See Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director for the Center of Economic and 
Policy Research, Statement to OAS Meeting Between Civil Society Organizations, the 
Secretary General, and Heads of Delegations (June 6, 2005), available at  
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/news2005/0606-20.htm (last 
visited July 30, 2009).   
499
 At the time this Article went to press there was still no consensus resolution of the 
controversy surrounding Zelaya’s ouster, although it appeared that OAS member states, 
including the United States, were taking a wait-and-see approach and were poised to 
recognize the results of a planned November 29, 2009 election.  Mary Beth Sheridan, 
Honduras Accord is on Verge of Collapse; Ousted President Says U.S. Lacks 
Commitment to Reinstatement, The Washington Post, (Nov 12, 2009) at A3.   A full 
analysis of how the IADC worked in the wake of the Honduran coup (or not) will need to 
be conducted with the benefit of time, more complete information, and hindsight, but it 
appears even from contemporaneous and incomplete reports that the instrument worked 
at least in some of the ways it was planned to work by providing a framework for 
regional response and coordination—and for normative pressure.  The Charter did not 
prevent a coup, but that was not its purpose.  Instead it provided a basis for regional 
democracies to speak and act with a degree of purpose and unity, and it appears that, 






Examples such as the IADC also show the utility of summits as proactive 
mechanisms that allow states to move from a problem-oriented, reactive mode to 
one of setting goals and aspirations.  While the IADC grew partly out of Peru’s 
experience with Fujimori, and in that sense interest in such a mechanism can be 
seen as a reaction, broader regional support for the IADC can be seen as a 
proactive move to create a framework for response and to create disincentives to 
future democratic disruptions.  Canada’s effort to create a mechanism for NGO 
accreditation within the OAS is another example of a proactive approach.  It was 
not a response to any crisis or any new demand on the part of NGOs.  Until 
Canada began pushing to formalize access, NGOs that had historically chosen to 
work with the OAS or to seek to influence its policies had found informal avenues 
and mechanisms to do so.
500
  Canada sought broader participation in OAS 
political bodies and regularized access to documentation, among other things, as a 
means of improving the system at a time when it had the luxury to do so, and it 
found an advantage in working through the summit process and its network of 
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 See Report on Juridical and Political Affairs, supra note 467, at 4–6; see also Org. of 
Am. States, Permanent Council, Nongovernmental Organizations With Which the 
Organization of American States Has Established Cooperative Relations, OAS Doc. 
CA/CAJP-962/94 (Sept. 1, 2004), available at http://www.civil-
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democracy groups, instead of working solely through the OAS itself, which had 
been historically resistant to an accreditation scheme.
501
 
Inter-American summits have also helped place the negotiation of 
prescriptive agreements in the broader context of regional values.  In the case of 
the FTAA, summit commitments called for attention to regional social concerns 
that would otherwise be anathema to a traditional trade negotiation.
502
  While 
many have argued against the FTAA, and indeed trade agreements in general, as a 
neo-colonial instrument that will benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor,
503
 
summit instruments have at least called for some effort to balance economic goals 
with social concerns, and they have lent support to those who would bring social 
concerns to the negotiating table.  Nascent efforts to open the FTAA negotiating 
process to non-state actors can also be traced to explicit commitments made 
through the summit process.
504
  While the current breakdown in FTAA 
negotiations reflects a deeper global policy dispute about the terms under which 
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 Recall that efforts at reform through internal processes had proceeded at a snail’s pace 
and produced a proposal that was more of a step backward than forward.  See supra notes 
465 to 468 and accompanying text. 
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 See supra notes 452 to 460 and accompanying text; see also Miami Plan of Action, 
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with environmental policies and concerns for workers’ rights). 
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multilateral trade accords will proceed,
505
 the summit process has offered a stage 
upon which the issues at the heart of the quarrel can be publicly contested, and it 
may eventually provide a vehicle to resolve contests that otherwise would have no 
forum. 
The inter-American summit process has also promoted international policy 
transparency more broadly, both through the access it provides to non-state actors 
seeking to monitor and influence the agenda and through the stage it sets for 
leaders to carry their policy messages to a broader audience.  The former is 
facilitated in part because the process has been open from the outset, and because 
non-state actors have found ways to engage delegations and promote their 
agendas.
506
  The latter is facilitated in part because summit commitments are 
negotiated with a view toward a broader audience and because language is less 
technical and more accessible.
507
  The effort to explain policy priorities through 
public international forums has the potential to be transformative.  At the least, it 
opens up opportunities to engage the public in new and potentially meaningful 
ways.  Government officials and civil society leaders recognize that audiences for 
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 FTAA negotiations became stalled—along with global WTO negotiations—over 
disputes about agricultural subsidies and industrial market access that appeared to defy 
compromise in the Doha round.  See So, What Next?, 12 BRIDGES, DEC. 2008–JAN. 2009, 
at 1, 1 (“WTO Director General Pascal Lamy told the [WTO] membership on 12 
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summits are members of their diverse societies, and they thus seek to make policy 
goals and principles transparent.  The downside, of course, is additional precatory 
language that is vague, aspirational, and unenforceable.  But this language, though 
broad and aspirational, can serve to clarify and reinforce “international society’s 
values”508 in a way that more technical treaties often cannot and these values are 
an important touchstone for norms that guide state behavior. 
Institutional theorists should recognize inter-American summits as a 
valuable tool of international law because summits rely heavily on cooperative 
models and institution building.
509
  In each of the cases described above, there is 
evidence that commitments of the inter-American summit process have resulted in 
administrative changes and institutional adaptations at the regional level.  
Summits may be viewed either as supporting existing institutions—they certainly 
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 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal Process, in Steven R. Ratner and 
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breathed new life into the OAS in the past decade—or as being institutions in 
their own right.  In either case, summits potentially have independent effects on 
behavior by changing the context of interaction, facilitating negotiation and 
implementation, reducing transaction costs,
510
 providing constituent-derived 
information, inserting expert actors, and facilitating the pooling of information. 
Inter-American summits have also constructed frameworks for 
institutional cooperation.  Some of these frameworks have been formalized 
through the OAS system, such as the Summit Implementation Review Group
511
 
and the Inter-American Working Group on Sustainable Development.
512
  Some 
cooperative frameworks remain informal and fluid.
513
  Summits serve to motivate 
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offset by the increased animation of a public that can help shape and implement policy. 
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 This is a group of inter-governmental organizations including OAS technical units 
concerned with sustainable development issues that was convened by the Head of the 
Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment (now the OAS Department of 
Sustainable Development).  See Org. of Am. States, Working Group on Sustainable 
Development, Work Schedule of the CEPCIDI Working Group on Sustainable 
Development, October/December 2006, OAS Doc. Ser.W/IV 
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and facilitate this cooperation and to clarify the cooperative agenda.  They also 
offer a mechanism for ratifying institutional advancements and arrangements that 
emerge through the cooperative process. 
Finally, inter-American summits provide a potentially important 
negotiating space for heads of state, and for their advisors and agencies in the 
process of negotiating summit agendas, which might create strong inter-personal 
relationships and networks.  These interactions may promote greater trust and 
affinity among participants because they are not crisis driven, and in most cases 
they do not involve high stakes. In this respect, the broader, more aspirational 
nature of summit commitments gives diplomats an opportunity to interact and 
work toward consensus on statements of principle and programs of cooperation.  
This forward-looking, relatively positive negotiation space might help build 
relationships among and even informal networks of officials who might serve to 
foster deeper collaborative efforts and to diffuse tensions and facilitate progress 
when crises arise. 
Conclusion 
The cases reviewed in this Article offer examples of state and non-state 
actors working in the inter-American system, and they demonstrate unique 
participatory aspects of the summit process that advance policy and normative 
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goals.  The cases suggest that inter-American summits have a discernable 
normative push, at least in part because they exhibit process features such as 
transparency, openness, and inclusive agenda setting that emphasize value 
formation and collaboration among state and non-state constituencies.  Inter-
American summits can be seen to serve a legitimizing and value-internalization 
function that is meaningful in international lawmaking, even when direct 
outcomes are not hard law.   
By pursuing democratic objectives within a process that itself has 
democratic features, inter-American summits have produced a mutually 
reinforcing phenomenon, increasing their own jurisgenerative potential even as 
they expand public access to the traditionally insular world of international 
decision making.  Given that the discourse of democracy has become increasingly 
important in the Western Hemisphere, if not globally, the importance of this 
phenomenon should not be discounted. 
The case studies from the inter-American region demonstrate that head of 
state summits can satisfy the democracy concerns that animate both access critics 
and access proponents.  Where summits include the type of process features that 
have become integral to the summit of the Americas system—open consultations, 
information sharing, cooperative dialogue, and government financial support—
they engage and build epistemic communities that are concerned with summit 
agenda items, such as the environment, health care, women’s rights, and the 





type do not represent a move toward a formal, electoral “new order,” but they do 
offer an open, transparent, and network-driven model of deliberative democracy.  
Yet the outcomes are not forced upon state leaders nor formulated behind their 
backs.  In every case, state officials are at the center of negotiations and heads of 
state and government sign final commitments.  Where necessary, state legislators 
still ratify or adopt outcomes that require changes in domestic law.   
Thus, despite greater openness and participation, states do not compromise 
fundamental claims about decision-making authority.  In fact, as the Peru and 
Canada case studies show, state leaders often initiate proposals that are developed 
and strengthened through the summit process in a way that might not otherwise be 
possible.  The process itself—which takes place within a supportive and 
reinforcing epistemic community—demonstrably advances state goals and 
outcomes, and the active participation of domestic constituencies helps to deepen 
commitment to the outcomes within those constituencies. 
The cases presented in this Article each deal with state objectives that call 
upon values that are widely shared by active communities of interest.  The 
specific policy objectives were thus amenable to progress with the full 
participation of non-state actors.  It is probable that other state goals that are less 
broadly shared would have less purchase in the kind of deliberative international 
process that summits can offer.  Yet even where a state goal is controversial, there 
is reason to believe that public access can support positive outcomes.  The FTAA 





outcomes even where deep controversy exists.  This Article assesses only an 
initial sample and additional work is needed to determine the extent to which 
issue variables would advance or impede successful outcomes in a deliberative 
international setting. 
The Article also samples a set of case studies within a regional system that 
itself has unique features.  All state participants in the inter-American summit 
process are nominal democracies, and while some key actors have demonstrated 
less-than-democratic tendencies, this formal feature might also lead to more 
positive outcomes for deliberative processes.  Certainly, the willingness of 
regional summit participants to pursue a democracy agenda, and to do so in a 
participatory manner, can be tied to their shared political traditions.  But it should 
be recalled that the position of access critics is that increased participation in an 
international setting threatens the democratic values of democratic states, so it is 
valid to test this claim within a community of democracies.  Certainly, as summits 
are studied for their broader potential as deliberative mechanisms, the variables of 
state political systems and regional political heterogeneity will need to be 
separately assessed. 
No claim is made that the inter-American summits are representative of all 
summits, or that their process features are universal; indeed, summits follow 
many forms and produce varied results.  But summits held in the Western 
Hemisphere do share many features in common with other summits, making them 





above, further research is needed to determine how far claims about normative 
push and legitimization may extend beyond the inter-American experience.  Even 
where summit processes are less open and transparent, as many regional models 
seem to be, the jurisgenerative potential of summits is a feature worth examining.  
While these issues are beyond the scope of this Article, the work presented herein 










Non-state actors have helped to advance the international climate regime 
since its inception.
515
   They breathed life into initial commitments in 1992, 
playing a “prominent role in galvanizing support” for the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that emerged from the Rio 
Conference.
516
   By one account of Rio, “the ratio of NGO participants to UN and 
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 This chapter was published as Eric Dannenmaier, The Role of Non-State Actors in 
Climate Compliance, in Jutta Brunnée, et al., eds., PROMOTING COMPLIANCE IN AN 
EVOLVING CLIMATE REGIME, 149-77 (Cambridge University Press) (2012).  Citations to 
the material in this chapter should be to that piece.  It is available for download from 
ssrn.com 
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major groups identified as stakeholders in Agenda 21 (business and industry non-
governmental organizations (BINGO); environmental non-governmental organizations 
(ENGO); indigenous peoples organizations (IPO); farmers non-governmental 
organizations (Farmers); local government and municipal authorities (LGMA); research 
and independent non-governmental organizations (RINGO); trade unions non-
governmental organizations (TUNGO); women and gender non-governmental 
organizations (Women and Gender); and youth non-governmental organizations 
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among these groups or individuals for purposes of access rights.  Although these 
distinctions may be relevant within a given institution, forum, or process, they are beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
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for Earth Summit +5, Special Session of the UN General Assembly to Review and 
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government officials was one to one.”517  Jessica Mathews has noted that “NGOs 
set the original goal of negotiating an agreement to control greenhouse gases long 
before governments were ready to do so, proposed most of its structure and 
content, and lobbied and mobilized public pressure to force through a pact that 
virtually no one else though possible before the talks began.”  Mathews argues 
that NGOs “penetrated deeply into official decision-making” at the 1992 
Conference.
518
  Non-state actors have been active demandeurs of negotiators ever 
since – supporting (and in some cases opposing) a robust climate regime.  They 
have even participated directly in negotiations, to a point.
519
  While this level of 
non-state participation is not universally acclaimed (indeed it is contested by 
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some states and scholars)
 520
 many states have welcomed and facilitated non-state 
access.  
Non-state actors have also been welcomed as observers of the compliance 
process as commitments to cooperative action and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
reductions emerged in 1998 at Kyoto and have continued to evolve in negotiations 
for a climate change framework beyond 2012.  Transparency has become a key 
feature of climate compliance.  As Jennifer Morgan notes in her contribution to 
this volume, “on a high level, all parties have agreed to a greater level of 
reporting, review and verification than ever before.”521  This commitment to 
openness is vital.  In addition to facilitating cooperative or enforcement 
interventions to resolve noncompliance, information access promotes broader 
public awareness of the climate change problem and informs debate about the 
effectiveness of measures designed to address that problem.  It also, not 
coincidentally, links constituents to the work of their state representatives and 
facilitates more articulate public demands for action (as noted above, these 
                                                 
520
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521
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Unfortunately, despite this level of non-state participation and 
transparency, compliance mechanisms emerging from climate change 
negotiations create very limited formal space for non-state actors in assuring 
international climate law compliance through direct action.  Non-state actors have 
created a space for themselves (with state acquiescence) in negotiations, and 
states have assured a degree of transparency with respect to both negotiating and 
implementing climate regimes constructed so far.  But failing to integrate non-
state actors into the principal mechanisms for climate law compliance misses an 
important opportunity.  This is not to say that greater non-state participation in 
compliance is an unalloyed good, nor to deny the importance of state-to-state 
procedures.  But it can be reasoned, consistent with the increasing weight of 
international authority, that non-state access to compliance actions has important 
intrinsic and instrumental value that is of particular relevance in the climate 
change context. 
This chapter highlights that value and documents progress to date in 
providing that access.  The chapter offers examples of non-state access to existing 
multilateral environmental agreements that have features which may be relevant 
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for the evolving climate change regime.  In order to emphasize the utility – and 
creativity – of non-state actors in advancing climate concerns through the 
compliance provisions of international regimes, the author also details a number 
of recent cases where NGOs have advanced climate change concerns before “non-
climate” institutions.  These cases not only illustrate the ability of non-state actors 
to promoting climate compliance (even where legal tools are not originally so 
designed or particularly well suited) but also provide models of how they might 
be engaged in post-2012 climate compliance institutions.  The author concludes 
that the positive impact of non-state participation in advancing climate change 
concerns is an important feature of the evolving climate regime, and recommends 
that negotiators embrace a even more substantive role for non-state actors in post-
2012 climate compliance mechanisms and institutions. 
Access as an Emerging International Norm 
Non-state access to the institutions and processes of international law 
serves both intrinsic and instrumental values.
523
  Public participation advances 
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concerns about democratic process and the legitimacy of international rules
524
 
even as it promotes the integration and acceptance of legal norms on a 
transboundary basis.
525
  It supports the construction of international legal 
frameworks that more closely fit social norms and promotes greater compliance 
with those frameworks once constructed.  Broader access also helps to assure that 
information responds to priority public concerns and that communication occurs 
bi-directionally.
526
  Participatory and democratic models rely not only on citizens 
knowing what the state is up to.  State leaders must know what their constituents 
value.  Non-state access to decision-making and compliance has particular 
salience within a framework such as climate where the policies and measures that 
will assure success must be embraced and implemented locally.   
As the Framework Convention on Climate Change was approved at the 
1992 Rio Summit, delegates also produced an action programme for the United 
                                                 
524
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Nations, known as Agenda 21, and a Declaration on Environment and 
Development (Rio Declaration).  Each document highlighted the commitment of 
states to critical principles for assuring long term sustainable development.  
Agenda 21 recognizes the importance of “national strategies, plans, policies and 
processes” and “international cooperation” in facing “the challenges of the next 
century” even as it encourages the “broadest public participation and the active 
involvement of non-governmental organizations and other groups.”527  Principle 
10 of the Rio Declaration goes further, acknowledging that “environmental issues 
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant 
level.”528  Using relatively prescriptive, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states: 
At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, 
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.  States shall 
facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
                                                 
527
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information widely available.  Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
529
 




1. Access to information; 
2. Access to the process of (or “participation in”) decision-making; 
and 
3. Access to justice. 
These principles are increasingly recognized in practice – particularly 
within multilateral environmental agreements.   
In 2002, the environmental research group Eco-Logic conducted a study 
of NGO participation in international environmental co-operation on behalf of the 
German Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt).
531
  The study 
included an examination of MEA practices as well as economic institutions and 
                                                 
529
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other international institutions and relied on interviews as well as an examination 
of institutional agreements.  It concluded that “all international institutions 
relevant to the environment – be it formal organisations or treaty systems – appear 
to have at their disposal some kind of NGO consultation.”532  In 2006, the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Aarhus Secretariat circulated a 
questionnaire among more than one hundred ‘international forums’ (defined 
broadly to include institutions, secretariats, commissions, etc.) in an effort to 
catalogue current approaches to public participation.
533
  Respondents included 
most of the major global institutions with environmental policy relevance as well 
as secretariats of global environmental conventions and a number of regional 
forums.  The questionnaire responses reveal widespread practices that emphasize 
access to information and procedures granting observer status to non-state actors.  
The questionnaire responses also show that several forums have committees or 
groups that place non-state actors in an advisory role to the forum – either directly 
or through a sort of joint committee which includes key state actors alongside 
non-state actors – variously called “global steering committee,”534 “organizing 
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partners,’535 and “advisory networks.”536  Responses also revealed “formalized 
compliance mechanisms that allow NGOs to present issues of compliance” to 
several bodies.
537
  In addition, the secretariat of the Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) reported 
“draft operating rules then being drawn up” to assure that the Committee could 
consider compliance information from the public.
538
   
The Aarhus Convention Secretariat itself has created a “Compliance 
Committee for the review of compliance by the Parties with their obligations 
under the Convention,”539 and established procedures whereby “communications 
may be brought before the Committee by one or more members of the public 
concerning that Party’s compliance with the convention.”540  The compliance 
committee is required to consider these communications, unless they are 
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anonymous or found to be abusive, unreasonable, or “inconsistent with the 
provisions” of the convention.541  The committee may hold hearings542 and gather 
information relating to the communication,
543
 and is directed to bring the 
communication “to the attention of the Party alleged to be in non-compliance,”544 
which must “submit to the Committee written explanations or statements 
clarifying the matter and describing any response that it may have made.”545 
Another regional MEA, the environmental side agreement to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
546
 established a relatively robust 
system that gives NGOs direct access to policymaking processes.  The side 
agreement also gives citizen groups and individuals within a state party that are 
concerned about their government’s enforcement of its environmental laws access 
to a petition procedure.
547
  One of the concerns driving the side agreement was the 
possibility that a party might weaken its domestic environmental enforcement as a 
means of encouraging the relocation of businesses to a legal system less likely to 
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enforce environmental laws seen as costly.
548
  In response to this concern, the side 
agreement invites submissions to the North American Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation
549
 “from any non-governmental organization or 
person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law 
…”550  The Commission Secretariat is tasked with reviewing submissions – a 
process which can include expert review, hearings, and requests for response from 
the parties – and issuing a report (a “factual record”) where it “considers that the 
submission, in the light of any response provided by the Party, warrants 
developing a factual record.”  Since the creation of the article 14/15 submission 
process in 1995, dozens of submissions have been filed and dozens of factual 
records have been prepared.
551
  Although the process has been criticized as having 
no real enforcement teeth,
552
 its published factual records, and even the 
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investigatory and response process, have had some positive effect on parties’ 
behaviour.
553
  The NAFTA environmental side agreement also created a “Joint 
Public Advisory Committee” (JPAC) comprised of five head of government 
appointees from each party which oversees the cooperative work plan of the 




These examples all show an emerging state practice, particularly within 
environmental agreements, to provide non-state actors with robust access to 
information, and to the process of decision-making (even if only as observers).  
There is also an emerging practice of granting justice – or redress – that allows 
non-state actors to be part of the compliance process.  The final model, emerging 
from the North American context, might be especially relevant to a future climate 
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regime because the emerging ‘bottom-up’ approach seems to contemplate reliance 
on a state’s own environmental laws to meet targets and assure cooperation.  
Allowing citizens to have access to a multilateral mechanism within which they 
might challenge their government’s compliance with or commitment to domestic 
climate policies and measures would complement this emerging bottom-up 
model.  
Climate Access Commitments to Date 
Information exchange and information access features are present in the 
1992 Framework Convention commitment to “[t]he full, open and prompt 
exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal 
information related to the climate system and climate change,”555 to “[e]ducation, 
training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the widest 
participation in this process, including that of non-governmental 
organizations,”556 and to “[c]ommunicate to the Conference of the Parties 
information related to Implementation.”557  Access is also implicit in the promise 
to establish a financial mechanism “within a transparent system of 
governance.”558   
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Information sharing and access are features of the 1998 Kyoto Protocol, 
which encourages domestic policies and measures to achieve emission reduction 
targets in part by committing parties to “take steps to share their experience and 
exchange information on such policies and measures, including developing ways 
of improving their comparability, transparency and effectiveness.”559  Kyoto 
parties also agree that “greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks associated with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and 
verifiable manner and reviewed” through “modalities and procedures” that ensure 
“transparency, efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and 
verification.”560  Kyoto parties commit to “[c]ooperate in and promote … 
education and training programmes … and facilitate at the national level public 
awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change.”561 
These commitments to transparency are laudable.  Yet they remain one-
dimensional.  There is no promise in the Framework Convention or the Kyoto 
Protocol to engage civil society in constructing the system of climate governance 
and only limited efforts to integrate the public into compliance measures.
562
  The 
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present regime has two branches intended to promote compliance: an 
Enforcement Branch and a Facilitative Branch.
563
  As their titles suggest, the 
Facilitative Branch is “responsible for providing advice and facilitation to Parties 
in implementing the Protocol, and for promoting compliance by Parties with their 
commitments,”564 while the Enforcement Branch confirms whether emission 
limitation or reduction commitments are met and whether GHG inventory 
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adjustments or accounting corrections need to be made.
565
  The Enforcement 
Branch is also responsible for “applying the consequences” of non-compliance566 
which can include remedial measures and a suspension from participation in the 
Protocol.
567
  In essence, while the compliance branches are called “enforcement” 
and “facilitative,” (implying both a “stick” and a “carrot” approach) the protocol’s 
primary enforcement sanction is to withhold facilitation (that is, the principal 
“stick” is no “carrot”).568    
These compliance mechanisms integrate non-state actors to only a limited 
extent.  NGOs cannot file complaints, initiate investigations, challenge 
compliance data they believe to be incomplete or inaccurate, or request 
compliance documentation beyond pro forma submissions.
569
  Instead, the Kyoto 
Protocol provides that “competent nongovernmental organizations” may submit 
“relevant factual and technical information” relating to “questions of 
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implementation” where a matter has already been commenced by a state party.570  
Non-state actors may also support monitoring and implementation of Emission 
Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDM)
571
 because the nature of these mechanisms relies on their partnership and 
participation.   
The ability to make submissions on pending questions of implementation 
is important; it is something akin to an amicus brief process that many 
international dispute procedures do not afford for non-state actors.  And the 
ability to participate in trading, JI, and CDM implementation is practical.  After 
all, non-state actors will often have a direct stake in funding or implementing 
these mechanisms.  But it is notable that non-state actors have no right to initiate 
procedures where states fail or refuse to implement Kyoto obligations
572
 – even 
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where those procedures are designed to be cooperative in nature.
573
  This means 
that NGOs and other private actors cannot raise questions about a state’s failure to 
adopt appropriate policies and measures for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction or 
a state’s failure to achieve reduction targets.  These are the dominant means and 
ends of the climate regime, yet the ability of citizens to actively police them is 
foreclosed.   
As negotiations to extend and expand the Kyoto commitments within the 
framework of the UNFCCC continue, states have highlighted information 
exchange among parties, but they have been less careful to reiterate a 
commitment to non-state information access.  The Copenhagen Accord, while 
failing to renew or strengthen emission reduction targets, does promise that the 
“delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries” that may be agreed 
to in the future “will be measured, reported and verified” under guidelines that, at 
the least, “will ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, 
                                                                                                                                     
including, among other things, the requirement that “In conducting review activities, the 
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the best interest of the Convention. The expert shall notify the secretariat of any known 
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been invited to participate.”  “Agreement for Review Services” at ¶2, available at 
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robust and transparent.”574  The Accord also calls for a “context” of 
“transparency” with respect to funding mechanisms for mitigation and 
adaptation.
575
  But Copenhagen says nothing specific about the participation of 
non-state actors in cooperative action and there is no opening for access to 
compliance and enforcement processes. 
Emerging Access Post-Kyoto 
To negotiate commitments beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s target year of 
2012, states established ad hoc working groups to further greenhouse gas targets 
of the Kyoto Protocol (the “Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol,” or AWG-KP) and to advance 
cooperative action (the “Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention,” or AWG-LCA).576  The proposals emerging from 
these two working groups at the 16
th
 Conference of the Parties (the 6
th
 Meeting of 
the Parties to Kyoto) in Cancun in 2010 show divergent approaches to non-state 
actor access.   
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The Non-State Role in Cooperative Action 
The AWG-LCA explicitly “[r]ecognize[d] the need to engage a broad 
range of stakeholders at global, regional, national and local levels, be they 
government, including subnational and local government, private business or civil 
society, including youth and persons with disability, and that gender equality and 
the effective participation of women and indigenous peoples are important for 
effective action on all aspects of climate change.”577  The LCA group also 
affirmed the importance of a “participatory and fully transparent approach,”578 
and invited views on engaging “[s]takeholders with relevant specialized 
expertise” in the development of the committee’s work programme.579  In the 
context of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), 
the LCA working group also asked that developing country parties ensure “the 
full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia, indigenous 
peoples and local communities,” in “developing and implementing their national 
                                                 
577
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strategies or action plans.”580  The LCA working group invited accredited 
observers to submit views on the development of market-based mechanisms to 
promote mitigation,
581
 and decided that meetings of the Transitional Committee 
created to design a new “Green Climate Fund” would be open to observers.582  
The working group also acknowledged the importance of coordinating technology 
development and transfer initiatives with non-state stakeholders and 
organizations,
583
 called upon a newly-created Technology Executive Committee 
to “seek input from civil society,”584 and “reaffirmed” that capacity-building 
should be “participatory.”585 
The Non-State Role in Compliance with Further Commitments 
In contrast to the acknowledgement of the role of non-state actors in 
cooperative measures by the LCA working group, the AWG-KP made not a 
single mention of non-state actors, stakeholders, non-governmental organizations, 
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 Id. at ¶72.  See also Id. at Annex I ¶2(c), (d) (guidelines for policy approaches to 
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and effective participation of relevant stakeholders”). 
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 Id. at ¶¶82, 86, 87. 
582
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civil society, relevant experts, or even accredited observers, in the formal 
document approved in Cancun.
586
  Notably, even the draft negotiating text of the 
AWG-KP – the revised proposal by the Chair that was presented in Cancun – 
makes no mention of non-state actors, stakeholders, non-governmental 
organizations, civil society, or observers (accredited or otherwise).  Bracketed 
provisions of the draft text’s chapter on land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) “[e]ncourages Parties to invite their land use, land-use change and 
forestry experts to apply for the UNFCCC roster of experts, with a view to 
increasing the number of land use, land-use change and forestry reviewers.”587  
This suggests that experts outside of formal governmental institutions may be 
invited to join the LULUCF roster, and they would certainly bring an outside 
perspective to the role.  But, as with the Expert Review Teams established to 
                                                 
586
 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, COP 16 / CMP 6, 29 
November - 10 December 2010, Draft decision [-/CMP.6] “Outcome of the work of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol at its fifteenth session,” Advance unedited version available at 
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2011). 
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review Annex I Party GHG inventories, the function of experts acting in their 
expert capacity is not to directly advance civil society or stakeholder concerns.
588
 
Climate Compliance through Non-Climate Mechanisms 
As negotiators continue to construct a post-2012 approach, they may wish 
to take note of climate-related compliance actions that have been pursued through 
other, “non-climate” channels – the use of compliance mechanisms within 
international forums and tribunals outside of the formal climate regime.  The 
examples below reveal both openness to non-state access and a remarkable degree 
of innovation by non-state actors in creating channels to address climate concerns.  
Examples include the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, UNESCO’s framework for 
                                                 
588
 Arguments have been made that the identity or affiliation of experts necessarily 
influences the advice that they give to a governmental body.  See, e.g., Yiorgos Vassalos, 
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service (such as the ERT rules discussed supra at note 572) coupled with the scientific 
and technical nature of the task and the balance of experts called upon in the climate 
change context likely go a long way to minimize individual biases.  At the very least, 





protecting World Heritage Sites, and the compliance mechanisms of human rights 
bodies.  These forums, though limited and still evolving, are being deployed to 
address at least some concerns relating to climate change and may serve as 
models for a mechanism for engaging non-state actors in climate compliance 
mechanisms. 
International Financial Institutions (energy financing) 
International financial institutions have substantial potential to affect GHG 
emissions and the creation and preservation of carbon sinks because they finance 
development projects throughout the world.  Financial institutions can encourage 
investments that reduce carbon footprints, and discourage, condition, or withhold 
financing for inefficient projects with a large carbon footprint such as timber and 
fossil fuel extraction.  They can leverage their investments even if they are only 
providing partial financing or seed money for a project and, unlike private 
financiers, their investments decisions are subject to direct oversight by public 
officials.  Unfortunately, the record of international financial institutions as a 
positive force for climate policy has been mixed.
589
  At the World Bank, for 
example, climate change is now seen as a development concern, climate impact 
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  Kirk Herbertson & David Hunter, Sustainable Energy: Emerging Standards for 
Sustainable Finance of the Energy Sector,7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4 (2007).; 
see also Benjamin J. Richardson, Reforming Climate Finance through Investment Codes 





must be considered as part of the Environmental Assessment process,
590
 and the 
bank has increased its renewable energy portfolio.
591
  But this has not resulted in a 
fundamental change in the bank’s lending portfolio, and it has done little to blunt 
criticism of the bank’s continuing support for fossil fuel projects, timber projects, 
and other carbon-regressive development.
592
    
As NGOs press for improvements in lending policies to address 
environmental concerns such as climate, the ability to of non-state actors to 
review, challenge, and dispute lending practices and priorities has become 
increasingly important.  And a dispute mechanism has been formed in response to 
this need.  In 1993, the bank established an Inspection Panel to consider NGO 
challenges to bank lending decisions.
593
  The Inspection Panel can review 
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   World Bank, Operational Policy 4.01, Environmental Assessment, (Jan. 1999) at ¶3 
note 5. 
591
   Xiaodong Wang, Legal and Policy Frameworks for Renewable Energy To Mitigate 
Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 17 (2007). 
592
   Steven Ferrey, The Failure of International Global Warming Regulation to Promote 
Needed Renewable Energy, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 67 (2010).; see also David 
Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and 
International Law, 15 HASTINGS J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 39 (2009).; see also Press Release, 
Bretton Woods Project, Briefing “Clean Energy Targets for the World Bank: Time for a 
Recount” (May 2010), available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/env/energytargets.pdf).; see also Matthew 
Berger, “Civil Society Calls on World Bank to Reform its Energy Lending Source: Inter 
Press Service (April 26, 2010). 
593
   World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) Resolution 
No. IBRD 93-10; International Development Association Resolution No. IDA 93-6 “The 





decisions of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and the International Development Association (IDA) upon receipt of a Request 
for Inspection from parties “in the territory of the borrower” claiming that “rights 
or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an action or omission 
of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies 
and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a 
project financed by the Bank.”594  Procedures can lead to an investigation, if 
approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors, and a report to Bank management.  
Management responds to reports with recommendations to bring a project into 
compliance with Bank policies and procedures, and these recommendations must 
be approved by the Board.
595
 
The Panel process has been used to address climate concerns.  In April of 
2010, a request for inspection was filed by local NGOs regarding a proposed 
$3.75 billion loan for construction of the 4800 Mega Watt coal-fired power plant 
by the utility company Eskom in the Midupi, South Africa (World Bank 
                                                                                                                                     
International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 553 (1994). 
594
   World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) Resolution 
No. IBRD 93-10; International Development Association Resolution No. IDA 93-6 “The 
World Bank Inspection Panel,” (Sep. 22, 1993). 
595





Inspection Panel Request, 2010).
596
 The affected parties cited concerns including 
health impacts, water demand and scarcity, cultural impacts, and involuntary 
resettlement as well as concern over the project’s impact on climate:  
The proposed loan will compromise the World Bank's 
commitments on climate change, and make it more difficult for 
South Africa to meet its own greenhouse gas reduction 
commitments.  Despite claims that the Medupi plant will use 
‘cleaner coal technology’ and will be ‘carbon capture and 
storage-ready,’ there is no certainty whether these measures will 
be sufficient to control the enormous amounts of pollutants.
597
   
The Inspection Panel recently concluded that the request meets eligibility 
requirements and has recommended an investigation.
598
  The Panel’s Chair 
explained that bank policy:  
[c]alls for the Bank to consider if the borrower’s system is 
designed to achieve, among other elements, the operational 
principle to “assess potential impacts of the proposed project on 
physical, biological, socio-economic and physical cultural 
resources, including transboundary and global concerns” … The 
Panel will be guided by this policy provision in assessing, for 
instance, issues relating to greenhouse gas emissions of the 
Project, and the potential mitigation actions contained in the 
Project to address these concerns.599 
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   World Bank Inspection Panel Request for Inspection of Eskom Investment Support 
Project (Project ID: P116410) (Apr. 6, 2010). 
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   World Bank Inspection Panel Report and Recommendation South Africa: Eskom 
Investment Support Project (IBRD Loan No. 78620) (INSP/R2010-0003) (June 28, 
2010). 
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   World Bank Inspection Panel Statement of Mr Roberto Lenton, Chairperson of the 
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The panel’s eligibility finding is encouraging even though the scope of 
review will be limited to assessing compliance with formal bank policies.  
Although the panel has no enforcement or sanctioning authority, its reporting 
function has at times led to decisions by the bank’s board to withdraw or withhold 
funding where bank policies are clearly not being followed.  The panel’s public 
reporting function also serves to raise awareness of compliance problems and one 
cannot discount the deterrent effect that a report can have on bank officials who 
might consider evading bank policies or borrower countries that might seek to 
ignore environmental policy constraints on their borrowing.   
In addition to World Bank’s inspection panel procedures, a number of 
regional development banks also have related processes.  The African 
Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) each offer some 
opportunity for non-state actors to raise concern about compliance with 
policies.
600
  It is not difficult to imagine the potential that such mechanisms might 
                                                                                                                                     
climate change related claims mentioned in the Request that do not raise issues of 
compliance under Bank policy, such as for example whether the Project meets the 
requirements of the Bank strategy document on “Development and Climate Change: A 
Strategic Framework for the World Bank Group.”  Id. 
600
 U.N. Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe, “Synthesis of 
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Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Working Group of the Parties Seventh 





hold in the context of climate compliance, or to understand the importance of 
these mechanisms as a model for public oversight of future climate commitments. 
International Economic Cooperation Institutions 
International Economic Cooperation Organizations
601
 are increasingly 
embracing the language of sustainability and some have even made modest 
commitments to environmental goals or created guidelines that call for greater 
attention to environmental – and climate – issues. 
The OECD, for example, has issued “Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises” that offer voluntary recommendations for governments and 
                                                                                                                                     
International Forums, U.N. Doc ECE/MP.PP/WG.1/2007/L.2 (Feb. 16 2007) at p. 7 ¶21. 
(hereinafter “UNECE Aarhus Secretariat Questionnaire Response Synthesis”). 
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   Examples include the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) a forum for seven 
members from Central Asia Treaty of Izmir, Mar. 12, 1977, available at 
http://www.ecosecretariat.org/; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) a forum for 
21 Pacific Rim countries Canberra Ministerial Statement, “First APEC Ministerial 
Meeting. Canberra, Australia, Joint Statement” (November 1989) at 6-7.; Latin American 
Economic System, (SELA), a forum for 27 Latin American and Caribbean States Panama 
Convention (Convenio de Panamá Constitutivo del Sistema Económico 
Latinoamericano) (SELA) (Oct. 17, 1975) available at 
http://216.122.62.22/attach/258/default/T023600000397-0-
Convenio_de_Panama_(enero_2006).pdf; and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), a forum for 32 members from various regions 
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Dec. 14, 






multinational enterprises “operating in or from adhering countries.”602  The 
Guidelines call for enterprises to focus on issues of environmental management 
and performance, and to operate with some degree of transparency.  Enterprises 
are called upon to “assess, and address in decision-making, the foreseeable 
environmental, health, and safety-related impacts associated with the processes, 
goods and services of the enterprise over their full life cycle,”603 and more 
generally to “minimize aspects of their activity that may have negative impacts on 
the environment.”604 
The OECD has also established a complaint process that non-state actors 
can use where they believe that the guidelines have been ignored, and the process 
has been used at least once in the climate context.  In 2007, Germanwatch filed a 
complaint against Germany-based Volkswagen alleging that Volkswagen was 
representative of a transport sector “responsible for 20 to 28 per cent of 
worldwide CO2 emissions”
605
 and that the company had pursued technology and a 
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 Press Release, OECD, “Environment and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises Corporate Tools and Approaches,” (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/1/34992954.pdf. 
605
 Germanwatch Complaint Against Volkswagen AG Under the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (2000) – Request to the German National Contact Point 





market strategy destined to increase emissions from its products.  The NGO 
alleged fifteen violations of OECD Guidelines,
606








and the responsibility of industry to “contribute to the development of 
environmentally meaningful and economically efficient public policy.”610  
Germanwatch asked that the National Contact Point for Germany
611
 undertake 
public mediation proceedings aimed at bringing Volkswagen into compliance 
with OECD Guidelines. 
An initial assessment by the National Contact Point for Germany “found 
that the company had not violated the Guidelines”612 and thus Germanwatch did 
                                                                                                                                     
Solution of Conflicts and Problems in the Implementation of the Guidelines (May 7, 
2007), available at www.germanwatch.org/corp/vw-besch-e.pdf.  
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   Press Release, OECD, “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Specific Instances 











 “The National Contact Point (NCP) is a government office responsible for 
encouraging observance of the Guidelines in a national context and for ensuring that the 
Guidelines are well known and understood by the national business community and by 
other interested parties.”  (OECD 2010) 
612
  OECD “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Specific Instances Considered by 






not get the public mediation they had sought.  But the complaint did call attention 
to business practices of one of the chief actors in the automobile industry and 
advanced the case that corporate decisions have climate impacts.  As with the 
World Bank inspection panel, the OECD compliant process offers a window into 
how non-state actors might find a point of entry for compliance with future 
climate agreements. 
Human Rights Bodies 
Human rights institutions offer several mechanisms for non-state actors to 
initiate and participate in compliance proceedings that may also serve as useful 
models in the climate context.  NGOs can initiate petitions to human rights bodies 
to consider individual cases or broader human rights policy concerns, they can 
offer evidence where tribunals and special experts are considering compliance 
matters, and they can file “shadow reports” to supplement or challenge state self-
reporting that is filed periodically with human rights bodies. 
One prominent recent example of a climate-based human rights claim is 
the petition by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now the Circumpolar 
Council)
613
 to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
614
 in 2005 
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alleging that the United States has made a “major and disproportionate 
contribution to [the] transboundary environmental impacts of climate change
615
 
and that the US government “has violated its international responsibility for 
preventing activities within its jurisdiction from damaging the environment 
outside its borders [and failed] to take effective action to minimize these impacts 
….”616  The Commission declined to take the case and issued no formal opinion 
on the merits.  Instead, the Commission sent a letter to counsel for the 
Circumpolar Conference, in November of 2006, informing them that “it will not 
be possible to process your petition at present because the information it contains 
does not satisfy” the Commission’s rules “or other applicable instruments.”  The 
letter continued, “Specifically, the information provided [in the petition] does not 
enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a 
violation of rights protected by the American Declaration [of the Rights and 
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Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United 
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Duties of Man].”617  The Inuit petition thus appears to have been rejected without 
prejudice.  The Circumpolar Conference representatives did not directly appeal 
this decision or seek to re-file.  Instead, they requested a hearing “on the 
relationship between global warming and human rights,”618 and the Commission 
responded by inviting them to attend its “127th ordinary period of sessions” to 
“address matters relating to Global Warming and Human Rights.”619  The Inuit 
petitioners and counsel offered statements.
620
  To date, no findings or report has 
been published by the Commission on the basis of that hearing.
621
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Not long after the Inter-American Commission declined to proceed with 
the Inuit petition, in November 2007, the Republic of the Maldives hosted a 
meeting of representatives of small island developing states to explore the linkage 
between human rights and climate.  The Maldives has been an active proponent of 
international action on climate, and was a chief protagonist, along with other 
members of the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), in raising concerns 
over climate change in international forums, and in promoting the adoption of the 
UNFCCC at the Rio Summit.  Participants in the November meeting adopted the 
“Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change,” which 
called for progress on a post-Kyoto agreement at the next Conference of the 
Parties scheduled for Bali, and also called for “The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] to conduct a detailed study into 
the effects of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights … prior to the 
tenth session of the Human Rights Council.”622  At the next Council session, in 
March 2008, the Council adopted a resolution offered by the Maldives requesting 
that the OHCHR conduct “a detailed analytical study on the relationship between 
climate change and human rights,”623 and the OHCHR completed the study and 
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issued a report in January 2009.
624
  The OHCHR Report details the potential 
impact of climate change on specific human rights and describes the unique risks 







 as well as the potential impact of displacement caused by 
climate effects.
628
  Although the OHCHR Report declines to determine whether 
climate effects “[c]an be qualified as human rights violations in a strict legal 
sense, and stops short of finding that states have any particular responsibility to 
formulate development, energy, or transportations policies in any way that would 
be redressable under existing human rights instruments,
629
 the fact that the 
OHCHR would respond to a broad based public petition (NGOs joined by small 
island states – which were represented in part by NGOs) with a detailed and 
substantive study and report is telling. 
World Heritage Sites 
Under the Convention Concerning the Protection of The World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage non-state actors are able to petition the United Nations 
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Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to consider the 
state of World Heritage Sites that are threatened.
630
  In 2005, a series of NGO 
petitions to UNESCO sought to have World Heritage Sites included on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger because of the effects of climate change.
631
  The 
petitions addressed the need to adapt to climate impacts anticipated at these 
important cultural and natural sites and the need to mitigate GHG emissions as a 
continuing threat to the sites. 
When UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee (WHC) met in the summer 
of 2005, it took note of these petitions and the potential impact of climate change 
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  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
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  Petitions were filed concerning Sagarmatha National Park (Nepal), Huascaran 
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Durban, South Africa, “Decisions of the 29th Session of the World Heritage Committee 
(Durban, 2005)” (UN Doc. WHC-05/29.COM/22) at 36-37, Decision 29 COM 7B.a 
“Examination of the State of Conservation of World Heritage Properties: State of 
Conservation Reports of Properties Inscribed on the World Heritage List” (July 10-17, 
2005) [hereinafter UNESCO WHC 2005].  A later petition was filed concerning the 
Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park (Canada and the United States).  UNESCO 
World Heritage Committee Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, “Decisions Adopted at 
the 30th Session of the World Heritage Committee (Vilnius, 2006)” (UN Doc WHC-
06/30.COM/19) at 7-8, Decision 30 COM 7.1 “Issues Related to the State of 
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on World Heritage Sites.
632
  The Committee also asked the World Heritage Centre 
to work with interested states parties and petitioners to establish an expert 
working group to “a) review the nature and scale of the risks posed to World 
Heritage properties arising specifically from climate change; and b) jointly 
develop a strategy to assist States Parties to implement appropriate management 
responses.”633  The working group was charged with preparing a joint report on 
“Predicting and managing the effects of climate change on World Heritage” for 
review by the Committee.
634
  The Committee also “encouraged” states parties to 
“highlight the threats posed by climate change to natural and cultural heritage,” 
and “start identifying the properties under most serious threats,” so that 
management actions could be taken, and it “encourage[ed] UNESCO to do its 
utmost to ensure that the results about climate change affecting World Heritage 
properties reach the public at large, in order to mobilize political support for 
activities against climate change.”635 
These steps may seem limited, but they served, at least, to call climate 
change to the attention of those concerned with culturally and ecologically 
important sites.  The move also got the attention of the United States 
administration, which had been active at the time in shutting down, or at least 
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avoiding, climate mitigation and adaptation commitments internationally and 
domestically.  The US joined the World Heritage Committee in late 2005 and 
began working to oppose a strong response to the petitions.
636
  The US issued a 
position paper questioning climate science, opposing the listing of a site as being 
“in danger” without the consent of the state in which it is located, and arguing that 
“There is no compelling argument for the Committee to address the issue of 
global climate change-- especially at the risk of losing the unified spirit and 
camaraderie that has become synonymous with World Heritage.”637 
At its next meeting in the summer of 2006, the World Heritage Committee 
stepped back from strong commitments to work on climate mitigation and did not 
link state energy and climate policies to effects on World Heritage Sites.  Instead, 
it requested that the World Heritage Centre “prepare a policy document on the 
impacts of climate change on World Heritage properties” to be discussed at the 
next meeting of States Parties in 2007.
638
  The Committee asked specifically that 
the document address “legal questions on the role of the World Heritage 
Convention with regard to suitable responses to Climate Change” and “alternative 
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http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/intl/unescoglacier/2006Mar15/. 
637
  US Position Paper, Position of the United States of America on Climate Change with 
Respect to the World Heritage Convention and World Heritage Sites, (2006) available at 
www.elaw.org/system/files/u.s.climate.US+position+paper.doc. 
638





mechanisms, other than the List of World Heritage in Danger, to address concerns 
of international implication, such as climatic change.”639 
 The policy statement on “legal questions” prepared at the 
Committee’s behest contains no elaboration of states parties’ obligations to pursue 
energy and climate policies and measures in order to protect World Heritage 
Sites.
640
   In a sense, this missed an opportunity to make the link implicit in NGO 
petitions to the Committee and to clarify to the Convention’s original call for 
parties “to ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the protection, 
conservation and presentation of the cultural and natural heritage situated on its 
territory.”641   The policy statement asserts only that: 
In the context of climate change, this provision will be the basis 
for States to ensure that they are doing all that they can “to the 
utmost of their resources, which they may be able to obtain” to 
address the causes and impacts of climate change, in relation to 
the potential and identified effects of climate change (and other 
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threats) on World Heritage properties situated on their 
territories.
642
   
The policy statement does clarify that climate effects should be considered 
“serious and specific dangers” to World Heritage sites under Article 11 (4) of the 
Convention even though the article “does not specifically refer to climate 
change.”643   
The World Heritage Committee endorsed the policy statement and 
authorized work on changes to its Operational Guidelines to reflect the link 
between climate and threats to World Heritage Sites.
644
  Those changes were later 
adopted by the Committee.
645
  The Committee also asked the “World Heritage 
Centre and the Advisory Bodies to develop in consultation with States Parties 
criteria for the inclusion of those properties which are most threatened by climate 
change on the List of World Heritage in Danger.
646
  Again, this example of a non-
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state actor petition process leading to investigation and reform by 
intergovernmental bodies can serve as a model for institutions designed 
specifically to deal with climate. 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
In 2009, a Canada-based NGO, the Action Group on Erosion Technology 
and Concentration (ETC Group), submitted a letter to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) Bureau alleging that Germany had breached CBD 
decisions on ocean fertilization.
647
  The fertilization experiment had apparently 
been conducted by Germany’s Ministry of Science over the objection of the 
German Minister of Environment and following a “detailed discussion in the 
German Government as well as in the German Parliament.”648  The experiment 
was conducted outside of coastal areas in contravention of a CBD Conference of 
the Parties decision.
649
  The Bureau Executive Director reported that it had no 
procedural jurisdiction to address an “issue of implementation of COP decisions” 
and the Bureau concluded that “the responsibility to implement COP decision lay 
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with the Parties at the national level.”650  While the Bureau directed the chair to 
send a letter to Germany expressing its “concerns,” it also decided that any direct 




This case offers an example of an international environmental secretariat 
responding to an NGO’s compliance concern despite the lack of a formal process 
for non-state access to the compliance process.  It resulted in little more than a 
letter of concern to the party alleged to be out of compliance, but this was because 
the Bureau determined it was without jurisdiction – not because the complaining 
NGO was found to be without standing.  While this level of response is entirely 
within the discretion of the international body – discretion unlikely to be 
exercised where a lack of interest, an over-crowded docket the objection of a state 
party serve to impede
652
 – the case illustrates a relatively benign procedure that 
can have a positive impact on compliance matters.  Absent the NGO letter, the 
matter may not have reached the CBD Bureau in the first place.   
Domestic Institutions  
 Non-state actors have also had success in litigating climate issues 
in domestic forums under domestic law.  These cases, or their corollaries, might 
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have a strong influence on encouraging a state to comply with international norms 
even where the basis for the claim is grounded in domestic law.  In 2006, for 
example, a US environmental group sued to compel the US Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) to 
conduct environmental impact assessments under the US National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) where lending and financing decisions supported fossil fuel 
exploration and extraction projects.  The court in Friends of the Earth v 
Mosbacher, 
653
 held that that the procedures sought by FOE should not be seen as 
an “extraterritorial application of NEPA” because the decisions by the agencies 
“purportedly significantly affect the domestic environment.”654  The case was 
later settled by an incoming Obama administration, which agreed that the 
agencies would conduct NEPA analysis, before it could proceed further,
655
 but the 
case serves as an example of the utility of domestic institutions in addressing 
international environmental norms that have been embraced at the national level.  
Climate commitments that are effected by means of national legislation could be 
similarly enforced by non-state actors through domestic tribunals. 
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Given the potential importance of domestic enforcement, a post-Kyoto 
climate regime might look to mechanisms to encourage access to local tribunals 
through redress provisions or through cooperative support for citizen suits. 
Conclusion 
Much has been made of the promise of transparency in recent climate 
commitments, and for good reason.  The breakthrough on monitoring, reporting, 
and verification negotiated in Copenhagen and cemented in Cancun is a critical 
means to help assure the integrity of any continuing climate commitments and has 
appropriately been celebrated as strengthening the regime that remains under 
construction.  But transparency is only one step in service of meaningful 
compliance.  Where monitoring and reporting identify performance failures, the 
ability of interested parties to pursue compliance responses or regime adjustment 
strengthens regime effectiveness. 
Developments in the climate change regime from Rio in 1992 through 
Cancun in 2010 show that international climate law is being constructed in a 
manner that engages non-state actors and recognizes the importance of openness 
to critical constituencies.  But it also constrains the non-state role in important 
respects.  Building a legal regime that offers information access but limits or 
denies access to compliance and enforcement mechanisms relegates important 
constituencies to the role of relatively passive recipients of data rather than 





Non-state actors are proven enforcers – sometimes more effective than 
states.  The climate cases brought by non-state actors to non-climate institutions 
demonstrate this point.  Leaving the public without standing to push for 
compliance within any formal mechanisms misses a critical opportunity to 
promote compliance.  And the mechanisms for non-state access to compliance are 
already modelled within multilateral environmental agreements ranging from 
Aarhus to NAFTA. 
 
 
